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This thesis addresses the question of how conventions and other instruments regulating 
court jurisdiction should deal with court proceedings relating to arbitration. It argues 
that the conventional approach of excluding court proceedings related to arbitration 
entirely from the scope of the jurisdiction instrument cannot be justified with reference 
to any international arbitration convention. It continues to argue that the exclusion of 
arbitration causes or exacerbates significant problems at the interface between the 
courts and arbitration, taking the European Union’s recent experience as an example. 
It then argues that the European legislature has recently directly considered the 
exclusion of arbitration from its jurisdictional instruments and failed to act effectively. 
Any amendments to this system will necessarily be offered within the relevant legal 
context, so an assessment of the prevailing principles in European international private 
law and international commercial arbitration will follow. Furthermore, the ongoing 
debate surrounding the delocalisation of arbitration and its relevance to the debate 
about the interface between court jurisdiction and arbitration shall be addressed. 
Finally, this thesis proposes a model for inclusion of arbitration in the European 
jurisdiction instrument (the Brussels I Regulation) that would, it is argued, solve or 
ameliorate the problems at the interface between the Regulation and arbitration, whilst 
broadly aligning with the prevailing principles in the relevant legal context. The thesis 
then considers whether this approach could be extended beyond Europe to the world 
at large, concluding that it could not. 
This work therefore takes an original approach to a topic of much contemporary 
controversy, by taking a holistic, rounded, and reasoned view of the problems at the 
interface between court jurisdiction and arbitration. It also contains original insights 
into several other areas, including the historical justification for the exclusion of 
arbitration from jurisdiction conventions, the importance of mutual trust as a founding 
principle of the common market, the relevance of the delocalisation debate to the topic, 






In international legal disputes, controversy often arises over which country’s courts 
should take practical authority (jurisdiction) to hear and decide cases. Because of this, 
many international laws have been created to regulate which country’s courts can take 
jurisdiction over what kinds of dispute. This process has developed furthest within the 
European Union, because clear rules as to how a dispute can be resolved are important 
to encourage trade in the single market. 
Arbitration is a method of resolving legal disputes privately, without going to court. It 
can be thought of as effectively an agreement to submit the dispute to a private judge 
or judges, and to abide by their decision. Arbitration relies on the support of national 
courts, especially to provide compulsive force to the decisions (awards) of arbitrators, 
but also to ensure that the process remains fair and that unwilling parties participate in 
arbitration. 
Arbitration is a very popular method of resolving international legal disputes, 
especially because most countries in the world have agreed by treaty to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate and arbitration awards.  
Disputes can arise as to which courts should have practical authority to provide support 
to or supervise any given arbitration. The jurisdiction laws referred to above however 
do not address the appropriate approach to these questions, having excluded court 
proceedings related to arbitration from their scope of application.  
This thesis asks whether this is an appropriate approach for jurisdiction laws to take. 
It concludes that it is not; that the exclusion of arbitration from jurisdiction laws was 
never justified, and has caused or exacerbated significant problems; and that court 
proceedings related to arbitration could and should be included in jurisdiction laws at 
least within the European Union in a way that resolves practical problems and aligns 
with the principles and goals of both the law of jurisdiction and the law of international 
arbitration. There is less pressing need for reform beyond the European Union because 




solutions could be reached because the lack of a trust-based single market could 
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This thesis is concerned with the interface between jurisdiction instruments and 
arbitration. Several points must be made in introduction, including defining the scope 
of the inquiry into the topic and some of the key terms and concepts that will be 
referred to throughout.  
A. The scope of inquiry into the topic 
The title of this thesis prefers jurisdiction ‘instruments’ to jurisdiction ‘conventions’ 
because the European law of jurisdiction, which finds its origins in conventions, is 
now in large part regulated by EU legislation in the form of the Brussels Regulations. 
The title therefore encompasses both the legislative jurisdiction rules of the modern 
EU and the jurisdiction rules of the old EEC and Hague Conference, contained in 
conventions.  
‘Jurisdiction’ in the title means not only jurisdiction in the classical sense – a court’s 
authority to hear and decide a dispute – but also in the sense of one court’s decision to 
recognise and/or enforce the judgments of a foreign court, sometimes referred to as 
‘indirect jurisdiction’, because it concerns the enforcing court’s decision whether or 
not to recognise the jurisdiction of the issuing court. These concepts will be considered 
in more detail below. 
‘Arbitration’ in the sense of this thesis is limited to genuine international commercial 
(i.e. business to business) arbitration. Domestic arbitrations are excluded, as are 
arbitrations concerning any subject matter over which arbitration law or the European 
law of jurisdiction tends to recognise the need for a protective jurisdiction, such as 
consumer or employment contracts. Insurance contracts will also be excluded, except 
insofar as the Brussels Regime allows parties to enter into a valid pre-dispute choice-
of-court agreement, it being argued that such insurance contracts are in fact true 
commercial contracts and thus not in need of rules of protective jurisdiction. It equally 
does not concern non-commercial international arbitration, such as state-state or 




Finally, as the title suggests, the investigation and findings of the work are not intended 
to be limited to the European law of jurisdiction. As, however, the Brussels Regime 
has provided over a period of more than fifty years the best example of a successful, 
multinational set of jurisdictional rules, analysis of the European experience – the 
successes, failings, and future of its relationship with arbitration – will form the 
backbone of this thesis. This is not intended to take away from the implications of the 
work for the allocation of jurisdiction amongst non-European states, but to add to them 
by way of empirical example. 
B. Terminology and definitions 
(1) The Brussels Regime 
As mentioned above, this thesis will rely heavily on an analysis of the European 
example provided by the Brussels Regime. The Brussels Regime itself requires a short 
introduction and explanation.  
‘The Brussels Regime’ is used as a collective term for the European jurisdictional 
instruments. These instruments are the Brussels Convention,1 the Brussels I 
Regulation,2 Brussels I Recast,3 Brussels II bis Regulation,4 and the Lugano 
Conventions.5 This thesis will concentrate on the former three. This is because the 
Brussels II bis Regulation concerns family law and is not relevant to the scope of 
inquiry of this thesis, whilst the Lugano Conventions have a similar scope to the 
Brussels Convention and Regulations, are virtually identical in substance,6 but are also 
open to accession by European Free Trade Association (‘EFTA’) Member States. 
                                                 
1 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 27 September 1968, 1262 UNTS 153 (‘Brussels Convention’). 
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [2000] OJ L 12/1 (‘Brussels I Regulation’). 
3 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(recast) [2012] OJ L 351/1 (‘Brussels I Recast’). 
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility [2003] OJ L 388/1 (‘Brussels II bis Regulation’). 
5 Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters 1659 UNTS 202; and its successor: Convention of 21 December 2007 on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 2007 OJ L 339/3 
(‘Lugano Convention 2007’).  




Cases concerning the Brussels Convention and Regulations seem to come before the 
Court of Justice far more frequently than Lugano cases.7 
(2) Jurisdiction 
As stated above, ‘jurisdiction’ can refer to both jurisdiction in the classical sense – the 
practical authority of a court to resolve a given dispute – and recognition and/or 
enforcement of judgments. This entails the obvious possibility of confusion, so this 
thesis will from time to time use a set of terms summarised and explained by Ralf 
Michaels in a 2006 article to enhance ease and clarity of expression.8 The phrase ‘direct 
jurisdiction’ refers to jurisdiction in the classical sense, also sometimes referred to as 
‘judicial jurisdiction’ or ‘adjudicatory jurisdiction’.9 ‘Indirect jurisdiction’ in turn 
refers to a court’s decision whether or not to recognise the jurisdiction of the foreign 
court that rendered a judgment by granting recognition and/or enforcement.10 For the 
most part this thesis will refer simply to ‘jurisdiction’ for direct jurisdiction and 
‘recognition and/or enforcement’ for indirect jurisdiction. It will occasionally, 
however, be convenient or necessary to use these terms for ease or clarity, hence their 
introduction here. 
Some other conceptions are relevant and useful to the discussion in this thesis. He 
distinguishes between ‘single’ and ‘double’ conventions. The former kind of 
convention regulates one of direct or indirect jurisdiction; the latter, both. As such, the 
Hague 1971 Convention is an example of a single convention;11 the Brussels Regime 
provides examples of double conventions.12  
                                                 
7 This is perhaps because the original Lugano Convention did not allow for reference to the Court of 
Justice. The Lugano Convention 2007 does, but only by the courts of an EU member state. See Protocol 
2, Arts 1 and 2 Lugano Convention 2007; G Maher and BJ Rodger, Civil Jurisdiction in the Scottish 
Courts (2010) (‘Maher and Rodger’), para 2-16. 
8 R Michaels, ‘Some Fundamental Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgment Conventions’ in 
E Gottschalk, R Michaels et al (Eds), Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World (2006) (“Michaels, 
‘Jurisdictional Conceptions’”). 
9 Ibid, II (2). See also AT von Mehren, ‘Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: Some General Theories Compared 
and Evaluated’ (1983) 63(2) BUL Rev 279, 282-285.  
10 Michaels, ‘Jurisdictional Conceptions’, II (2). 
11 Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in civil and commercial 
matters, 1 February 1971, 1144 UNTS 249 (‘Hague Convention 1971’). 




The final relevant conception distinguishes between ‘required’, ‘permitted’, and 
‘excluded’ bases of jurisdiction. Both direct and indirect jurisdiction can be allocated 
on any of these bases. Required direct jurisdiction means the court addressed must take 
jurisdiction over a dispute; permitted direct jurisdiction means the court may do so; 
and excluded direct jurisdiction means the court must decline jurisdiction. Similarly, 
required indirect jurisdiction means the court asked for recognition and enforcement 
of a foreign judgment must recognise and enforce that judgment; permitted indirect 
jurisdiction means that the court may recognise and enforce the judgment; and 
excluded indirect jurisdiction means that the court must refuse recognition and 
enforcement.13 Together, these conceptions and terms explained by Michaels are a 
significant aid to accurate, concise discussion of jurisdiction conventions.  
(3) Arbitration 
Arbitration is a non-judicial dispute resolution process whereby parties to a dispute 
agree to submit their dispute to an independent tribunal for final and binding 
resolution.14 This thesis is concerned with international commercial arbitration as 
opposed to domestic, investor-state,15 or inter-state arbitration,16 though examples 
from these fields may be used illustratively.  
There is no international consensus as to the distinction between international and 
domestic arbitration, with some laws making reference only to the nationality or 
residence of the parties, others considering the subject matter in dispute, still others 
considering the choice of the parties, and others some combination of the above 
standards.17 The precise distinction is not particularly important for this thesis, because 
                                                 
13 Ibid, II (1). 
14 See generally SM Kröll, JDM Lew and LA Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial 
Arbitration (2003), ch 1; N Blackaby et al, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, (5th edn, 
2009) (‘Redfern and Hunter’), ch 1. 
15 Disputes between states and nationals of another state, where both states are contracting states to the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 
March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (‘ICSID Convention’).  
16 Disputes to which both parties are states, such as those regularly settled at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (‘PCA’) in The Hague amongst other places. See Redfern and Hunter, above, 64-67. 
17 See, for example; Art 1 (3) UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, 
as amended in 2006 (‘UNCITRAL Model Law 2006’):  
‘An arbitration is international if: 
(a) the parties to an arbitration agreement have, at the time of the conclusion of that agreement, 




any provisions of jurisdiction conventions concerning arbitration will apply only in 
those cases where an arbitration is subject to court proceedings or enforcement 
proceedings in a member state other than that in which it takes place, which will 
automatically provide the requisite international element for the rules of the 
jurisdiction convention to become applicable. 
Arbitration as an area of law has its own sizeable vocabulary, some of which will now 
be introduced. This will include the concepts of the seat of an arbitration, the place of 
an arbitration, the lex arbitri, the lex loci arbitri, and set aside. Each of these ideas will 
play a role throughout this thesis (and especially in chapter 7), and an understanding 
of their meanings is therefore essential. 
In any given arbitration there may be several different laws applicable to different 
elements of the process. These include: the law applicable to the capacity of the parties 
to enter into an arbitration agreement; the law applicable to the arbitration agreement; 
the law applicable to the arbitration or arbitral process itself; the law applicable to the 
substance of the dispute; and the law applicable to the recognition and enforcement of 
                                                 
(b) one of the following places is situated outside the State in which the parties have their places 
of business: 
(i) the place of arbitration if determined in, or pursuant to, the arbitration agreement; 
(ii) any place where a substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is 
to be performed or the place with which this subject-matter of the dispute is most 
closely connected; or 
(c) the parties have expressly agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to 
more than one country’;  
US law, 9 US Code § 202: ‘ 
An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between citizens of the 
United States shall be deemed not to fall under the [New York] Convention unless that relationship 
involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other 
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.’;  
s 85 Arbitration Act 1996 (yet to be brought into force):  
‘(2) For this purpose a ‘domestic arbitration agreement’ means an arbitration agreement to which 
none of the parties is—(a)an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, a state other 
than the United Kingdom, or (b)a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central control 
and management is exercised in, a state other than the United Kingdom, 
and under which the seat of the arbitration (if the seat has been designated or determined) is in the 
United Kingdom.’;  
Art 1504 Code de procédure civile, ‘An arbitration is international when international trade interests are 
at stake’;  
Art 176 (I) (1) Private International Law Act 1987 (Switzerland): ‘The provisions of this chapter shall 
apply to all arbitrations if the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in Switzerland and if, at the time of the 
conclusion of the arbitration agreement, at least one of the parties had neither its domicile nor its habitual 
residence in Switzerland’; 




the award.18 Of these, the most relevant to this thesis is the law applicable to the 
arbitration itself, though there remains controversy over other applicable laws to the 
extent that they have not been effectively harmonised by the New York Convention19 
or are not understood to be subject to the agreement of the parties.20 
The law applicable to the arbitration itself, often referred to as the lex arbitri, plays 
various supporting and supervisory roles in the arbitral process. This law is the 
arbitration law (not domestic court procedural or substantive law) of the ‘seat’ of the 
arbitration21 and often functions like a specialised lex fori.22 The seat can be thought 
of as the domicile or juridical centre of the arbitration,23 and is most often (but not 
always) the place where the arbitration actually takes place (lex loci arbitri).24  
The losing party in an arbitration will often not comply voluntarily with the award, 
which will thus need to be taken to a national court in an action for recognition and 
enforcement to gain compulsive force. The losing party may resist enforcement on a 
                                                 
18 See: Redfern and Hunter, above, para 3.07; A Belohlavek, ‘Importance of the Seat of Arbitration in 
International Commercial Arbitration: Delocalization and Denationalization of Arbitration as an 
Outdated Myth’ (2013) 31(2) ASA Bull 262, 264. 
19 For harmonised minimum standards for recognition and enforcement of the award, see generally Art 
V. For the law applicable to the capacity of the parties, and for the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, see Art V (1) (a), all of which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
20 It is well understood that the parties to an arbitration are entitled to select the law applicable to the 
substance of their dispute. Without wishing to labour the point, see for example: Art 28 UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, as amended in 2006; s 46 Arbitration Act 
1996 (England and Wales); Art 187 Private International Law Act 1987 (Switzerland); Art 21 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration (2012) (‘ICC Rules’); Art 22.3 London Court 
of International Arbitration Rules (2014) (‘LCIA Rules’). 
21 G Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 2014) (‘Born’), 1246. 
22 See Born, above, 1247. 
23 Born, above, 1246. 
24 The New York Convention effectively provides at Art V (1) (a), (d), and (e) that the parties are free 
to agree on a seat of arbitration, but that failing such agreement the seat will be the place where the 
hearings take place (see Born, above, 1247). It is therefore possible that the parties will choose a place 
for the arbitration that is mutually convenient, but subject that arbitration to a different supervisory law. 
So for example, German and French parties may choose to hold arbitral hearings in Luxembourg, but 
provide in their agreement that the law of England should govern the arbitration. In this case, England 
would be the seat of the arbitration and the Arbitration Act 1996 the lex arbitri. Equally, it is quite 
foreseeable in the modern world that parties will agree to arbitration without specifying a seat and that 
hearings will be conducted in multiple countries or even entirely by videoconferencing. In such a case 
there is no clear seat and the parties are unlikely to agree to a seat after a dispute has arisen between 
them. Such cases are generally provided for by allowing an arbitral institution or the arbitral tribunal 
itself to determine the seat, or providing that the court seised in respect of the arbitration will determine 
the seat (cf Art 176 (3) Private International Law Act 1987 (Switzerland); s 3 Arbitration Act 1996 
(England and Wales); Art 20 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, 




number of grounds under the New York Convention. Where the losing party feels an 
award is tainted, for example by a breach of due process in the arbitration, he may 
proactively seek to have the award ‘set aside’ (‘vacated’, ‘nullified’, or ‘annulled’) by 
the courts at the seat of the arbitration, in preference to resisting recognition and 
enforcement wherever the successful party seeks it. This is a process whereby the 
competent court declares the award to be of no legal force, and forms a discretionary 
basis for refusal of recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention.25 
There is much controversy surrounding the proper role of the seat and the effect that 
can and should be given to set-aside judgments handed down at the seat of arbitration. 
This controversy, and its relevance to this thesis, shall be discussed in detail in Chapter 
7. 
C. Introduction to the topic and research questions 
This thesis is concerned with the interface between jurisdiction conventions and 
arbitration. As stated above, the thesis will largely focus on the European example 
provided by the Brussels Regime.  
The Brussels I instruments regulate both direct and indirect jurisdiction as between 
European Union member states. Their scope extends to civil and commercial matters, 
subject to a list of exceptions.26 Arbitration is, and always has been, one of those 
exceptions.27 This represents a conscious legislative decision not to regulate court 
jurisdiction over matters relating to arbitration in the Brussels I instruments. Equally, 
jurisdiction over matters relating to arbitration has not been allocated under another, 
specialised agreement or piece of European legislation.  
This thesis proposes to investigate the topic with the following structure and answering 
the following research questions.  
Chapter 2 of this thesis will investigate the history of the arbitration exclusion from 
both the Brussels Regime and similar global jurisdiction conventions. The following 
                                                 
25 Art V (1) (e).  
26 See Art 1 of each instrument of the Brussels Regime.  




research questions will be addressed. Why was arbitration excluded from the Brussels 
Convention in the first place? How does arbitration compare to other excluded subject 
matters? Why has arbitration continued to be excluded? Was the justification for the 
exclusion of arbitration ever strong? If so, does it remain strong today? And is there 
some conceptual difference between arbitration and other civil and commercial matters 
that means arbitration simply does not fit within jurisdiction conventions such as 
these? This section will conclude that there never was a convincing justification for 
the exclusion of arbitration from jurisdiction conventions and that that absence of 
justification persists in the present day. 
The logical next step is for chapter 3 to investigate the effects of the arbitration 
exclusion within Europe. This is because, even absent rational justification, if the 
exclusion has had no, or only de minimis, negative effects, there would be no 
compelling reason to question it or call for change. This section will seek to answer 
the research questions: what problems has the exclusion of arbitration caused or 
exacerbated, and could these problems be rectified by the inclusion of arbitration? It 
shall conclude that the exclusion of arbitration has caused or exacerbated significant 
problems that could have been avoided by some form of European jurisdictional rules 
on court proceedings related to arbitration. 
Chapter 4 will consider the process of recasting the Brussels I Regulation, which was 
completed in late 2012. The relevant research questions to be addressed will be: what 
arbitration-related proposals were made during the recasting process, both officially 
and in the literature? What approach was ultimately taken and why? What are the likely 
consequences of this approach? Does the Recast address the problems outlined in the 
previous chapter? It shall be concluded that the Recast makes little-to-no substantive 
change, and that it fails to address the problems at the interface between the Brussels 
Regime and arbitration. This chapter, together with chapter 3, will indirectly serve the 
function of a literature review of the Brussels Regime’s relationship with arbitration. 
After concluding that the exclusion of arbitration could productively and should be at 
least partially deleted, this thesis will turn its attention to the question of how to go 
about that deletion effectively. Before proposing a model for deletion, the thesis will 




exercise as a proposal for reform will be more likely to meet with acceptance if it not 
only addresses extant problems, but also accords well with contemporary thinking in 
the relevant fields. The first of those fields, to be considered in chapter 5, is European 
international private law, as a subset of European Union law more generally. This 
chapter will ask what principles currently underlie the European law of jurisdiction 
and how these principles can be ranked against one another, if at all. This section will 
conclude that mutual trust has become perhaps the single most important guiding 
principle in European international private law, and perhaps European Union law 
itself, whilst also emphasising the importance of legal certainty and party autonomy in 
international private law. 
The thesis will then set out the legal context in international commercial arbitration. 
Chapter 6 will consider the aims of and principles underlying the quasi-constitutional 
New York Convention, again seeking to rank these principles against one another.28 
Chapter 7 will investigate where a proposal to include arbitration in the Brussels 
Regime sits with the longstanding and ongoing debate on the delocalisation of 
international commercial arbitration. These sections shall conclude that arbitration can 
be included in the Brussels Regime in a fashion by and large consistent with the New 
York Convention and with delocalisation as it exists in the contemporary world. 
With this theoretical groundwork laid, this thesis will then move on in chapter 8 to 
propose a system of partial integration of arbitration in the Brussels Regime that 
addresses existing problems in a fashion consistent with the ideals and principles of 
the contemporary legal framework. The research questions addressed in chapter 8 will 
include: what a scheme for the partial inclusion of arbitration in the Brussels 
Regulation would look like; how this scheme would apply compared to the current 
regime in various scenarios in practice; how the proposal is placed within its legal 
context; and whether any fatal objection can be raised to the proposal advanced. This 
chapter will then ask whether the European example holds any lessons for the rest of 
the world when it comes time once again to consider civil and commercial court 
jurisdiction on a global scale. It shall ultimately be concluded that Europe is more 
                                                 
28 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 




fertile ground for the creation of jurisdictional rules concerning court proceedings 
related to arbitration, especially because of the principle of mutual trust and the 
ongoing push for European integration. Without mutual trust, many of the proposals 
advanced in this thesis would be impaired or entirely obstructed in their operation. The 
proposal of this thesis must therefore be limited to Europe for the time being. 
D. Original contribution to knowledge 
This thesis read as a whole is intended to make a contribution to knowledge, thereby 
satisfying the requirements for the award of a doctoral degree. The contribution is the 
holistic approach to the question of the appropriate relationship between jurisdiction 
conventions and arbitration, bringing together the strands of modern thought in 
European international private law, international commercial arbitration, and the 
practical experience of the European Union with the arbitration exclusion. Other 
literature in this field tends to be article-length and concentrate one of these threads, 
or several in scant detail, rather than taking a truly broad approach. 
It is also intended that this thesis will be peppered with original insights into several 
of the areas it covers. These original insights are intended to lie in: the detailed analysis 
of the history of the arbitration exclusion from the Brussels Regime and Hague 
instruments; the identification of mutual trust as a fundamentally important tenet of 
European international private law and European Union law more generally; a unique 
and extensive engagement with the ongoing delocalisation debate in the context of this 
topic; the proposal and justification of a novel scheme of inclusion of court 
proceedings related to arbitration in jurisdiction conventions; and the thesis’s outward-






2. THE HISTORY OF THE ARBITRATION EXCLUSION 
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome is in the following terms: 
‘Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other 
with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals… 
…the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of judgements [sic] of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.’29  
Thus, in setting out its goals for the original six European Economic Community 
(‘EEC’) members, the Treaty of Rome mentioned recognition and enforcement of state 
court and tribunal judgments and of arbitral awards in the same sentence. This points 
to a certain proximity between the two in the drafters’ minds, as if the recognition and 
enforcement of commercial judgments and arbitral awards are somehow interrelated. 
Indeed, there were a number of bilateral and trilateral conventions between EEC 
member states that covered both the recognition and enforcement of civil and 
commercial judgments and arbitral awards, concluded both before and after the Treaty 
of Rome.30 If this was indeed the thinking of the legislators, however, the linkage did 
not survive for long; only the recognition and enforcement of judgments has ever been 
regulated at a European level.  
In the European Union, the recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial 
judgments is governed by the Brussels Regime, which also governs court jurisdiction. 
The recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is governed by external treaties, 
including most notably the global New York Convention, but also the European 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.31 The former tends to be the 
                                                 
29 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 294 UNTS 3 (‘Treaty of 
Rome’). Emphasis added. 
30 Convention between Belgium and France on Jurisdiction and the Validity and Enforcement of 
Judgments, Arbitration Awards and Authentic Instruments, Paris, 8 July 1899; Convention between 
Belgium and the Netherlands on Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy, and the Validity and Enforcement of 
Judgments, Arbitration Awards and Authentic Instruments, Brussels, 28 March 1925; Convention 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Belgium on the Mutual Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments, Arbitration Awards and Authentic Instruments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Bonn, 30 June 1958; Treaty between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on 
Jurisdiction, Bankruptcy, and the Validity and Enforcement of Judgments, Arbitration Awards and 
Authentic Instruments, Brussels, 24 November 1961. 





more commonly used and discussed, especially because of its virtually universal level 
of subscription, though the latter remains relevant in some contexts.32  
The deliberately separate treatment of civil and commercial judgments and arbitration 
awards is demonstrated by the fact that every instrument of the Brussels Regime 
expressly excludes arbitration from its scope. Indeed, the Brussels Convention even 
repeals several bilateral and multilateral agreements on the recognition and 
enforcement of both judgments and arbitral awards.33 When attempts have been made 
to create jurisdiction conventions on a global scale at the Hague Conference, these too 
have either largely ignored or completely excluded arbitration.  
This chapter explores why the drafters of these jurisdiction conventions and 
instruments would choose to exclude arbitration as a subject. It will first look into the 
drafting history of the relevant instruments to discover that the principal justification 
for the exclusion of arbitration is the existence of other conventions, most notably the 
New York Convention, which deal with the same subject matter. After examining the 
reasoning of this justification, this thesis will ask whether it remains, or ever was, 
convincing. It shall be argued that there is only a very limited substantive overlap 
between a court jurisdiction convention and the conventions on the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, meaning that the justification as traditionally and 
repeatedly presented does not hold. Furthermore, in the European context, the lack of 
overlap in membership between the Brussels Convention and relevant arbitration 
conventions at the time of drafting undermines the justification still further. The 
chapter will then examine the subsequent treatment of other excluded subjects from 
the scope of the Brussels Regime. This evaluation will conclude that bespoke 
jurisdictional rules have been created for all other expressly excluded matters, 
suggesting the reason for their exclusion was not simply that the subjects were 
                                                 
32 The New York Convention has, at time of writing, 154 parties from all over the world. See the UN 
Treaties website, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
1&chapter=22&lang=en (last accessed: 21 April 2015). The European Convention has 31 parties, 
mostly States wholly or partly in the continent of Europe, though with some other curious additions 
such as Burkina Faso and Cuba. 18 of the 28 EU member states are also signatories of the European 
convention. See the UN Treaties website, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
2&chapter=22&lang=en (last accessed: 21 April 2015). 




incompatible with the creation of jurisdictional rules. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
create bespoke jurisdictional rules within jurisdiction conventions: not every included 
matter has to fit neatly within general rules. This chapter will conclude that there is no 
good reason for the exclusion of arbitration from jurisdictional instruments.  
A. The treatment of arbitration and the reasons given 
This section shall investigate the treatment of arbitration by each of the Brussels 
Convention and Hague Conventions and the reasons given for that treatment in the 
official reports and commentary. The exclusion from the Brussels Regime will be 
examined first, followed by the relationship between judgments and arbitration in the 
Hague Convention 1971, and then in which way arbitration was intended to be handled 
in the Draft Hague Convention 2000.34 
(1) The Brussels Regime 
Arbitration has been excluded from the Brussels Regime since its inception in the 
1960s. The wording of the exclusion has remained consistent: ‘The Regulation shall 
not apply to… arbitration.’35 This wording is obviously very general. The exact 
intention behind it is unclear from the wording and, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, judicial interpretation has therefore been required to define its precise 
meaning.  
So why was the exclusion drafted in the first place? In order to understand the 
exclusion completely, it is relevant first to consider the legal context in which the 
Brussels Convention was concluded in 1968.  
More than a decade previously, the Treaty of Rome was concluded in March 1957 and 
entered into force on 1 January 1958. As mentioned above, the Treaty of Rome called 
                                                 
34 Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, Hague Conference Enforcement of Judgments Prel Doc No 11 of August 2000 (‘2000 Draft 
Hague Convention’). The negotiations towards the conclusion of this convention broke down, and 
eventually gave rise to the much more limited Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 30 June 
2005 (‘Hague Choice of Court Convention’). 
35 This wording is included in Art 1 (4) of the Brussels Convention, Art 1 (2) (d) of the Brussels I 




on its signatories to simplify the process for the recognition and enforcement of both 
judgments and arbitral awards. 
Also in 1958, the New York Convention was concluded, coming into force in 1959. 
The Convention was subscribed by five of the six then EEC Member States.36 The 
Convention’s full title, ‘Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards’, gives a misleading impression of the Convention’s scope. Although 
principally concerned with the recognition and enforcement of awards, the Convention 
also contains provisions on the validity of arbitration agreements and states that a court 
seised of a matter in respect of which the parties have concluded an arbitration 
agreement should refer the parties to arbitration.37 This is effectively a jurisdictional 
rule requiring the court to decline jurisdiction. So although the New York Convention 
is principally concerned with the indirect jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals (that is, the 
recognition of their jurisdiction by courts in the form of the enforcement of their 
awards), it also contains some provision on the direct jurisdiction of both arbitral 
tribunals and courts.38 Furthermore, Art V (1) (e) contains the rule that an arbitral 
award may be refused recognition and enforcement when it has been set aside where 
rendered, effectively permitting, and some would argue requiring, the recognition of 
foreign set-aside judgments. These are important factors to bear in mind when 
considering the context in which arbitration was excluded from the Brussels 
Convention a decade later, and will be discussed in more detail below. 
In 1961, 16 European states concluded the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, which came into force in stages between 1964 and 1965. 
Obviously not all of the 16 signatories were then EEC member states, and only four of 
the six then EEC members subscribed to the Convention.39 As will be discussed in 
more detail below, Art VI of the European Convention addresses court jurisdiction in 
                                                 
36 Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands were all signatories to the New York 
Convention, though not all would ratify it before the 1980s. Italy would accede only in 1969. See 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
1&chapter=22&lang=en (last accessed 21 April 2015). 
37 Art II (3) New York Convention. 
38 See above, Chapter 1.B.2. 
39 Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy subscribed; Luxembourg did not but later would; and the 
Netherlands never has. See 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-




slightly more detailed terms than Art II of the New York Convention, while Art IX 
provides more detail on which set-aside judgments may be accorded recognition by 
contracting states.40 Again, the fact that this treaty was available for accession at the 
time of the conclusion of the Brussels Convention should be borne in mind in assessing 
the justification for the exclusion of arbitration. 
In 1966, the Council of Europe concluded the European Uniform Law Convention, 
with the aim of harmonising arbitration law within Europe.41 The Convention was 
signed only by Austria and Belgium and only ratified by the latter, therefore failing to 
achieve the required three ratifications to enter into force.42 It would however have 
been impossible to know in the late 1960s how successful or unsuccessful this 
endeavour would ultimately prove, so the European Uniform Law Convention would 
have been taken into consideration by the drafters of the Brussels Convention. This is 
stated expressly in the Jenard Report, which is the official report on the Brussels 
Convention.43 It makes sense that the potential success of this Convention would 
influence the thinking of the negotiators of the Brussels Convention, given it contained 
rules on the definition and validity of arbitration agreements, which if unified could 
have a significant effect in improving international consistency in the referral of 
disputes to arbitration.44 This would in turn significantly reduce the perceived need to 
harmonise rules on the jurisdiction of courts over the question of the validity of an 
arbitration agreement, because all courts would be more likely to reach the same 
conclusion.  
It was in this context that the 1968 Brussels Convention was negotiated. The Treaty of 
Rome at Art 220 had set the EEC member states the goal of simplifying the process of 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards. Since then, two 
major conventions – one European, one worldwide – had been negotiated to simplify 
                                                 
40 See below, Ch 2.B.1. 
41 European Convention providing a Uniform Law on Commercial Arbitration, 20 January 1966, 1966 
COETS 2 (‘European Uniform Law Convention’). 
42 Art 11 (2) European Uniform Law Convention; 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=056&CM=4&DF=&CL=ENG (last 
accessed: 21 April 2015). 
43 P Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968 [1979] OJ C 59/1 (‘Jenard Report’), 13. 




the process of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Each of these 
conventions also contained some provisions affecting both the direct and indirect 
jurisdiction of national courts, as did a further European convention, through its efforts 
to harmonise arbitration law on the domestic level. The Brussels Convention was to 
address direct and indirect jurisdiction of national courts over civil and commercial 
matters. It may therefore have seemed completely logical to exclude court proceedings 
concerning arbitration from the scope of the Brussels Convention.45 
This is certainly the most often repeated justification for the exclusion of arbitration 
from the Brussels Convention. It is mentioned by the drafters, in official reports, 
literature, and case law. 
Perhaps the most authoritative explanation for the exclusion can be found in the 
writings of Georges Droz. Droz was the General Secretary at the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, and therefore heavily involved in the drafting of a 
multitude of international private law conventions. He contributed to the drafting of 
both the Brussels Convention and the Hague Convention 1971. Droz wrote both a 
commentary and a longer treatise on the Brussels Convention, and was described by 
Pierre Bellet as follows: ‘he oversaw the preliminary efforts that led to the creation of 
the [Brussels] Convention. He knows its origins, and its implications and nobody could 
be considered more qualified to comment on its provisions.’46 His information 
therefore comes from the inside of the drafting process and should be given weight.  
That said, Droz’s commentary on the Brussels Convention contains only one short and 
slightly informative paragraph on the arbitration exclusion at Art 1 (4): 
‘The Convention expressly excludes arbitration, which is the subject of several special 
conventions. The rules of the treaty do not apply to the jurisdiction of courts in disputes 
                                                 
45 It is assumed that the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and indirect jurisdiction over arbitral awards is 
excluded from a judgments convention by definition: an arbitral tribunal is not a court and an arbitral 
award is not a judgment. 
46 ‘…il a, depuis le premier jour, assisté aux travaux qui ont mené à la conclusion de la Convention du 
27 septembre 1968. Il en sait les origines et les implications et peu de personnes étaient aussi qualifiées 
que lui pour en commenter les dispositions’. P Bellet, ‘Préface’, in G Droz, Pratique de la Convention 
de Bruxelles du 27 Septembre 1968 (1973) (‘Droz, Pratique’), v. Translation of this and any quote from 
this work is by the author, with the able and necessary assistance of Mlle Évodie Fleury, for which she 




relating to arbitration, nor to the recognition or enforcement of court decisions relating 
to arbitration’.47 
This language hints that the reason for the arbitration exclusion is the existence of other 
‘special conventions’ concerning arbitration. Droz does not go in to any detail as to 
which conventions he means, but the New York, European, and European Uniform 
Law Conventions are the most obvious and likely.48  
Droz’s lengthier treatise on the Brussels Convention treats the arbitration exclusion in 
slightly more detail, but again fails to provide a full explanation of the reason or 
reasons for the exclusion. He begins by pointing out the obvious: that the jurisdiction 
of arbitral tribunals and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards are by 
definition excluded from judgment conventions.49 This is self-evident, but is worth 
repeating because it helps to define the scope of the exclusion more accurately: if not 
meant to exclude the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, it must be intended to exclude court proceedings 
relating to arbitration. This clearer understanding of the scope of the exclusion is in 
turn helpful in determining and analysing the reasons for that exclusion. 
Droz goes on to explain that the negotiators of the Brussels Convention ‘wished once 
and for all to remove any notion of enforcing court decisions relating to arbitration, 
such as for example a set-aside action,’ even though arbitration is expressly mentioned 
in Art 220 Treaty of Rome.50 He continues: ‘[t]he reason for the exclusion of 
                                                 
47 ‘La Convention exclut expressément la matière de l’arbitrage qui fait l’objet de plusieurs conventions 
spéciales. Les règles du Traité ne s’appliquent donc pas à la compétence des tribunaux judicaires pour 
les contestations relatives à l’arbitrage ni à la reconnaissance ou l’exécution des décisions relative à 
un arbitrage’. Droz, Pratique¸ 12 (emphasis added). 
48 There had also been, in the early 1900s, bilateral arbitration conventions concluded between the 
United States and France on the one hand, and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other. 
See: JE Noyes, ‘William Howard Taft and the Taft Arbitration Treaties’ (2011) 56 Vill L Rev 535. These 
treaties are little remembered nowadays and likely were not part of the collective legal consciousness 
in the 1960s, but it is possible that Droz had in mind the possibility of similar, smaller arbitration 
conventions when he referred to ‘several special conventions’. At any rate, as will be discussed below, 
this is not how the references have come to be popularly interpreted. See also the conventions listed at 
Art 55 Brussels Convention. 
49 G Droz, Compétence Judicaire et Effets des Jugements Dans le Marché Commun (1972) (“Droz, 
Compétence”), 37. Translations from this work are by the author, with the assistance of Mlle Évodie 
Fleury. 
50 ‘…ils ont voulu, par une disposition formelle, éliminer toute tentative de reconnaissance ou 
d’exécution de décisions judicaiires statuant sur des contestations relatives à l’arbitrage, comme par 




arbitration… has to do with the large number of international agreements that now deal 
with the issue’.51 
Again, the existence of other arbitration Conventions – including the New York and 
European Conventions – is given as the express justification for the exclusion of 
arbitration from the Brussels Convention.52 Once again, however, the reasoning 
underlying this justification is left unexplained. Droz’s writing does not explain what 
substantive overlap or conflict was envisaged, what problems this might cause, or why 
complete exclusion was thought more appropriate than bespoke rules. 
Droz does, however, add an afterthought to the ‘other conventions’ justification in the 
form of an additional paragraph 49 bis. He writes that ‘determining the scope of a 
treaty is a very delicate question,’ and that ‘too wide a scope, whether geographical or 
material, could harm the chances of solutions [to difficult issues in negotiations]’.53 
Presumably he means that at the negotiation stage, the broader the scope of the treaty, 
the more problems will need to be solved to create a satisfactory draft and the more 
scope for disagreement there will be. There may be something telling in Droz’s 
decision to include this addendum in the section of his treatise dealing with arbitration. 
If so, it suggests that Droz did not necessarily believe that it was essential to exclude 
arbitration from the scope of the Brussels Convention. It suggests, rather, that he 
believed a convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments 
could conceivably have included court proceedings relating to arbitration, but that it 
would have been too difficult to negotiate a satisfactory regime, whether because of 
the complexity of the subject or difficulty in securing the agreement of all negotiating 
parties. Arbitration may simply have been excluded as a matter of expediency. The 
                                                 
51 ‘La raison pour l’exclusion de l’arbitrage… tient aux nombreux accords internationaux qui règlant 
aujourd’hui la matière’. Ibid, 38. 
52 Droz also lists the predecessors to the New York Convention, the Geneva Convention and Protocol 
of 1927 and 1923, which, although repealed by the New York Convention, remained in force between 
France and Italy at the time of conclusion of the Brussels Convention. Ibid. 
53 ‘La détermination du champ d’application d’un traité est une question fort délicate... Nul doute qu’un 





plausibility of this conclusion is reinforced by the Jenard Report, which gives very 
similar reasons for the exclusion of other matters from the convention.54 
It may also be emphasised here that the EEC lacked power to legislate in this area, it 
being part of what would come to be known as the ‘third pillar of the EU’ of co-
operation in justice and home affairs, so progress was reliant on the conclusion of 
conventions between the member states with only policy input from the EEC 
institutions.55 Agreement is not always easily reached, and the exclusion of arbitration 
may therefore arguably be explained by practical considerations and difficulty 
reaching consensus amongst the EEC founding members. If this is true, however, it 
could have been freely stated in the official reports, as it is in respect of other 
exclusions. That would have allowed a far more open consideration of reform in future 
instruments. But the justification offered for the exclusion of arbitration was always 
that other conventions covered the matter, so it is this justification that is being 
questioned here. 
The lack of detailed explanation from inside the drafting process of the rationale 
underlying the decision to exclude arbitration and this expression of reservation by 
Droz become particularly important when it is considered that the Brussels 
Convention’s arbitration exclusion has set a precedent that has been followed without 
being significantly questioned in future conventions. Furthermore, the proffered 
justification that arbitration should be excluded from jurisdiction conventions because 
of overlap with special conventions has survived and prevailed in legal memory.  
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giving the EU legislative power over some matters relating to justice and home affairs, hence the 




Tracking the development of the justification offered for the exclusion through time, 
it is worth remembering its shaky foundations. 
The Jenard Report explains the exclusion in the following terms: 
‘There are already many international agreements on arbitration. Arbitration is, of 
course, referred to in Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the Council of 
Europe has prepared a European Convention providing a uniform law on arbitration, 
and this will probably be accompanied by a Protocol which will facilitate the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to an even greater extent than the New 
York Convention. This is why it seemed preferable to exclude arbitration.’56 
This explanation is illuminating in that it adds specific examples of the international 
agreements referred to: the New York Convention and the European Uniform Law 
Convention. That these Conventions were considered is hardly surprising, though the 
emphasis placed on the latter is informative. As will be shown below, this emphasis 
shifts over time after the failure of the European Uniform Law Convention. 
Future official reports on the Brussels Regime would offer the same explanation for 
the exclusion of arbitration. The Evrigenis-Kerameus Report in 1986 cited the 
‘existence of numerous multilateral international agreements in this area’ as the 
explanation for the arbitration exclusion.57  
The 2007 Heidelberg Report goes into more detail, and gives a slightly different 
explanation to its predecessors: 
‘Article 1 (2) (d) [Brussels I Regulation] comprehensively excludes arbitration from 
the scope of European procedural law. Historically, this exclusion is explained by the 
relationship between the ‘Brussels regime’ and the [New York Convention]. When the 
[Brussels Convention] was negotiated in the 1960s, there was a large consensus that 
the recognition of arbitral agreements and awards worked efficiently under the 1958 
New York Convention and, accordingly, arbitration should not be addressed by the 
European instrument. In addition to this, the European Council [sic] was elaborating a 
parallel instrument on arbitration at that time which finally proved to be 
unsuccessful.’58 
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This explanation shifts the emphasis to the New York Convention, when it had been 
placed more firmly on the Council of Europe’s European Uniform Law Convention in 
the earlier Jenard Report. This is likely explained by the failure of the latter and the 
success of the former, which by then was widely in force and had taken on quasi-
constitutional significance in the world of international commercial arbitration. It 
makes sense that modern authors would look to the more significant convention in the 
modern world to underpin the justification, but it should be remembered that this is a 
slight distortion of the original reasoning, which always cited various international 
agreements.  
The focus on the New York Convention however is central in most other modern 
references to the reason for the arbitration exclusion. The Court of Justice59 in its 1991 
Marc Rich judgment cites the passage of the Jenard Report quoted above, before 
discussing the relationship between the Brussels and New York Conventions.60 The 
court was in that case ruling on the scope of the exclusion, and looked to the reason 
for the exclusion to help define that scope. Paragraph 18 of the judgment reads, in 
relevant part: 
‘The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York 
Convention […] lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators 
themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for example, 
to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards.’ 
The court uses this analysis of overlap to justify the reading of the exclusion to cover 
all court proceedings relating to arbitration. Again, the focus has shifted from several 
international agreements to the New York Convention. This makes sense in a world 
                                                 
– the European Union institution composed of the heads of government of each member state – is 
erroneous. The Convention was prepared by the Council of Europe, an institution separate to and with 
wider membership than the EU, which is best known as the protector of European human rights through 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
59 The ‘European Court of Justice’, often abbreviated to ‘ECJ’, was renamed the ‘Court of Justice of the 
European Union’, often abbreviated to ‘CJEU’ with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 
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where the New York Convention is the principal arbitration convention, because it 
extends the relevance of the justification to the present day.  
The justification has survived in this form in literature, which routinely cites the Jenard 
Report and often emphasises the New York Convention as the primary justification 
for the exclusion of arbitration.61 Sources frequently erroneously conflate the 
European Uniform Law Convention and the European Convention in doing so.62 The 
European Convention cannot possibly, however, be the convention referred to in the 
Jenard Report.63 The frequency of references to the New York Convention, combined 
with the complete misunderstanding of the European instrument referred to in the 
Jenard Report, demonstrates the extent to which the New York Convention is treated 
as the primary justification for the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Convention. 
There can be seen, therefore, a development in the generally proffered justification for 
the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Regime over time. At all times, the 
existence of other, special arbitration conventions is put forward as justification for the 
exclusion. The early references to these other conventions are usually not specific, and 
when they are, mention the New York Convention and especially emphasise the 
Council of Europe’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to harmonise arbitration law 
across Europe. Moving forward in time, the ‘other conventions’ justification has 
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remained the most commonly repeated, but the emphasis has shifted firmly to the New 
York Convention. The Council of Europe’s European Uniform Law Convention has 
been forgotten to the extent that it has routinely been confused with the European 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. It will be important to remember 
this shift in the emphasis of the justification when it comes to analysing the validity of 
that justification. 
(2) The Hague Convention 1971 
Though a contemporary of the Brussels Convention, the Hague Convention 1971 deals 
with arbitration somewhat differently. It does not list arbitration amongst its excluded 
subject matters, which include, like the Brussels Convention, matters of status and 
capacity, family law, bankruptcy, succession, and social security,64 as well as questions 
of damage or injury in nuclear matters.65 
In fact, the Hague Convention 1971 mentions arbitration expressly in its provisions. 
Before considering this provision, it is worth noting that this Convention applies only 
to indirect jurisdiction, i.e. the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This 
may have played into the drafting, and would certainly change the considerations about 
overlaps with arbitration conventions. The provision on arbitration, found in Art 12, 
reads: 
‘the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin need not be recognised… 
(3) if the authority addressed considers itself bound to recognise an agreement by 
which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred upon arbitrators.’ 
Thus the Hague Convention 1971 considers arbitration only insofar as to provide that 
a valid arbitration agreement, and presumably by extension an arbitral award made 
thereunder, shall be a defence to recognition and enforcement of a judgment. It does 
not exclude judgments relating to arbitration, such as set-aside judgments. These 
would on the face of it be covered, as they are ‘decisions rendered in commercial 
matters by the courts of Contracting States’.66 This is backed up by Droz, who implies 
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that but for the exclusion of arbitration in the Brussels Convention, judgments such as 
set-aside would fall within its scope.67  
Droz, however, also suggests that this was an oversight rather than a conscious 
decision by the negotiators at The Hague Conference. In Compétence, he states when 
writing about the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention that the 
question of judgments concerning arbitration ‘had not influenced negotiations at The 
Hague’.68 This suggests that it simply did not occur to the negotiators to exclude 
arbitration or judgments relating to arbitration. 
This is odd for a number of reasons. Firstly the Hague Convention 1971 was concluded 
three years after the Brussels Convention, and both would have been negotiated by 
experts in the field. Furthermore, Georges Droz at least was present for the 
negotiations of each. It is possible that the negotiations were conducted concurrently 
and therefore blindly to one another, but this seems unlikely, especially as several of 
the same negotiators were involved in the drafting of each convention.69 On top of that, 
arbitration was obviously to some extent discussed, resulting in Art 12 (3). In this 
context, it seems highly unlikely that judgments concerning arbitration were not 
discussed at all or were forgotten.  
Because the Hague Convention 1971 was poorly subscribed and never technically 
entered into force, its effects have never been tested.70 One can only speculate as to 
how courts would react to a set-aside judgment brought for recognition under the terms 
of the Convention. All that can be said with confidence is that, whether by accident or 
design, with or without appreciation of the potential consequences, the negotiators of 
the Hague Convention did not exclude arbitration from its scope. A source from inside 
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the drafting process suggests that this was simply because drafters did not consider the 
relevant question. At any rate, the negotiators of the Draft Hague Convention 2000 
would not follow suit. 
(3) Draft Hague Convention 2000 
The Draft Hague Convention 2000 took a decidedly different approach from its 
predecessor to the arbitration question. The Hague Convention negotiators this time 
chose to follow the European lead, excluding arbitration entirely from the scope of the 
Convention, and in clearer language than the Brussels Convention. Art 1 (2) (g) of the 
draft states that: 
‘(2) The Convention does not apply to- 
… (g) arbitration and proceedings related thereto’. 
The draft is therefore more express about the intention to exclude not only the 
jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and the enforcement of their awards but also all court 
proceedings related to arbitration. 
The commentary annexed to the draft explains the exclusion in very similar terms to 
the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention. The report explains: ‘[t]here 
was general agreement in the Special Commission that the Convention should not 
interfere with the operation of international Conventions on the subject, the most 
important of which is the [New York Convention]’.71 Again, there is a return to the 
justification that arbitration is covered by special conventions – especially the New 
York Convention – and that these regimes should be left undisturbed. Indeed, the word 
choice of ‘interfere’ demonstrates a genuine worry, not present during the negotiations 
of the Hague Convention 1971, that the inclusion of arbitration in the Convention 
could cause problems with the operation of the New York Convention regime. 
According to the report, there was discussion as to how to treat court proceedings 
ancillary to arbitration, and it was ultimately decided that complete exclusion would 
be the most appropriate solution.72 This is borne out by earlier travaux préparatoires, 
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which show that some of the many possible permutations and potential complications 
of including judgments relating to arbitration were discussed.73 Ultimately, the 
decision was taken to exclude everything. This in turn suggests that at least part of the 
reason for the exclusion was the complexity of the issues raised.  
Once again, arbitration has been excluded from a jurisdiction convention during the 
drafting process, and once again the main reason given for the exclusion is the 
existence of other conventions, most notably the New York Convention. There is some 
suggestion that the complexity of the issues raised by potential inclusion was also a 
deterring factor. 
(4) Summary 
Of the three jurisdiction conventions examined, two excluded arbitration completely 
from their scope. In both cases, the reason given was the existence of other, special 
arbitration conventions. In both cases, there was also the suggestion of some hesitancy 
on the part of negotiators because of the intricate complexity of the potential inclusion 
of arbitration, as well as the potential for such inclusion to cause disagreement. In the 
case of the convention that did not exclude arbitration, the best sources suggest that 
this was an oversight and that the question simply was not considered by negotiators. 
It seems, therefore, that the general consensus is that arbitration should be excluded 
from jurisdiction conventions and that the existence of the New York Convention 
justifies this. This thesis now considers the question whether it does. 
B. The justification examined 
This section of this thesis will critically examine the ‘other conventions’ justification 
offered for the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention and the Draft 
Hague Convention 2000. The justification will be criticised for two reasons. The first 
is the differing scope between the arbitration conventions mentioned as justification 
on the one hand and jurisdiction conventions on the other. The second is, especially in 
the European context, the membership of the relevant regimes. This section will then 
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investigate the academically interesting, but no longer practically relevant, question of 
whether the creation of a uniform arbitration law would justify the exclusion of 
arbitration in a given region. 
(1) The overlap in scope between arbitration and jurisdiction conventions 
When it comes to justifying the exclusion of arbitration from jurisdiction conventions, 
much is made of the potential overlap such conventions and special arbitration 
conventions. The tenor of the rhetoric of justification varies from leaving the New 
York Convention and other special conventions’ operation undisturbed, to preventing 
active interference with the New York Convention regime. But to what extent do the 
scopes of arbitration and jurisdiction conventions actually overlap? This section will 
seek to answer this question, leaving aside the European Uniform Law Convention, 
which is of a different nature and will be considered separately under section (3), 
below. 
In fact, as has been pointed out in scholarship, the actual overlap between arbitration 
and jurisdiction conventions is slight.74 The former concerns the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals and the enforcement of their awards; the latter concerns the jurisdiction of 
courts and the enforcement of their judgments.  
Jurisdiction conventions delineate whether a national court or tribunal must, may, or 
may not take jurisdiction over a given dispute, and whether a foreign court must, may, 
or may not recognise and enforce that judgment once rendered.75 These instruments 
tend to limit their scope to civil and commercial matters, with certain broad 
exclusions.76 It is not controversial to assume that international commercial arbitration 
is a commercial matter to which such a convention would apply in the absence of 
express exclusion. 
The first thing that may be pointed out is that these conventions do not and cannot 
regulate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, nor positively give 
jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal. This is because the scope is limited to the 
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jurisdiction of national courts rather than arbitral tribunals and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments of these courts rather than the awards of arbitral tribunals.77 
Jurisdiction conventions could, of course, operate negatively to exclude the direct or 
indirect jurisdiction of courts over disputes in respect of which an arbitration 
agreement has been concluded. 
The jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and the recognition and enforcement of their 
awards are regulated by arbitration conventions, especially the New York Convention 
and the European Convention. These special arbitration conventions contain detailed 
provisions on when an award must be enforced and under what conditions enforcement 
may be refused.78 Indeed, this is the first aim of the New York Convention, as evinced 
by its full title, ‘Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards’.79 In this respect, there is no possibility of overlap with jurisdiction 
conventions, which cover the recognition and enforcement of court judgments rather 
than arbitral awards. 
Both the New York Convention and the European Convention also contain provisions 
on the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. Art III (3) New York Convention states: 
‘The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at 
the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the 
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.’ 
Here, the New York Convention protects the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals over 
disputes in respect of which arbitration agreements have been reached by way of a 
negative jurisdictional provision excluding the jurisdiction of national courts over such 
disputes. This is therefore an example of a potential overlap in scope between an 
arbitration and a jurisdiction convention, as the arbitration convention includes a rule 
governing court jurisdiction. 
The European Convention is more specific in establishing the jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals, and a little more specific in regulating the jurisdiction of courts. Art V (1) 
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and (2) establish an estoppel/waiver rule to protect the jurisdiction of the arbitrator 
from tactical challenge by requiring pleas as to jurisdiction to be raised before the 
arbitrator at the earliest possible moment in the arbitral process. Art V (3) enshrines 
the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, that an arbitral tribunal has the power to rule on 
its own jurisdiction, subject to the judicial control of the arbitral seat. These rules 
protecting and establishing arbitral jurisdiction clearly fall outwith the scope of a 
jurisdiction convention. 
Art VI European Convention concerns the jurisdiction of courts over disputes in 
respect of which an arbitration agreement has been made. Art VI (1) requires 
objections to the jurisdiction of the court based on the existence of an arbitral 
agreement to be made at the earliest possible moment in the proceedings, on penalty 
of estoppel. Art VI (3) establishes a lis pendens rule, providing that where arbitration 
is commenced before court proceedings on the same matter, the court shall stay its 
proceedings until such time as the arbitral award has been made, unless the court has 
‘good and substantial reasons’ not to do so. Art VI (4) gives courts jurisdiction over 
requests for interim measures. Like Art III NY Convention, this is an example of a 
potential overlap between an arbitration and jurisdiction convention. Indeed, a lis 
pendens rule similar to Art VI (3) European Convention is one of the most often 
suggested amendments to the Brussels Regime.80 
Arbitration conventions do not clearly state what should happen when a court is asked 
to recognise and enforce a judgment that has been rendered by a foreign court in spite 
of an arbitration agreement that the former court considers valid. There is an argument 
that Art II New York Convention covers this situation by providing that a court ‘seized 
of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an [arbitration 
agreement], shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration’. 
It is hard, however, to argue that a court asked to enforce a judgment is ‘seised of’ the 
matter that judgment concerns. The matter before the court is whether or not to enforce 
the judgment, which forms a head of jurisdiction separate from the merits of the 
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underlying dispute,81 and which is clearly a subject matter incapable of settlement by 
arbitration. This confusion is compounded by the exclusion of arbitration from 
jurisdiction conventions, which means that such conventions do not include rules on 
the enforceability of judgments rendered in spite of arbitration agreements, unlike the 
Hague Convention 1971. Here again we see an area in which jurisdiction conventions 
could usefully fill gaps left by arbitration conventions. 
All of this demonstrates that there is very limited potential for overlap between the 
primary functions of arbitration conventions and jurisdiction conventions. There will 
be no overlap as regards the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and the 
establishment of the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, except insofar as the latter 
excludes court jurisdiction. To this extent, it cannot be said that the exclusion of 
arbitration from jurisdiction conventions is necessary to protect the function of 
arbitration conventions, especially given the very limited provisions that could overlap 
and the ease with which these could be replicated or respected in a jurisdiction 
convention. Where else, then, could overlap arise? 
It is often said that arbitration does not and cannot exist in a legal vacuum. What is 
meant by this is that, although the arbitral process itself is private and extrajudicial, 
arbitration relies on court support in order to function. The most obvious example of 
this is for enforcement of arbitral awards, as arbitral tribunals and institutions lack the 
power of courts to compel parties to comply with their decisions. But court support 
comes in many guises. This support may take the form of enforcing the arbitration 
agreement by ordering an uncooperative party who has started court proceedings to 
arbitrate its dispute, as envisaged in Art II New York Convention. It may be by 
providing interim relief or protective measures, or giving assistance in the taking of 
evidence. It may be by providing the first port of call to challenge a defective award 
by setting it aside rather than merely refusing recognition and enforcement. Arbitration 
conventions provide direct or indirect jurisdiction rules for practically none of these 
things.  
                                                 




On enforcement of the arbitration agreement, Art II New York Convention provides 
that any court seised of a matter in respect of which the parties have reached an 
arbitration agreement must decline jurisdiction in favour of the arbitral tribunal, and 
provides some minimum standards for formal validity of arbitral agreements. Art II 
says nothing about which court should have jurisdiction to assess the validity of the 
arbitral agreement and whether the result it reaches should be respected by other 
courts. This is a gap a jurisdiction convention would be perfectly placed to fill. 
On interim measures, the European Convention provides at Art VI (4) that courts in 
general shall have jurisdiction to grant such measures. It does not provide which court 
should have jurisdiction to order interim measures in any given case, nor whether that 
court’s order should be recognised and enforced by other courts. Again, this is an 
obvious gap that could be filled by a jurisdiction convention, and indeed has been filled 
by the Brussels Regime despite its exclusion of arbitration.82 
On set-aside, Art V (1) (e) New York Convention provides that a court asked to 
recognise and enforce an arbitral award may refuse to do so if the award has been set-
aside in the country in which or under the law of which it was rendered. This does not 
expressly provide for direct jurisdiction over set-aside proceedings, though it does 
strongly imply that such jurisdiction should lie with the courts at the seat of the 
arbitration. It effectively provides a rule of indirect jurisdiction, permitting the court 
asked to enforce an award to recognise the set-aside judgment of the courts at the seat 
of the arbitration. Art IX (2) European Convention limits the circumstances in which 
such judgments may be recognised. Again, the gap in provision for direct jurisdiction 
could easily be filled by a jurisdiction convention. As regards recognition of set-aside 
judgments, there is the potential for some overlap here. However, the New York 
Convention rule is so permissive that a jurisdiction convention could easily operate 
alongside and in harmony with it. 
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It has been demonstrated that there is in fact very little scope for overlap between 
jurisdiction and arbitration conventions, and that even where there is, the two could 
work harmoniously quite easily. It is therefore submitted that the original justification 
for the exclusion of arbitration from judgment conventions – that the subject is covered 
by many special arbitration conventions, and that inclusion could impede the operation 
of these conventions – does not stand up to scrutiny. 
(2) The overlap in membership between arbitration conventions and the 
Brussels Convention 
A further issue can be raised with the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Regime specifically. It is the issue of the stated aims of the Treaty of Rome and how 
these were hoped to be achieved. 
As has been stated above, Art 220 Treaty of Rome requires the member states of the 
EEC to simplify the intra-Community enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards. 
As has also been stated above, the Brussels Convention was the principal instrument 
intended to achieve this with respect to judgments. No such Community instrument 
was created to do so for arbitral awards. The best explanation for this is the creation of 
the New York, European, and European Uniform Law Conventions, which performed 
or would have performed the same function. As discussed above, the same reason is 
given for the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention. This justification 
is questionable because of the lack of potential for overlap between the Brussels 
Convention and arbitration conventions. But overlap is pertinent for another reason: 
the differing membership of the then EEC and these arbitration conventions.  
It is submitted that, it being a stated goal of the EEC to enhance the enforceability of 
arbitral awards between its member states, it should be seen as the responsibility of the 
member states of the EEC to conclude the relevant conventions amongst themselves. 
Whether an external convention could ever be seen to satisfactorily achieve that goal 
is questionable, but it is altogether impossible for external conventions to achieve that 
goal when their membership is different from the EEC. Yet this was true of all three 
of the arbitration conventions commonly referred to as justification for the arbitration 




The EEC had six member states when the Brussels Convention was concluded in 1968: 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. For any external 
convention to satisfy the aims expressed in the Treaty of Rome and justify the 
exclusion of arbitration from the EEC jurisdiction regime, it would at a minimum need 
to have these six member states as signatories. 
Yet when the Brussels Convention was concluded, only five of the six EEC member 
states had signed the New York Convention. Although Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and The Netherlands were signatories of the New York Convention, and 
France, Germany and The Netherlands had ratified it by 1968, Italy would only accede 
in 1969. Belgium would ratify the New York Convention in 1975, and Luxembourg 
only in 1983.83 There is no suggestion that the Brussels Convention required its 
members to accede to or ratify the New York Convention. It cannot therefore be said 
that the New York Convention achieved the goal of simplifying the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards between EEC Member States at the time the Brussels 
Convention was concluded, given it was in force in only three of those member states.  
Likewise, the European Convention was not subscribed by every then EEC member 
state. Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy were signatories when the Convention was 
concluded in 1961. However, Belgium and Italy would only ratify the Convention well 
after the conclusion of the Brussels Convention, in 1975 and 1970 respectively. 
Luxembourg would only accede to the Convention in 1982, and the Netherlands never 
has.84 Again, because this Convention was not in force in all member states, and never 
has come into force in all member states, it can in no way be said to achieve the goals 
of Art 220 Treaty of Rome. 
The stillborn European Uniform Law Convention was concluded in 1966, signed by 
just Austria and Belgium, and ratified only by the latter, therefore failing to achieve 
the three ratifications required for its coming into force.85 Again, this Convention could 
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not be said to achieve the aims of Art 220 Treaty of Rome with respect to arbitral 
awards as of 1968, nor to look at the time as if it were ever likely to do so. 
It is therefore submitted that the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention 
could not possibly have been justified by reference to any of these three special 
conventions in 1968, given none of them applied to all the then EEC member states. 
Like the lack of overlap in scope, this points to the conclusion that the justification for 
exclusion was weak. 
(3) Would a uniform arbitration law justify exclusion? 
It has been argued above that arbitration conventions such as the New York and 
European Conventions could not justify the exclusion of arbitration from jurisdiction 
conventions. It has also been submitted that neither of these two, nor the European 
Uniform Law Convention could justify the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Convention due to their differing membership. But what if the European Uniform Law 
Convention had been successful in harmonising arbitration law across the EEC and 
beyond, or at least genuinely looked like it could do so when the Brussels Convention 
was concluded in 1968? Would a uniform arbitration law justify the exclusion of 
arbitration from a jurisdiction convention? 
The answer is a frustrating ‘yes and no’. To explain this, it is necessary to examine the 
gaps left by recognition and enforcement arbitration conventions and to what extent a 
uniform law convention would fill them.  
Recognition and enforcement arbitration conventions leave gaps as to which court 
should have jurisdiction over the question of the validity of an arbitration agreement, 
the provision of interim measures, and the set-aside of an arbitral award. A uniform 
law would not directly solve these problems. This is because a uniform law consists 
of a set of provisions for importation into domestic law, which will then be harmonised 
across contracting states. This does not provide a direct solution as to which 
contracting state should have jurisdiction over the issues set out above. 
A uniform law could, however, significantly reduce the practical need for such 




the Brussels Regime’s relationship with arbitration.86 This is because a uniform law 
could significantly reduce the potential for jurisdictional issues to arise. 
For example, it has already been stated that the New York Convention operates to 
deprive courts of jurisdiction over a dispute when an arbitration agreement has been 
entered into. The New York Convention does not provide when an arbitration 
agreement will be considered valid, save for delineating the most stringent permitted 
formal requirements at Art II (2). This aside, contracting states have wide freedom to 
determine when an arbitral agreement will be considered valid. Different states will 
therefore have different conditions for validity of arbitral agreements.87  
This creates the obvious problem that one state might perfectly possibly view an 
arbitration agreement as valid, whilst a second state views it as invalid and therefore 
subject to court jurisdiction. This is one of the reasons that it might be desirable to 
provide in a jurisdiction convention which court should have jurisdiction over the 
question of validity of the arbitration agreement, with that court’s decision receiving 
recognition in other convention countries.88 The same can be argued to be necessary 
to achieve consistency in provision of interim measures and approach to set-aside 
judgments. 
With this argument in mind, it is obvious why a uniform law would reduce the need to 
include arbitration in a jurisdiction convention. If standards for the validity of 
arbitration agreements, the provision of interim measures, and the availability of set 
aside are harmonised, the courts in member states should theoretically reach the same 
conclusion on the same set of facts. An arbitration agreement valid in one state should 
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be considered valid in another. An award set aside in one state for any reason other 
than public policy should be considered invalid in any other state.  
This argument, however, only goes so far. Courts called upon to apply the same rule 
to the same or very similar sets of facts can often reach different conclusions. 
Regarding the validity of arbitration agreements, informative examples can be found 
in the application by different courts of the uniform UNCITRAL Model Law.  
For instance, in interpreting the requirement in Art 7 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law 1985 that arbitration agreements be concluded in writing, different courts have 
taken very different approaches. According to Art 7 (2), ‘An agreement is in writing if 
it is contained in a document signed by the parties[…] The reference in a contract to a 
document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement 
provided that the contract is in writing…’.  
In a Hong Kong Court of First Instance case, the writing requirement was interpreted 
narrowly.89 An arbitration clause was contained in standard terms allied to a purchase 
order. The plaintiff had signed the purchase order, but could not produce a copy signed 
by the defendant. The two parties had clearly concluded a contract based on the 
purchase order and had performed the contract. The court held that the agreement was 
not in writing because it, or the contract incorporating it, was not signed by both the 
parties.90  
In very similar circumstances two years later, where a signed offer containing an 
arbitration clause was communicated to a defendant who did not countersign but 
subsequently performed, the Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan was happy to 
find the arbitration clause to have been accepted by conduct.91 This is despite applying 
the same UNCITRAL Model Law 1985 provision as the Hong Kong Court of First 
Instance, a plain reading of which would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. The 
court even expressly states that it is giving a ‘liberal interpretation’ to Art 7 (2).92 
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It can be seen, therefore, that the same provisions can be interpreted very differently 
by different courts. Similarly, courts have also taken widely divergent approaches to 
the validity of arbitration agreements under Art II New York Convention.93  
It is therefore submitted that the harmonisation of arbitration law would not justify the 
exclusion of arbitration from jurisdiction conventions unless there were a 
supranational authority to ensure uniform interpretation of the provisions: the function 
served by the Court of Justice in the European Union. Failing this – and this 
supervisory authority would have been lacking under the European Uniform Law 
Convention – divergent interpretation is inevitable, and the same jurisdictional issues 
will arise as if each member state applied an arbitration statute of its own drafting. So 
although a uniform arbitration law may improve the situation that calls for the 
inclusion of arbitration in jurisdiction conventions by reducing the incidence of 
divergent interpretation, it does not justify the exclusion of arbitration as a whole. In 
turn, the argument that the European Uniform Law Convention, had it been successful, 
would have justified the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention must 
be rejected. 
C. Other excluded matters 
Arbitration is not the only matter excluded from the Brussels Convention. The scope 
of the convention is defined at Art 1 as ‘civil and commercial matters, whatever the 
nature of the court or tribunal’. The stated exclusions from this scope fall into two 
categories. The first is those matters that naturally fall outside the scope of the 
convention, being inherently public law matters, but are listed presumably for the 
avoidance of doubt.94 These include ‘revenue, customs, and administrative matters’. 
The second set of exclusions concerns matters that could be seen as ‘civil and 
commercial matters’, but are nonetheless excluded. Arbitration is one of these. The 
others include: matters of family law; succession; bankruptcy; and social security.95  
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The other excluded matters can to an extent contribute to the debate surrounding the 
arbitration exclusion. The first set of exclusions – those inherently public in nature – 
adds little to the discussion because their nature is so different from arbitration. It is, 
however, useful to compare arbitration with the other matters in the second category 
of exclusion: those civil or commercial in nature, but nonetheless excluded. Evaluating 
why these other matters were excluded and how they have subsequently been treated 
may reveal that these matters have something in common.  
Indeed, the other excluded matters do have one striking feature in common: all have 
been subject to at least proposals for special, bespoke regulation since their exclusion 
from the Brussels Convention. This in turn suggests that these are not matters that by 
their nature fall outside the scope of jurisdiction conventions, but simply special, 
complex cases that require bespoke regulation.  
Bankruptcy and similar proceedings are excluded by Art 1 (2) Brussels Convention. 
The Jenard Report explains this exclusion with reference to a special EEC convention 
that was being drafted at the time.96 Two draft Conventions were created before a 
Convention was finally concluded, though this never entered into force.97 Each of these 
Conventions contained detailed provisions on jurisdiction.98 Following the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which laid down new powers for the European Council over judicial co-
operation,99 the Insolvency Regulation was adopted.100 This regulation also contains 
bespoke jurisdiction rules.101 In contrast to arbitration, it can be seen that there was a 
sustained effort to create a bespoke system of regulation at an EEC level for insolvency 
proceedings, filling the gap left by the exclusion from the Brussels Regime.  
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According to the Jenard Report, mutual recognition of succession judgments was 
considered essential, but impossible until such time as the conflict of laws rules of the 
EEC member states could be harmonised, owing to the vastly different conceptions of 
and approaches to succession in the different member states.102 Following the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, this has become possible, and succession has also become subject to 
special regulation, following over a decade of preparatory work.103 Because of the 
complexity of the issues raised by cross-border succession, the Succession Regulation 
contains many lengthy and detailed provisions on jurisdiction.104 Here, the original 
exclusion of succession from the Brussels Convention makes sense owing to the 
complicated nature of the rules required to regulate jurisdiction over such questions. 
Still, these rules have ultimately been concluded at the EU level, filling the gap left by 
the Brussels Regime. 
The Jenard Report states that ‘rights in property arising out of a matrimonial 
relationship’ was expressly excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention due 
to the wildly divergent rules and conflict rules applied to this question in the member 
states.105 Although to date there has been no convention concluded or legislation 
passed to govern the question, and the matter is specifically excluded from the scope 
of the Brussels II Bis Regulation which governs family law matters,106 there has 
recently been a proposal for a regulation in this area.107 It is clear, therefore, that there 
is an ongoing commitment to filling this gap left in the Brussels Regime. 
A related exclusion is ‘the status or legal capacity of natural persons’.108 This refers to 
family law matters such as marriage and divorce, and was excluded because of the 
wide divergence on the subject of divorce between member states, whose approaches 
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varied from allowing divorce by consent (Belgium) to an absolute prohibition under 
any circumstances (Italy).109 It was feared that forcing courts to recognise decisions 
relating to family law and especially to divorce would encourage abuse of the public 
policy exception to enforcement.110 These matters have since been brought within the 
wider Brussels Regime by the Brussels II and Brussels II Bis Regulations.111 
The only remaining express exclusion other than arbitration, social security, was 
excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention largely because of differing 
conception of social security in the member states.112 Some view it as a matter of public 
law, others as quasi-public; in some member states, social security litigation falls 
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, in others, administrative tribunals.113 
Furthermore, the EEC legislature was empowered by Art 51 Treaty of Rome to enact 
legislation in the field of social security with a view to securing free movement of 
workers, which it duly did.114 These regulations provided which member state’s social 
security legislation would apply to a given worker, and court jurisdiction over social 
security claims was treated as falling to the court of the country whose legislation 
applies to a worker.115 This left the gap in the Brussels Regulation half-filled, with 
recognition and enforcement of social security decisions still unregulated.116 This gap 
has since been filled by the modernised Social Security Regulation, passed in 2004.117 
Once again, a gap left by exclusion from the Brussels Regime has been filled over the 
past 40 years. 
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It can therefore be seen that, arbitration aside, every specific exclusion from the 
Brussels Convention, other than those included for the purpose of clearly defining 
‘civil and commercial’, has been dealt with by bespoke European Community/Union 
conventions or legislation.  
What can be read into this? At the very least, this demonstrates that these matters are 
not excluded because there is no place for the creation of jurisdictional rules at a 
European level. Many were excluded because of the difficulty of creating rules 
acceptable to the six member states back in 1968. Indeed, some of the matters were 
excluded with the express intention of the creation of bespoke rules. When looking at 
the complexity of some of the jurisdictional rules that have been created, it makes 
sense that separate instruments were required. What is certain is that exclusion from 
the Brussels Convention was in no way intended to exempt matters from becoming 
subject to European jurisdictional rules. Indeed, arbitration is entirely the odd man out 
in this respect. Whilst it would be rash to draw too wide-reaching conclusions from 
this fact, it is submitted that it is certainly pertinent to the debate on the creation of 
jurisdictional rules on arbitration at a European Union level. But does that mean the 
exclusion of arbitration was justified by the need for separate, bespoke arbitration 
legislation? 
D. Is exclusion necessary for the creation of bespoke 
jurisdictional rules? 
The foregoing may suggest that excluded subjects have been left out because of their 
complexity and can only be satisfactorily dealt with in bespoke legislation, rather than 
by inclusion in a dedicated jurisdiction convention like the Brussels or Draft Hague 
Conventions. This is not true for two main reasons. First, the Brussels and Draft Hague 
Conventions contain bespoke rules for several subject matters which do not fall neatly 
into the general jurisdictional rules. Second, only a limited number of jurisdictional 
rules are required concerning arbitration to fill the gap between a jurisdiction 
convention and arbitration conventions. 
The Brussels and Hague Conventions contain bespoke rules covering several subject 




a defendant may be sued where domiciled, and fallback rules of special jurisdiction, 
which allow plaintiffs to bring actions in courts other than those at the defendant’s 
domicile based on the subject matter of the dispute or the existence of a choice of court 
agreement.118 There are then bespoke rules for those subject matters for which 
jurisdiction would not be appropriately allocated by the general rule. These include 
special sections on insurance,119 consumer contracts,120 and prorogation,121 as well as 
conferring exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters.122 The bespoke rules vary in 
complexity, from the seven articles regulating jurisdiction in matters relating to 
insurance to the individual provisions giving exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of 
certain countries over certain matters. Like the Brussels Convention, the Draft Hague 
Convention 2000 contained bespoke rules concerning, for example, prorogation,123 
consumer contracts,124 employment contracts,125 trusts,126 and other items of exclusive 
jurisdiction.127 All of this makes perfectly clear that jurisdiction conventions are 
capable of including bespoke jurisdictional rules of varying complexity for certain 
subject matters. 
The jurisdictional rules required for arbitration are not so complex as to demand their 
own separate instrument. Compared with the other excluded matters from the Brussels 
Convention that have become subject to bespoke rules, the rules required for 
arbitration would be relatively few and uncomplicated. Social security, for example, 
is intrinsically linked to the free movement of workers, one of the fundamental 
freedoms of the EEC. It would obviously require separate and thorough consideration, 
and was likely to require detailed and comprehensive regulation to ensure the systems 
of social security amongst the member states work harmoniously. Considering this, it 
makes sense that social security would be excluded from the Brussels Regime and 
jurisdictional rules contained in the relevant specialised legislation. By contrast, 
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arbitration needs only a few special rules: likely no more in number or complexity than 
the seven articles dedicated to jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance.128  
It is therefore submitted that bespoke jurisdictional rules relating to arbitration could 
feasibly be included in jurisdiction conventions; specialised instruments are not the 
only way to fill the gaps left by exclusion. 
E. Preliminary conclusion 
It is therefore concluded that the traditionally accepted justification for the exclusion 
of arbitration from jurisdiction conventions – that arbitration is satisfactorily dealt with 
by other, bespoke conventions – does not stand up to examination. As has been 
demonstrated, the bespoke arbitration conventions have very little potential for 
substantive overlap with the jurisdiction conventions. Furthermore, in the case of the 
Brussels Regime, the membership of the bespoke conventions did not align with the 
membership of the EEC at the time, suggesting that the justification was never 
particularly well thought through. Exclusion was not justified by the prospect that 
arbitration law might have been harmonised across the member states, because this 
would not eliminate the problems that would typically be seen as requiring inclusion 
of arbitration. If the exclusion was not justified at the time it was written, it could not 
possibly justify the continued exclusion of arbitration since. Furthermore, exclusion in 
1968 was clearly not intended to mean a subject would never be subject to EEC or EU 
jurisdictional rules, as demonstrated by comparison with the other specifically 
excluded matters, all of which are now covered, whether as part of the wider Brussels 
Regime or another bespoke statute. Nonetheless, exclusion is not necessary for the 
creation of bespoke jurisdictional rules. All of this means it is entirely appropriate to 
reject the traditional justification for exclusion and reconsider arbitration’s relationship 
with jurisdictional rules. 
  
                                                 




3. THE EXCLUSION WITHIN EUROPE PART 1 – THE PROBLEMS 
WITH EXCLUSION 
The previous chapter argued that the standard justification for the arbitration exclusion 
does not stand up to scrutiny. The next step is to ask: what effects has the exclusion 
had? This is because it is one thing to demonstrate that the exclusion was never 
properly justified, but if it has had no significant practical effects, there would be no 
pressing reason to make any change. It is therefore vital for this thesis to establish not 
only that the arbitration exclusion cannot be justified, but also that it has caused 
significant problems. 
This thesis will therefore now take the European example as a case study to examine 
the practical effects of the arbitration exclusion. Europe has been chosen because it is 
the only example of a multi-state set of jurisdictional rules that is actually in effect and 
has had time to be tested. This chapter will focus on Europe’s struggle with the 
arbitration exclusion up to the creation of the Brussels I Recast in late 2012 and entry 
into force in early 2015. The next chapter shall focus on the recasting process, and 
analyse the Recast as passed. In the limited number of situations where the analysis 
presented in this chapter would or could be affected by the changes in the Brussels I 
Recast, this will be noted in passing and subject to deeper analysis in the following 
chapter. 
This chapter shall be split into three main parts. First it will examine the case law that 
was required to define properly the scope of the arbitration exclusion and the effects 
of this exclusion. Next it will focus on the problems arising from or exacerbated by 
the arbitration exclusion as defined. Finally, it will briefly consider why these 
problems are particularly significant within Europe, albeit many of the problems are 
present to some degree in the world at large. The chapter shall conclude that there are 
significant problems at the interface between the Regulation and arbitration, many of 





A. The scope of the arbitration exclusion 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the exclusion of arbitration from each 
instrument of the Brussels Regime is written in very general language, stating that the 
instrument ‘shall not apply to arbitration’.129 This generality also gives rise to 
uncertainty as to the exact parameters of the exclusion. Was it meant simply to exclude 
the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals and the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, even though these would seem by default to be excluded from instruments 
concerning the jurisdiction of national courts and the enforcement of court judgments? 
If so, it would seem unnecessary to include an exclusion at all, so surely court 
proceedings and judgments concerning arbitration must also be excluded. But which 
proceedings and judgments? There is not always a clear dividing line as to when court 
proceedings concern arbitration. What about a preliminary decision on the validity of 
an alleged arbitration agreement as a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court in an 
action in tort? Or an application for interim or protective measures in respect of a 
contractual dispute that is subject to an arbitration agreement? Are remedies proscribed 
under the Brussels Regime, such as the anti-suit injunction, available in actions not 
falling within the scope of the Brussels Regime, such as an action for the appointment 
of arbitrators under an arbitration agreement? These questions and more would have 
to be resolved by the Court of Justice to assist in lending certainty and predictability 
to the scope of the arbitration exclusion. 
This part of this thesis focusses on four of these cases that were decided in order to 
clarify the scope of the arbitration exclusion. The cases are: the Marc Rich case,130 
which concerns lis pendens and decisions on the validity of an arbitration agreement 
as a preliminary matter; the van Uden case,131 which concerns interim and protective 
measures; the infamous West Tankers case,132 which concerns the availability of the 
anti-suit injunction to courts in cases falling outwith the scope of the Brussels Regime; 
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and the Gazprom case,133 in which the relationship between the Brussels I Regulation 
and anti-suit injunctions issued by arbitrators was considered. 
(1) The Marc Rich case 
The Marc Rich case came before the Court of Justice in 1989, with judgment being 
handed down in 1991. The case was therefore decided under the Brussels Convention, 
though Brussels Convention decisions remain valid insofar as they remain relevant 
under the Brussels Regulation.134  
The facts of the case are worth recounting in some detail to aid in the understanding 
of the issues before the court, why they were important, and how the court resolved 
them.  
In January 1988, Marc Rich and Società Italiana Impianti (‘SII’) concluded a contract 
under which the former would purchase from the latter a quantity of Iranian crude oil 
on FOB terms.135 The terms of the contract included a clause for ad hoc arbitration136 
providing that ‘[s]hould any dispute arise between buyer and seller the matter in 
dispute shall be referred to three persons in London. One to be appointed by each of 
the parties hereto and the third by the two so-chosen, their decision or that of any two 
of them shall be final and binding on both parties.’ 
The oil was loaded onto the nominated ship in early February. That same day, Marc 
Rich complained that the cargo was badly contaminated, causing it significant losses. 
In mid-February, SII requested the Regional Court of Genoa, Italy, to declare that SII 
was not liable to Marc Rich for the alleged contamination. Summons were served on 
Marc Rich on 29 February, and that same day Marc Rich began arbitration proceedings 
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in London. SII refused to take part in the arbitration proceedings, which entailed 
refusal to take its part in the arbitrator appointment procedure under the arbitration 
agreement. 
In May 1988, Marc Rich requested the High Court to appoint arbitrators under s 10 (3) 
of the Arbitration Act 1950, SII still having failed to do so. The High Court granted 
leave to serve originating summons on SII in Italy. 
In July 1988, SII requested that the order granting leave should be set aside. It argued 
that the question before the English court was one of the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, which should fall within the scope of the Brussels Convention and 
therefore be adjudicated in the Regional Court of Genoa: the court first seised.  
In October 1988, Marc Rich contested the jurisdiction of the Regional Court of Genoa 
under the New York Convention or implementing Italian statute on the basis of the 
arbitration agreement. 
In November 1988, the High Court held that the Brussels Convention did not apply to 
the action before it, by virtue of the arbitration exclusion in Art 1 (4).137 The court 
applied English law, therefore refusing to set aside the order granting leave to serve 
summons.138 SII appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal, which made a 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice.139 
Three questions were referred to the Court of Justice, of which the relevant one was:  
‘Does the exception in Article 1(4) of the Convention extend: 
(a) to any litigation or judgments and, if so, 
(b) to litigation or judgments where the initial existence of an arbitration agreement is 
in issue?’ 
The Court of Justice was therefore called upon to define the scope of the arbitration 
exclusion. The case had the potential to have very serious consequences. Both the 
Italian and English courts had to rule on the question of the validity of the arbitration 
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agreement between Marc Rich and SII before potentially proceeding to hear the merits 
of the relevant proceedings, on contractual liability or the appointment of arbitrators 
respectively. If the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement fell within the 
scope of the Convention, the lis pendens rule at Arts 22 and 23 of the Convention 
would apply and the English court would have to stay proceedings pending the 
resolution of the earlier-filed Italian claim. This could prove problematic because 
Italian courts are notoriously slow-moving, so SII would effectively ‘torpedo’ the 
contractually agreed arbitration by beginning proceedings in Italy and refusing to 
participate in the arbitrator appointment procedure.140 
The Court concluded that the contracting parties to the Brussels Convention intended 
to exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before national 
courts.141 The Court also reasoned:  
‘In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the Convention, 
reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the dispute. If, by virtue of its 
subject-matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the 
scope of the Convention, the existence of a preliminary issue which the court must 
resolve in order to determine the dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify 
application of the Convention.’142 
The Court of Justice also justified this holding by re-emphasising the importance of 
legal certainty and the need for a rule producing a clear and definite result.143 To allow 
the application of the Convention to vary according to the existence and nature of a 
preliminary matter would undermine this legal certainty. 
The Marc Rich case therefore lays down a subject-matter test for the applicability of 
the Brussels Regime, with focus on the main issue at stake in the proceedings. The 
focus is put on the main issue before the court to avoid creating uncertainty when a 
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preliminary issue must be decided, even if the Brussels Regime would in theory apply 
differently to this preliminary issue than to the main issue.  
Thus in the Marc Rich case the proceedings before the Regional Court of Genoa fell 
within the scope of the Brussels Convention, as would that court’s decision on the 
validity of the arbitration agreement. In theory, this meant that the court’s decision on 
the validity of the arbitration agreement would be enforceable in other Convention 
states, and that the lis pendens rule of the convention would operate to prevent the 
litigation of that dispute or that preliminary question before other Brussels Convention 
state courts. However, where proceedings in the other Convention state are ancillary 
to arbitration, such as where there are proceedings to appoint an arbitrator, the 
Convention cannot apply by virtue of the arbitration exclusion. The lis pendens rule in 
the Convention does not apply to and cannot interfere with these proceedings, 
notwithstanding that the courts must answer an identical preliminary question in each 
case. 
This ruling can be seen as a positive, pro-arbitration decision. It protects arbitration 
agreements from torpedo actions and allows national arbitration laws to function free 
from interference from European private international law. As will be discussed below, 
it may not provide a perfect system, but the Marc Rich was an absolutely necessary 
development for a Brussels Regime that excludes arbitration yet still envisages that 
arbitration will take place within its contracting states. 
(2) The van Uden case 
In the late 1990s, the Court of Justice would again be asked to consider the arbitration 
exclusion, this time in the context of provisional and protective measures. It would 
reach a decision arguably inconsistent with that in Marc Rich.144 
In van Uden, van Uden entered into a charter agreement with Deco-Linecargo. Van 
Uden was to provide space on board a liner service and Deco-Linecargo in turn to pay 
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charter hire. The agreement contained an arbitration clause for arbitration in the 
Netherlands. 
Van Uden commenced arbitration under the agreement for payment of unpaid invoices 
– a simple contractual claim – and also requested the District Court of Amsterdam to 
order interim payment of the invoices to maintain its cash flow. To do so was 
compatible with the then Dutch arbitration law. Deco-Linecargo was however based 
in Germany, so even had there been no arbitration clause, the Dutch court could not 
have taken jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute under the Brussels 
Convention, because both the domicile of the defendant and place of performance of 
the obligation in question – payment – were in Germany.145  
The District Court ordered interim payment to be made, though its decision was 
overturned on appeal. Upon further appeal to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, a 
preliminary reference was made to the Court of Justice. The questions referred 
included whether the existence of an arbitration clause in a contract affects the ability 
of a court to order interim measures by way of a provisionally enforceable Brussels 
Convention judgment in respect of a claim for payment under that contract. 
Courts having jurisdiction over the substance of a dispute under the Brussels 
Convention are generally accepted to have jurisdiction to issue interim measures 
without relying on the provisions on provisional and protective measures in ex Art 
24.146 In this case, however, because the arbitration clause excludes the jurisdiction of 
all courts for the purposes of the Brussels Convention, the only way that a court could 
found jurisdiction to issue an enforceable judgment for interim measures was on Art 
24, which provides: 
‘Application may be made to the courts of a Contracting State for such provisional, 
including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, 
under this Convention, the courts of another Contracting State have jurisdiction as to 
the substance of the matter.’147 
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It was argued by Deco-Linecargo and the UK government that interim proceedings 
were ‘intrinsically bound up with’ the arbitration proceedings, and therefore must fall 
within the exclusion of arbitration at Art 1 (4). Van Uden and the Commission argued 
that an arbitration agreement does not exclude an application to a court for interim 
measures enforceable under the Convention. 
The decision in Marc Rich would seem to support the former view: all proceedings 
ancillary to arbitration should be excluded from the scope of the convention in their 
entirety, and the exclusion is to be given a wide reading.148 The court had, however, 
previously developed a line of case law that provisional measures were not 
incorporated in the Convention by virtue of their own nature as provisional measures, 
but by virtue of the nature of the rights they served in any given instance to protect.149 
It had also held that Art 24 could not be relied upon to bring within the scope of the 
Brussels Convention provisional and protective measures relating to matters otherwise 
excluded from its scope, such as matters concerning matrimonial property or family 
law.150 
The court therefore faced the task of deciding whether a request for interim measures 
in a dispute subject to arbitration should be characterised as ancillary to that arbitration, 
and therefore excluded from the Convention, or as protecting the substantive rights 
asserted in the arbitration, and therefore capable of inclusion if those substantive rights 
fell within the scope of the Convention. It ultimately took the latter route, holding that: 
‘provisional measures are not in principle ancillary to arbitration proceedings but are 
ordered in parallel to such proceedings and are intended as measures of support. They 
concern not arbitration as such but the protection of a wide variety of rights.’151  
In this case, the right to be protected was, according to the Court of Justice, a 
contractual claim for payment, which falls within the scope of the Convention.152 This 
is where the Court of Justice’s decision is ultimately made: as one of characterisation. 
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Had the court decided to characterise the right being protected as ‘a claim in 
arbitration’, which it could conceivably have done, then the judgment on interim 
measures would have been excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention, even 
if the application for interim measures in itself was not considered inherently ancillary 
to arbitration. In this way, the court could have excluded the application of the 
Convention in a fashion consistent with its previous case law. As soon, however, as 
the right being protected is characterised as contractual, it must fall within the scope 
of the Convention to remain consistent with previous jurisprudence. 
It has also been argued that interim and protective measures in support of arbitration 
proceedings fall not only outwith the scope of the Brussels Convention, but also 
outside the scope of the language of Art 24 itself. This is because Art 24 of the Brussels 
Convention could be read as only applicable when the courts of one contracting state 
have jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute.153 In this case, no court, but rather 
an arbitral tribunal, has jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute.  
The language of Art 24 is not clear and does not necessarily lead to this conclusion. 
However, the rationale behind Art 24 appears to be to prevent the jurisdictional rules 
of the Convention being used to deny access to provisional measures when the court 
able to issue effective preliminary measures would not have jurisdiction over the 
substance of the dispute. In light of this, the requirement of a ‘real connecting link’ 
between the territorial jurisdiction of the court seised under Art 24 and the provisional 
relief sought154 makes sense. Furthermore, it is open to question whether Art 24 was 
ever meant to allow internationally enforceable provisional measures, or simply to 
allow courts with territorial jurisdiction to issue interim measures notwithstanding that 
they did not have jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute.155 Finally, it should be 
noted that the granting of provisional measures in support of arbitration proceedings 
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tends to be treated as a matter of domestic arbitration, rather than general procedural, 
law.156 
If the rationale of Art 24 is indeed to prevent the ordinary jurisdictional rules of the 
Convention from interfering with the granting of provisional measures, then the 
application of Art 24 in cases in which the ordinary jurisdictional rules of the 
Convention do not apply makes little sense. Further, if most countries view provisional 
measures in support of arbitration to be a matter of arbitration law, it would seem far 
easier to say that provisional measures in support of arbitration should be excluded 
from the Convention, and therefore available from any court in any country that would 
ordinarily issue such measures in support of arbitration proceedings according to its 
own arbitration law, rather than under the Brussels Convention.  
At any rate, the importance for this thesis of the van Uden decision is the scope it gives 
to the arbitration exclusion. The case demonstrates the difficulty in defining the precise 
meaning of the exclusion, especially when compared with Marc Rich. As stated above, 
the two decisions have been argued to be inconsistent,157 though scholars have equally 
argued that the two are reconcilable.158 Whether the cases are consistent is as 
debateable as the characterisation of the rights being protected by the interim 
proceedings in van Uden, and both questions serve only to show the difficulty with 
which the arbitration exclusion has come to be defined. 
(3) The West Tankers case 
Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, arbitration case to come before the Court of 
Justice is West Tankers.159 As in Marc Rich, the facts are somewhat complicated and 
require a relatively detailed retelling. 
In August 2000 a ship owned by West Tankers and chartered by an Italian party 
collided with and damaged a dock owned by the latter in Syracuse, Italy. The 
charterparty contained a clause for arbitration of disputes in London. The Italian party 
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was indemnified by its Italian insurers up to the limit of its policy, and recovered the 
balance of damages from West Tankers in London arbitration without incident.  
The insurers then began a subrogated action before the Italian courts in Syracuse to 
recover from West Tankers the sum paid out under the insurance policy. The action 
before the court was in tort and, but for the potentially effective arbitration clause, the 
Italian courts would have had jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation, which had 
by then largely superseded the Brussels Convention, as Italy was the place where the 
harmful event occurred.160 West Tankers objected to the jurisdiction of the Syracuse 
court on the basis of the arbitration agreement contained in the original charterparty.  
While that action was pending, West Tankers applied to the English courts for a 
declaration that the dispute was subject to arbitration and an anti-suit injunction 
restraining any proceedings by the insurer other than London arbitration. This was 
granted because under English law a party pursuing a subrogated right is also 
subrogated into an arbitration clause binding on the original parties to the dispute.161 
The same is not necessarily true in Italian law, and though the New York Convention 
points to the law of the seat of the arbitration (in this case English law) as the 
appropriate law to resolve this question, it is unclear what result the Italian court might 
have reached as to its own jurisdiction. 162 The insurer appealed the anti-suit injunction 
to the House of Lords, which made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on 
the question: 
‘Is it consistent with [the Brussels I Regulation] for a court of a Member state to make 
an order to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in another 
Member state on the ground that such proceedings are in breach of an arbitration 
agreement?’163 
Several previous Court of Justice decisions provide relevant context to the decision in 
West Tankers. The first is Turner, in which the Court held that the English courts were 
not entitled to issue an anti-suit injunction to restrain vexatious proceedings before a 
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Spanish court.164 This decision is rooted in the mutual trust that is supposed to exist 
between the European member states and the fact that anti-suit injunctions represent 
an interference with the jurisdiction of a foreign court.165 The Turner decision also 
took place against the background of a continental European tradition that rejects the 
anti-suit injunction as a common-law remedy that is offensive to sovereignty and the 
principles of comity.166 
Further relevant cases are those in which the Court of Justice has held that a member 
state court must be allowed to determine its own jurisdiction under the Brussels 
Regime without interference from the courts of other member states.167 These cases 
are obviously of some relevance to the question of whether a court can enjoin Brussels 
I Regulation proceedings in another member state in defence of an arbitration 
agreement. 
Several factors, however, could have set the West Tankers judgment apart from these 
previous cases. The main factor was the arbitration exclusion, and the scope already 
given to the exclusion in the Marc Rich case, which held that the existence of an action 
on the merits in another member state should not interfere with court proceedings in 
support of arbitration.168 Ancillary proceedings should therefore theoretically be 
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allowed to proceed free from interference by the Brussels I Regulation. Furthermore, 
since The Angelic Grace,169 the English courts had readily issued anti-suit injunctions 
in support of arbitration, and commentators, including even some eminent civilian 
scholars in the Heidelberg Report, have argued that the protection of an arbitration 
agreement is a situation in which issuing an anti-suit injunction could be considered 
justifiable.170 Finally, it should be noted that London is one of the few truly thriving 
international arbitration hubs in Europe, and it was feared that any interference with 
England’s arbitration procedure might harm London’s arbitration practice.171 In the 
totality of the circumstances, and especially because of the arbitration exclusion, it was 
entirely conceivable that the Court of Justice might deviate from its previous line of 
reasoning, described above. 
The Court, however, remained consistent in its approach to the anti-suit injunction. It 
ruled that the Italian action, as a claim in tort, fell within the scope of the Regulation, 
holding: ‘because of the subject-matter of the dispute, that is, the nature of the rights 
to be protected in proceedings, such as a claim for damages, those proceedings come 
within the scope of [the Brussels I Regulation], a preliminary issue concerning the 
applicability of an arbitration agreement, including in particular its validity, also comes 
within its scope of application’.172  
Combined with the previous jurisprudence of the court, this means that a court seised 
with a merits action must be allowed to determine its own jurisdiction, including the 
validity of the alleged arbitration agreement.173 This is true even where another 
Member State court has referred the parties to arbitration in ancillary proceedings, 
because that judgment is excluded from the Regulation and has no automatic effect 
under the Regulation outwith the territory of the state in which it was issued. In West 
Tankers, the English courts had to allow the Italian proceedings to run their course, 
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and the Italian court to determine whether it would accept jurisdiction under the 
Regulation or refuse it under New York Convention Art II (3) or its own implementing 
legislation.174 The mutual trust between the courts of the member states required this 
result.175 
The outcome was that, although the English proceedings for a declaration that the 
dispute is subject to arbitration and for an anti-suit injunction fell outwith the scope of 
the Brussels Regime, the English court was not competent to issue an injunction to 
restrain proceedings falling within the Regime’s scope. This arguably demonstrates 
less about the scope of the exclusion of arbitration and more about the interaction of 
excluded proceedings with Brussels Regime proceedings, on which view West Tankers 
and Marc Rich are in fact consistent.  
Criticism of the West Tankers decision has been heated, but has largely focussed on 
its implications for English practice and for the future of London as an arbitration 
venue.176 It has also been criticised for removing the anti-suit injunction from the 
English procedural armoury without fashioning an acceptable replacement under the 
Regulation, such as the lis pendens rule covering court proceedings.177 These 
criticisms aside, the decision is consistent with the Court of Justice’s previous rulings 
on the arbitration exclusion in Marc Rich, on anti-suit injunctions in Turner, and on 
the right of a court to assess its own jurisdiction under the Brussels Regime in Overseas 
Union, Turner, and Gasser. It is difficult to see what other conclusion the court could 
have reached without departing from at least some of its earlier decisions. 
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(4) The Gazprom case 
The Gazprom case concerned a dispute between shareholders in a Lithuanian natural 
gas company. The principal shareholders at the relevant time were Gazprom (Russia), 
EON (Germany), and the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy. The three were party to a 
shareholders’ agreement concluded in 2004 that contained an arbitration clause. 
In 2011, the Ministry of Energy began proceedings in the Vilnius District Court 
requesting an investigation into the activities of a legal person. The proposed subject 
of the investigation was the natural gas company, its general manager, and two of its 
board members, who were Russian nationals appointed by Gazprom. 
Gazprom believed that these court proceedings violated the arbitration clause in the 
shareholders’ agreement and commenced arbitration against the Ministry of Energy at 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The arbitral tribunal issued an award ordering 
the Ministry to withdraw or amend some of its claims before the Vilnius District Court. 
The award did not include penalties for non-compliance. 
The Vilnius District Court ignored the arbitral award, holding that an investigation of 
the activities of a legal person fell within its jurisdiction and was not capable of 
settlement by arbitration. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Lithuania, considering the 
arbitral awards to amount to an anti-suit injunction, referred some questions relating 
to the dispute to the Court of Justice.178 The questions referred included, inter alia: 
‘Whether, if an arbitral tribunal issues an antisuit injunction by which it restricts a 
party from bringing a case with certain claims before a court of a Member State, which, 
under the rules of jurisdiction in the Brussels I Regulation, has jurisdiction to rule on 
the merits of the civil case, the court of a Member State has the right to refuse to 
recognize such arbitral award, because the award restricts the court's right to determine 
itself whether it has jurisdiction in the case under the rules of jurisdiction in the 
Brussels I Regulation.’ 
And: 
                                                 
178 Lithuania No 2 – OAO Gazprom v The Republic of Lithuania, represented by the Ministry of Energy 
of the Republic of Lithuania, Court of Appeal of Lithuania, 17 December 2012; Civil Case No 3K-7-





‘Can a national court, seeking to safeguard the primacy of EU law and the full 
effectiveness of the Brussels I Regulation, refuse to recognise an award of an arbitral 
tribunal if such an award restricts the right of the national court to decide on its own 
jurisdiction and powers in a case which falls within the scope of the Brussels I 
Regulation?’ 179 
This case was decided under the Brussels I Regulation, not the Brussels I Recast, the 
proceedings having been started before January 2015. The two quoted questions 
appear to ask roughly the same thing: whether or not a member state court can refuse 
to recognise and enforce an arbitral award that constitutes an anti-suit injunction 
because of the provisions of the Brussels Regulation. The right to refuse enforcement 
of an arbitral award can only be exercised under the New York Convention, and, as 
far as protecting the jurisdiction regime of the Brussels I Regulation is concerned, only 
under the public policy exception at Art V (2) (b). In other words, even if the provisions 
of the Brussels I Regulation obligate the enforcing state to refuse to recognise and 
enforce an arbitral award, the actual refusal of enforcement will take place under the 
New York Convention’s public policy exception. The questions can therefore be 
treated as asking whether the Brussels Regulation scheme of jurisdiction gives rise to 
a public policy defence to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award under 
Art V (2) (b) New York Convention. The difference between the two is that the former 
question effectively asks whether the provisions of the Regulation obligate the 
enforcing country to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award, and the second 
asks, if the first question is answered negatively, whether the provisions nonetheless 
permit non-enforcement. 
The Court of Justice took a narrow approach to the questions asked, only answering 
those questions actually put to it in the precise scenario put to it. This meant answering 
only whether the jurisdiction provisions of the Brussels Regulation (not the Recast) 
can oblige or allow a member state court to find public policy grounds to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of this specific kind of arbitral anti-suit injunction under 
the New York Convention. The Court held that it is permissible to enforce such an 
arbitral anti-suit injunctions because an arbitral tribunal is not subject to the same 
requirement to act in a spirit of mutual trust as a national court, and because the 
                                                 




question of recognition and enforcement of the award was to be decided under the New 
York Convention or implementing national legislation.180 This holding may however 
be limited on its facts to the situation where the arbitral anti-suit injunction does not 
carry a penalty and therefore its recognition cannot prevent the court of a second 
member state from ruling on its own jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation.181 In 
that situation, the court addressed by the anti-suit injunction can decide freely whether 
or not to enforce the award, thereby deciding on its own jurisdiction. 
Under the Brussels I Regulation, there remains an argument that a member state court 
should not enforce an arbitral award that constitutes a true anti-suit injunction – i.e. 
one that provides for penalties for non-compliance – against the jurisdiction of another 
member state court. This is because, in West Tankers, the English courts were 
prohibited from issuing an anti-suit injunction in ancillary proceedings falling entirely 
outwith the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, because to do so would interfere with 
the Regulation jurisdiction of another member state court, thereby undermining the 
spirit and purpose of the Regulation. There is no obvious reason why the approach to 
enforcing an arbitral award that does the same thing should be any different. Even if 
the New York Convention takes precedence over the Brussels I Regulation, it may 
only to do so insofar as it is consistent with the aims and purposes of the Regulation.182 
The Court of Justice certainly emphasised the lack of penalties for non-compliance as 
distinguishing the arbitral anti-suit injunction in Gazprom from the state-court-issued 
anti-suit injunction in West Tankers.183 It may therefore be argued that, as a matter of 
European Union policy, the correct approach to a true arbitral anti-suit injunction 
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would be to refuse enforcement, and that the Gazprom decision can be limited to the 
situation where an arbitral ‘anti-suit injunction’ does not provide for penalities for non-
compliance.  
The second question was ignored by the Court of Justice, but if it were to have been 
answered, the Court would have been very unlikely to state what should or should not 
be considered part of a member state’s public policy under New York Convention Art 
V (2) (b). The Court has refused to determine what forms part of a member state’s 
public policy even under the Brussels Regime, though it has been willing to give 
general guidance on how to determine what rises to the level of European public 
policy.184 If determining the content of member state public policy under the Brussels 
Regulation is ultra vires the Court of Justice, then so must be determining the content 
of public policy under the New York Convention. Indeed, even suggesting what might 
be considered public policy under the New York Convention is clearly far beyond the 
remit of the Court. 
The Gazprom decision addresses a very narrow set of facts and adds little to the 
understanding of the arbitration exclusion under the Brussels I Regulation. It is 
consistent with West Tankers, unless it can be understood to mean that a genuine anti-
suit injunction against the jurisdiction of a member state court issued by an arbitral 
tribunal and providing for penalties for non-compliance could be freely enforced in 
any other EU member state. It is submitted that Gazprom is actually limited on its facts 
to arbitral anti-suit injunctions that do not provide for penalties for non-compliance, 
and therefore cannot prevent a member state court from ruling on its own jurisdiction. 
In this sense, it is submitted, the decision is entirely consistent with West Tankers. 
(5) The scope of the exclusion summarised 
What emerges from these cases is a subject-matter test: the substantive issue of the 
case before a national court determines the applicability of the Brussels Regime. The 
fact that a preliminary matter of the validity of the arbitration clause would logically 
seem to be excluded from the scope of the Brussels Regime is irrelevant – that 
                                                 




preliminary matter is secondary to the substantive question before the court. 
Proceedings ancillary to arbitration are excluded from the scope of the Brussels 
Regime, are not subject to interference from Brussels Regime proceedings, but equally 
cannot prevent the continuation of proceedings that do fall within the Regime’s scope. 
The exception to this rule is the provision of interim measures, where one must look 
beyond the arbitration agreement to the substantive rights to be protected in 
determining the applicability of the Brussels Regime. 
B. Consequences of exclusion 
The scope of the exclusion from the Brussels Regime being established, it is now 
necessary to identify the problems that the given scope creates or exacerbates. This 
section of this chapter will examine the problems caused by the exclusion of arbitration 
with reference to relevant cases. The problems identified will include: the problem of 
scope itself; the parallel proceedings problem; the declaratory judgment problem; the 
treatment of various judgments relating to arbitration; and the problem of conflict 
between awards and judgments. This section will conclude with the argument that 
these issues – many of them commonplace in the rest of the world – are particularly 
problematic within Europe under the Brussels Regime. Where any of the analysis 
presented here has potentially been changed under the Brussels I Recast, this will be 
noted in passing and will be subject to further discussion in the next chapter. 
(1) The scope of the exclusion 
As has been identified above, defining the scope of the blanket exclusion of arbitration 
has caused difficulty. Litigation directly concerning the scope of the arbitration 
exclusion has come before the Court of Justice four times, producing arguably 
inconsistent results. Van Uden is arguably inconsistent with Marc Rich, as it 
undermines the notion of a broad and all-encompassing arbitration exclusion.185 West 
Tankers again has been argued to be inconsistent with Marc Rich and van Uden as the 
Brussels Regime appears to interfere with proceedings excluded from its scope, 
thereby indirectly expanding that scope.186 Gazprom may in turn be inconsistent with 
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West Tankers as it may reintroduce the indirect restraint of foreign proceedings by the 
back door. Whilst these arguments on inconsistency really depend on the focus placed 
on different parts of the judgments, they serve to underline the complexity of defining 
the scope of the exclusion in a consistent and predictable fashion.  
The scope of the exclusion has now been defined more fully by way of a recital to the 
Brussels I Recast. As will be discussed below, the recital far from resolves all the 
issues about the scope of the arbitration exclusion. There may yet be the need for 
further litigation to address new scope-based concerns.187  
The recurring need for litigation and legislative reform to define the scope of the 
exclusion signifies the confusion and the difficulty that it has caused. The may link 
back to the discussion in the previous chapter of how the arbitration exclusion may 
have been included less as a thoroughly thought out rule and more to simplify the 
process of the conclusion of the Brussels Convention. A poorly justified, poorly 
thought out, and vague rule will inevitably necessitate more judicial intervention than 
would a clear and well-thought out rule. It is at any rate submitted that the difficulties 
in defining and redefining the scope of the arbitration exclusion are themselves a 
problem with the exclusion as originally drafted. It is furthermore highly unlikely that 
these problems have been resolved by the detail included in the recitals to the Brussels 
I Recast. 
(2) Parallel proceedings  
In September 2007, the Heidelberg Report on the Brussels I Regulation was published 
ahead of the recasting process which would culminate in the Brussels I Recast. The 
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report was the result of a two-year consultation188 with officials from the then 28 
member state jurisdictions in which the Regulation applies.189 
Question 1.5 of questionnaire 3 reads: ‘Should the scope of application be extended, 
especially to incorporate arbitration and mediation proceedings?’ The vast majority of 
the officials that responded to the questionnaire answered in the negative in respect of 
arbitration, believing that the New York Convention created a sufficient international 
structure for the enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards, thereby repeating the 
standard justification for the arbitration exclusion.190 The few positive responses 
generally came from countries with relatively little involvement in international 
arbitration and were either sparsely reasoned or unreasoned.191 Many of the negative 
responses to the questionnaire did, however, raise concerns about the interface 
between the Regulation and arbitration. These concerns will be given central 
importance in this and the following subsections of this thesis. 
The problem that has been described as the most serious at the interface between the 
Brussels Regime and arbitration is that of parallel proceedings.192 ‘Parallel 
proceedings’, as the name may suggest, occur when the same issue is simultaneously 
litigated in more than one different forum. This is obviously undesirable as it is 
inefficient, creates uncertainty, and can result in a race to judgment or the existence of 
conflicting decisions in the same case, contrary to the aims and purposes of the 
Brussels Regime.193 
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The arbitration exclusion as defined by the Court of Justice contributes to the parallel 
proceedings problem in the following way. Because of the arbitration exclusion, when 
a dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement, proceedings in one member state to 
begin arbitration under that agreement do not preclude court proceedings in another 
member state seeking a determination on the merits, despite the fact that both courts 
will have to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement as a preliminary matter. 
Similarly, the commencement of proceedings before an arbitral tribunal will have no 
effect on the availability of proceedings on the merits before another member state 
court. 
It may be that the court at the seat of arbitration or the arbitral tribunal on the one hand 
and the court in a second member state hearing a merits action on the other will reach 
the same conclusion as to jurisdiction. In a case where the arbitration agreement is 
valid at the seat of the arbitration, that would mean the court hearing the merits action 
should refer the parties to arbitration under Art II (3) New York Convention or its own 
implementing legislation. In this case the party pursuing a claim in arbitration will 
have had to expend resources contesting the jurisdiction of the court hearing the merits 
action in the second member state on the basis of the arbitration agreement. This may 
even prove impossible in cases where there is a financial imbalance between the 
parties, or the party pursuing a claim in arbitration could find itself so frustrated or 
financially exhausted by the whole saga that it agrees to settle the case when it 
otherwise may not have.194 This leaves real scope for ‘guerrilla warfare’ or tactical 
litigation by the respondent in the arbitration. 
Although such parallel litigation of the validity of the arbitration agreement is 
objectionable, this situation may also foreseeably develop into the dual litigation of 
the dispute as a whole. Different courts seised of the same problem may apply different 
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law, or simply reach different conclusions on the facts.195 It is possible, then, that an 
arbitration agreement is valid at the seat, but is found to be somehow invalid by a court 
otherwise having jurisdiction under the Brussels Regime. The result would be the 
parallel arbitration and litigation of the entire dispute. Followed to its logical 
conclusion, this could also mean the existence of conflicting awards and judgments in 
the same dispute. 
The German response to the Heidelberg Study identified this problem.196 The authors 
of the Heidelberg Report itself even highlighted the need for a device ‘as effective as 
an English anti-suit injunction or the French doctrine of the negative effect of the 
competence-competence,’197 to discourage the bad-faith ‘obstruction’ of arbitration 
agreements.198 As stated above, parallel proceedings have also been described in 
scholarship as ‘the most serious of the many debated issues’ surrounding the 
arbitration exclusion,199 while the English unrest at the prohibition of the anti-suit 
injunction in West Tankers, summarised above, is clearly based on concern that the 
Commercial Court has been deprived of its power to restrain parallel proceedings in 
order to protect arbitration agreements. 
The desire to address the difficulties caused by parallel proceedings is plainly evident 
as the West Tankers saga rumbles on into a new decade, with English lawyers and 
courts seeking new ways to defend agreements to arbitrate. The West Tankers case 
began with a maritime collision in the year 2000. It was referred to the Court of Justice 
in 2007, and judgment on the preliminary reference was handed down in early 2009. 
It would have been optimistic to assume the protracted litigation would end there.  
In 2008 the arbitral tribunal seised of the dispute issued an award stating that West 
Tankers was not liable to Allianz in respect of the collision. Allianz had taken no part 
in the arbitration. After the Court of Justice ruling was handed down in 2009, the 
insurer continued its action before the Italian courts in the hope of obtaining judgment 
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against West Tankers. In 2010 Simon J granted leave to enforce the arbitral award as 
a judgment in England under s 66 (1) and (2) Arbitration Act 1996. West Tankers 
hoped thereby to pre-empt any attempt to enforce an Italian judgment against it in 
England, because such enforcement would thereafter be contrary to a judgment already 
rendered between the parties in England.200  
Allianz then sought to have the order that the award be entered as a judgment set aside 
on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction to make such an order.201 The order was 
upheld, Field J ruling that West Tankers had demonstrated that it ‘has a real prospect 
of establishing the primacy of the award over an inconsistent judgment.’202 This 
decision was upheld on appeal.203 
It may well be that this enforcement of a declaratory award serves as protection against 
the enforcement of a subsequent judgment in the English courts, and commentators 
have welcomed the decisions.204 It cannot, of course, serve to protect against 
enforcement of a judgment under the Brussels Regime in any other member state. This 
is because ‘judgments on judgments’ – that is, decisions to recognise and enforce a 
judgment or to refuse the same – do not fall within the scope of the Brussels Regime.205 
An enforcement action in a third member state would therefore most likely fall to be 
decided as a question of competing public policies.206 
Since then, the West Tankers litigation has been back before the English courts. This 
time it appeared in the form of an appeal on a point of law under s 69 Arbitration Act 
1996 against the decision of the arbitrators that they could not issue damages against 
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legal fees and expenses incurred by West Tankers in Italy, nor could it indemnify West 
Tankers against any pecuniary judgment rendered against it in Italy. This claim was 
founded on the breach of duty to arbitrate. The High Court allowed the appeal, holding 
that the tribunal was free from the constraints placed on national courts by European 
Law, and that indemnity is a logical consequence of a declaratory award of non-
liability,207 and considered that the tribunal also had jurisdiction to award equitable 
damages for breach of the duty to arbitrate.208 
This would effectively amount to the granting of an anti-suit injunction by arbitrators, 
an action whose legitimacy was at issue in the Gazprom case.209 As has been argued 
above, the Gazprom decision does not address an arbitral anti-suit injunction that 
provides for a penalty for non-enforcement, so the legitimacy of the above anti-suit 
injunction in West Tankers is still dubious.  
At any rate, as West Tankers rumbles on towards its 15th year and further similar cases 
come before the Court of Justice, it serves to show the lengths parties will go to in the 
hope of avoiding conflicting awards and judgments. The exclusion of arbitration from 
the Brussels Regime combined with the prohibition of anti-suit injunctions has forced 
parties to arbitration agreements down new and inventive roads to protect those 
agreements. Where next is anybody’s guess. 
Indeed, the arbitration exclusion and the West Tankers decision can be criticised on 
the basis that they leave no effective mechanism to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction and 
parallel proceedings when they do arise. This author has argued in a separate paper 
that the prohibition of the anti-suit injunction was inevitable, and indeed wholly 
desirable, in cases falling within the scope of the Brussels Regime.210 This is because 
the Brussels Regime resolves conflicts of jurisdiction through its lis pendens rules in 
a fashion more consistent with the aims and principles of European Union than does 
the unilateral injunction of proceedings before courts in one member state by the courts 
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of another.211 Furthermore, because the English courts had been relatively hesitant to 
issue anti-suit injunctions for any reason other than to protect a contractual right to sue 
or be sued in a particular forum, it is in fact only in a tiny minority of non-arbitration 
cases in which a litigant will find itself relying on the judgement of a foreign court 
applying the lis pendens rule rather than the unilateral action of an English court 
issuing an anti-suit injunction.212  
This is not the case where arbitration is concerned. In West Tankers the Court of Justice 
removed the anti-suit injunction from the procedural armoury of the English courts. 
That it did so was understandable in the context of the ongoing project of ever-deeper 
European unification. What is regrettable is that it did so without providing any 
workable alternative to reduce or eliminate parallel proceedings to arbitration. The 
only hope for the prevention of parallel proceedings is now the uniform interpretation 
and application of the New York Convention, which, as argued in the previous chapter, 
is unlikely, given the variety in implementing legislation and approaches of courts, 
together with the lack of a supranational authority to ensure uniform application.213 
The arbitration exclusion as currently interpreted therefore not only allows parallel 
proceedings, but takes away the only widely acknowledged as successful, non-Regime 
method of preventing such parallel proceedings, albeit one that the courts of only some 
member states had at their disposal.214 
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It should be noted that these concerns are not raised as an argument in favour of taking 
the regressive step of reinstating of the anti-suit injunction.215 The arguments for a 
more co-operative, trust-based approach to conflicts of jurisdiction are well-founded 
and will be expanded upon in much greater detail in later chapters.216 This section 
should serve merely to highlight another difficulty of the arbitration exclusion as 
currently understood: that it encourages parallel proceedings and removes the member 
states’ ability to deal with them unilaterally, while not providing an alternative solution 
within the Brussels Regime. As has been argued in scholarship, ‘greater uniformity of 
European procedural laws [has] been bought at the expense of the loss of yet another 
sophisticated tool developed by English courts, which will take away from Europe's 
competitiveness in the international arbitration arena’.217 Whilst the above author 
clearly writes in defence of the anti-suit injunction, it is submitted that the provision 
of a European alternative would significantly soften the blow of the anti-suit 
injunction’s loss. 
It can thus be seen that the possibility of parallel proceedings in arbitration is one of 
the most widely agreed upon and most serious issues with the exclusion of arbitration 
from the Brussels Regime. The importance of preventing parallel proceedings will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapter, as part of an analysis of the Brussels 
I Recast’s failure to deal with the problem. At this stage of this thesis, it is sufficient 
to note that problem exists and is widely acknowledged. 
(3) Declaratory judgments 
Another concern raised in the Heidelberg Study is that the current blanket exclusion 
of arbitration effectively renders declaratory judgments as to the validity or invalidity 
of an arbitration agreement ineffective internationally.218 The authors of the 
Heidelberg Report note that, though they believe this will rarely adversely affect 
parties in practice, it is nevertheless an unsatisfactory situation.219 Why the authors 
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consider that this problem would be of little practical significance is never explained 
and is not immediately obvious. 
Courts will often be asked for a declaratory judgment on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement.220 This action can be raised as a preliminary matter before both 
proceedings ancillary to arbitration or actions on the merits of a case.221 It may be 
raised before the courts of the place where arbitration is intended to take place, or the 
courts of another country.222 
There are therefore effectively four fact patterns in which a court may be asked for a 
declaratory judgment on the validity of an arbitration agreement. This section will now 
evaluate the effectiveness of the declaratory judgments rendered in each of these fact 
patterns. 
(a) Ancillary action at the seat of arbitration (a member state) 
(b) Ancillary action in the courts of another member state 
(c) Merits action at the seat of arbitration (a member state) 
(d) Merits action in the courts of another member state 
Any of these actions could require a court to make a declaratory judgment as to the 
effect of an arbitration agreement. Only the judgment in scenario (c), a merits action 
at the seat of the arbitration, would ever have been capable of meaningful international 
effect. However, following the recast process, the declaratory judgment in none of the 
above scenarios is capable of any international effect. The analysis presented here will 
focus first on the situation pre-Recast, then the changes made by the Recast will be 
presented in brief, before being analysed in greater detail in the following chapter.223 
In all of the following examples it should be assumed that all the claims discussed 
would fall within the substantive scope of the Brussels Regime but for the existence 
of an arbitration agreement, such as a contractual claim or a claim in tort. 
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(a) Ancillary action at the seat of arbitration 
This is the situation in the English action in West Tankers with the anti-suit injunction 
stripped away. The English court was asked for a declaratory judgment that the dispute 
was subject to arbitration in the hope that the insurer would commence London 
arbitration instead of Italian court proceedings. Under the combined case law of Marc 
Rich and West Tankers ancillary proceedings fall outwith the scope of the Brussels 
Regime, as does any preliminary assessment of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. As these proceedings fall outwith the scope of the Brussels Regime, the 
judgment handed down will not be enforceable under the Regime in any other form of 
case in any other member state, whether ancillary to arbitration or on the merits. 
Furthermore, according to the West Tankers judgment, a decision in proceedings 
outside the scope of the Brussels Regime cannot interfere with the determination of 
jurisdiction in proceedings falling within its scope. A declaratory judgment in ancillary 
proceedings is therefore not capable of any international effect under the Brussels I 
Regulation. This analysis remains unchanged under the Brussels I Recast. 
(b) Ancillary action in another member state 
Ancillary action is occasionally required in a country other than the seat of the 
arbitration, for example to have a court with personal jurisdiction refer an 
uncooperative party to arbitration or assist in the taking of evidence. These courts 
would presumably make their own preliminary review of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, which may not match the assessment made by the court at the seat of 
arbitration or by the arbitrators. The judgment in these ancillary proceedings would 
also be excluded from the scope of the Brussels Regime and not enforceable 
thereunder. This is unlikely to prove problematic, as such ancillary support would most 
likely be sought in relation to an arbitration already commenced at the seat. This 
analysis also remains unchanged under the Brussels I Recast. 
(c) Merits action at the seat of arbitration 
This is the only scenario in which a declaratory judgment would have had meaningful 




arbitration was seised with an action on the merits of the dispute, the proceedings 
would have fallen within the scope of the Brussels Regime. According to Marc Rich 
and West Tankers, a preliminary determination of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement would also have fallen within the scope of the Regime because reference is 
made solely to the principal subject matter of the dispute in determining the Regime’s 
applicability.224 In that case, the principal subject matter would have been an action on 
the merits, falling within the scope of the Brussels Regime. The courts of any other 
member state later seised of the same merits action would have had to order a stay, 
pending the resolution of the case at the seat. If the court at the seat determined that it 
had no jurisdiction under Art II (3) New York Convention or that state’s own 
implementing legislation, the determination would have fallen within the Brussels 
Regime and would, it is submitted, have been binding in respect of merits actions in 
other Member States. It would, however, have had no automatic effect under the 
Regulation in ancillary proceedings in another member state, which would themselves 
fall outside the scope of the Brussels Regime, and therefore would be unaffected by 
proceedings falling within the Regime’s scope, as per Marc Rich. It is submitted, 
therefore, that this is one situation in which a declaratory judgment would have had 
meaningful automatic international effect pre-Recast. 
Now that the Brussels I Recast is in force, it appears this will no longer be the case. As 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, the Brussels I Recast 
contains a recital stating, in relevant part, that a judgment of the court of a member 
state on the validity of an arbitration agreement should not be capable of recognition 
and enforcement under the Recast, regardless of whether or not it is decided as a 
preliminary matter.225 Assuming operative effect is given to the recital over the case 
law of the Court of Justice, declaratory judgments on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement will have no international effect. 
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(d) Merits action in another member state 
When a court in a member state other than the seat is seised of an action on the merits 
of a dispute potentially subject to a valid arbitration agreement, it will have to 
determine the preliminary matter of the validity of that arbitration agreement. 
According to Marc Rich, this judgment will not affect the ability of courts at the seat 
of arbitration to make their own determination of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement in ancillary proceedings, nor will it prevent the commencement of 
proceedings before a tribunal, as both of these actions fall outwith the scope of the 
Brussels Regime. If the court seised of the merits action decides that there is a valid 
arbitration agreement, this will not automatically bind the court at the seat to find 
likewise in ancillary proceedings. Furthermore, if that court finds that there is no valid 
arbitration agreement and accepts jurisdiction, this does not preclude courts at the seat 
finding that the agreement is valid and referring the parties to parallel arbitral 
proceedings. Of course following the analysis described above the judgment of the 
court seised on the merits as to the validity of the arbitration agreement would bind 
another member state court later seised of the same merits action. This is not likely to 
be of any practical significance, as difficulties are more likely to arise when one party 
believes the dispute to be subject to court jurisdiction and the other believes it to be 
subject to arbitration. In the scenario where both believe the dispute to be subject to 
the jurisdiction of different courts, it may be argued that they have constructively 
agreed to terminate their arbitration agreement. 
When the Recast enters into force, the declaratory judgment in these cases will have 
no automatic international effect under the Recast, as mentioned above. 
(e) Summary 
In summary, before the Brussels I Recast was passed, the fears expressed by 
respondents in the Heidelberg Study that declaratory judgments concerning the 
validity of arbitration agreements were an internationally ineffective remedy were well 
founded. Almost any kind of conceivable declaratory judgment was incapable of 
meaningful international effect. Now that the Brussels I Recast has entered into force, 




obviously troubled the authors of the Heidelberg Report, yet it remains an issue several 
years on. 
(4) Treatment of judgments rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement 
The Heidelberg report highlights an inconsistency in the approach of member state 
courts to the recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in spite of a 
potentially valid arbitration agreement.226 The Brussels Regime does not provide for 
the refusal of recognition and enforcement of a Regime judgment on the basis that it 
violates an arbitration agreement.227 It does, however, provide that a judgment shall 
not be recognised if it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the state in which 
recognition is sought.228 
Courts in England have suggested that they may rely on this public policy exception 
to justify refusing to enforce foreign judgments that they consider to violate an 
arbitration agreement.229 A German court, on the other hand, has used similar 
reasoning to the Court of Justice in West Tankers, enforcing judgments on the validity 
of an arbitration agreement as a matter incidental to a merits dispute without raising a 
question of public policy.230  
In the Fincantieri cases, the Paris Court of Appeal refused to recognise the judgment 
of a Genoan court seised on the merits taking jurisdiction under the Brussels Regime, 
because the Parisian court considered the dispute to be subject to a prima facie valid 
arbitration agreement.231 In Bamberger the English courts suggested they may refuse 
to enforce a judgment considered to violate an arbitration agreement.232 This position 
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is also enshrined in UK legislation in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, 
although this provision is not supposed to interfere with the enforcement of otherwise 
enforceable Brussels Regime judgments.233 The reasoning in Bamberger was followed 
in obiter comments at first instance in National Navigation I,234 but overturned as part 
of the ratio decidendi on appeal in National Navigation II, which will be discussed in 
more detail below.235 The public policy implications of enforcing a judgment rendered 
in violation of an arbitration agreement has been subject of much legal debate in 
England, and the matter may yet be considered not fully settled.236  
Indeed, the degree of difference in the approaches of even arbitration-friendly member 
states to the validity of an arbitration agreement at the enforcement stage is highlighted 
in the ‘Dallah saga’,237 in which French and English courts took opposite views on the 
applicability of an arbitration agreement to a non-signatory of that agreement. An 
award against the non-signatory was refused recognition and enforcement in England 
on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction,238 which it was subsequently granted by the Paris 
Court of Appeal.239 Although this case concerns the validity of an arbitration 
agreement at the recognition and enforcement stage, it nonetheless demonstrates the 
potential for conflicting interpretations. 
The decisions in National Navigation in particular are valuable in illustrating the 
complexity of the issues raised by the question of enforcing a judgment rendered in 
spite of an arbitration agreement, especially the interplay between the black letter law 
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and overarching public policy considerations. It is therefore useful to discuss these 
decisions in more depth. 
The principal parties in the National Navigation cases were NNC, the Egyptian owner 
of the ship named The Wadi Sudr, and Endesa, a Spanish power company. Endesa was 
named as consignee on a bill of lading for a shipment of coal aboard The Wadi Sudr. 
The bill of lading in the case was designed to be used with charterparties and provided 
that the relevant charterparties would be incorporated. There were two potentially 
relevant charterparties, both of which contained a clause for London Maritime 
Arbitrator’s Association (‘LMAA’) arbitration. One of the charterparties also 
contained a choice of English law. 
The ship was damaged en route and the cargo had to be discharged at a port not 
contractually named. The coal was transported overland to the named port at Endesa’s 
expense. It became evident that Endesa intended to sue NNC for damages in respect 
of the expense of overland transport. 
Endesa applied to the Court of First Instance of Almeira, Spain, for the arrest of the 
vessel, which was granted ex parte. Its substantive claim was to follow within 30 days, 
which it duly did. Later on the same day the Almeira court was seised, unaware both 
of the Spanish action and the arbitration clause, NNC’s lawyers applied to the English 
courts for a declaration that it was not liable on the merits. The substantive claims on 
liability would fall within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.  
When its lawyers became aware of the arbitration clause, NNC challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Spanish court on that basis, claiming the clause was validly 
incorporated under English law. NNC also sought to begin LMAA arbitration. 
The Almeira court handed down a judgment dismissing NNC’s jurisdictional 
objection, holding that it had jurisdiction over the merits of the dispute. The English 
courts were then faced with the question of what to do with the action of which they 
were seised, in which the claims had been modified several times over to reflect the 




In National Navigation I, the operative part of the judgment relevant to this thesis was 
that the court was not required under the Brussels I Regulation to recognise the Spanish 
judgment on the validity of the arbitration clause.240 The judge also added obiter that, 
even if this conclusion was wrong, it would be ‘manifestly contrary to the public policy 
of the United Kingdom’ to recognise the judgment, because, inter alia, ‘there is a clear 
statutory and conventional obligation under English law for an English court to give 
effect to an arbitration agreement that is valid in accordance with its proper law’.241 
This judgment was overturned on appeal in National Navigation II. The Court of 
Appeal ruled that the holding that there was no obligation under the Brussels I 
Regulation to recognise the Spanish court’s judgment as to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement was plainly wrong in light of the West Tankers decision.242 The 
court therefore had to consider in earnest the question of public policy raised in the 
obiter comments in National Navigation I. One of the two leading judgments relied on 
the case law of the Court of Justice to read the public policy exception narrowly,243 
holding that the potentially valid arbitration agreement did not give rise to any 
arguments on the grounds of public policy as envisaged by the Regulation.244 The other 
leading judgment stated: ‘[i]mportant though arbitration agreements undoubtedly are, 
I think [the judgment in National Navigation I] puts the matter rather too high. It is 
not, I think, contrary to public policy to recognise a judgment of a foreign court 
of competent jurisdiction simply on the grounds that an English court would have 
come to a different decision.’245 
It can therefore be seen that there is significant scope for confusion and difficulty at 
the interface between arbitration and the Brussels Regime. These cases also 
demonstrate the difficulty of defining public policy, which one English judge was 
ready to invoke to defend arbitration agreements, while others disagreed. 
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The National Navigation and other cases are raised here to illustrate the scope for 
recognition and enforcement problems under the Brussels Regime with an arbitration 
exclusion. The Brussels I Recast makes small changes in this respect, most notably 
reversing part of the ruling in West Tankers, with the effect that the decisions of the 
Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf and the English Court of Appeal in National 
Navigation II are now out of date insofar as they recognise a judgment on the validity 
of an arbitration clause. In general, though, as will be discussed below, the Brussels I 
Recast has if anything muddied the waters in respect of these recognition and 
enforcement problems. 
(5) Treatment of judgments confirming or setting aside arbitral awards 
A different enforcement question is raised by the differing treatment in member states 
of judgments confirming or setting aside an arbitration award. On the face of things it 
would seem obvious that, following the Court of Justice jurisprudence, the subject 
matter of such a judgment relates to arbitration and the judgment is therefore excluded 
from the Brussels Regime. According to the authors of the Heidelberg Report, 
however, this approach has not been uniformly adopted in the member states and some 
courts enforce such judgments under the Regulation.246 Of course, countries are free 
under the New York Convention to enforce judgments confirming or setting aside 
arbitral awards if they so choose.247 The problem with enforcing these judgments 
under the Regulation is that this implies an obligation to do so. If this obligation 
extends to confirming judgments, it would also cover set-aside judgments. This is 
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clearly at odds with the current practice in France, where confirmation or set-aside 
judgments are viewed as effective only where rendered.248 
Again it can be seen that the exclusion of arbitration has caused some confusion and 
divergent practices amongst the courts of member states. It should be noted that Recital 
12 of the Brussels I Recast now makes expressly clear that such actions should not be 
covered by the Brussels Regime. 
A logical extension of the exclusion of set-aside judgments from the Brussels Regime 
is that a problem can arise where multiple awards are rendered in the same dispute. 
This problem arises because many arbitration laws provide that, when set aside of an 
arbitral award is granted, the matter may be submitted to the arbitral tribunal for 
reconsideration and the award edited or another award rendered.249 Indeed it stands to 
reason that if an award is set aside in its entirety but the arbitral tribunal had good 
jurisdiction, for example where set aside was for a procedural irregularity, the only 
possible rehearing of the claims would occur in arbitration. This could result in 
multiple awards being rendered in the same dispute. If the courts of a second member 
state do not respect the result in the set-aside action and choose to enforce the first 
award, then the courts at the seat enforce the second award, the arbitral process 
becomes fraught with uncertainty and confusion.  
This was the scenario in the Putrabali cases.250 These cases concerned a contract for 
the sale of spices between Putrabali and a French buyer. The contract contained a 
clause for arbitration in London.  
The cargo was lost at sea and in 2000 Putrabali commenced arbitration in London in 
accordance with the International General Produce Association (IGPA) rules. The 
arbitral tribunal issued an award in favour of Putrabali (Award 1), which the buyer 
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successfully appealed to the IGPA Board of Appeal. In 2001 the Board reversed the 
tribunal, holding that the buyer was not liable for the contract price (Award 2). 
Putrabali in turn appealed the Board’s award to the High Court on a point of law under 
s 69 Arbitration Act 1996, as provided for by the IGPA Rules. Putrabali obtained in 
2002 partial set-aside of the award, with the case being remitted to IGPA arbitration.251 
In 2003, the arbitral tribunal issued a new award in favour of Putrabali (Award 3).  
In the meantime, however, the French buyer had been granted recognition of Award 2 
by the First Instance Court of Paris. Between 2005 and 2007, seeking enforcement of 
Award 3, Putrabali appealed the decision to recognise Award 2 to the French Supreme 
Court. The French Supreme Court upheld the decision to recognise Award 2.252 It was 
already clear that, in French law, the setting-aside of an award does not provide valid 
grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award.253 The court 
further reasoned that ‘[a]n international arbitral award, which is not anchored in any 
national legal order, is a decision of international justice whose validity must be 
ascertained with regard to the rules applicable in the country where its recognition and 
enforcement are sought.’254 As such, the fact that Award 2 had been set aside in 
England had no bearing on its ability to be recognised in France. Award 2 had been 
recognised, and therefore Award 3 could not be recognised and enforced as a matter 
of res judicata. 
This meant that Award 2 had been given effect in France, whilst Award 3 would 
presumably be enforced in England, assuming the French party had assets there. The 
approach of a third country to enforcement would depend on that country’s application 
of Art V (1) (e) New York Convention. 
The Putrabali decision has been subject of much commentary and detailed criticism.255 
This criticism and more will be discussed further below, in the context of discussions 
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about the delocalisation of arbitration and the potential solutions to the problems 
created by the arbitration exclusion as currently exists. For now, the case is mentioned 
to demonstrate a concrete, practical example of problems exacerbated by the exclusion 
of arbitration from the Brussels Regime. 
The disharmony and uncertainty inherent in this state of affairs is obvious, and could 
easily be solved by rethinking the arbitration exclusion. 
(6) Award and judgment conflict  
A logical extension of the parallel proceedings problem is the possibility of both an 
award and a judgment – possibly with different results – being rendered in the same 
case. If this were to happen, a raft of problems would ensue. The arbitral award would 
be enforceable worldwide under the New York Convention. The judgment would be 
enforceable within the European Union under the Brussels Regime. The approach of 
national courts to such a potential problem would be impossible to predict with any 
certainty.256  
The courts of the country in which the judgment was rendered would not enforce the 
arbitral award and most likely the courts of the country where the award was made 
would not enforce any judgment. Each could rely on the doctrine of res judicata or the 
relevant public policy exceptions to justify this decision.257 What would happen in the 
court of a third member state would be entirely impossible to predict. The New York 
Convention does not specifically allow non-enforcement on the basis of an existing 
judgment; nor does the Brussels Regulation allow non-enforcement on the basis of an 
existing arbitral award.258 This would therefore come down to public policy. The 
decision would involve a weighing of the public policy interests in enforcing the 
judgment or the award and there is no predicting how such a determination would end 
in any given case. There would undoubtedly be problems with defining the appropriate 
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scope of public policy under the New York Convention and within European Law.259 
English courts have already sought to address this problem by granting recognition of 
declaratory awards as judgments under s 66 (1) and (2) Arbitration Act 1996, thereby 
‘trumping’ inconsistent Regulation judgments by triggering the Art 34 (3) exception, 
at least in respect of enforcement actions in the UK.260 This situation breeds 
uncertainty, gives rise to potential inconsistencies in approach between member states, 
and is therefore clearly undesirable. 
It may be argued that the Brussels I Recast changes this situation through the language 
of Recital 12.261 This possibility will be addressed in full in the following chapter, 
where it will ultimately be submitted that a plain reading of the Brussels I Recast does 
not support this conclusion.262 
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(7) Why these are serious problems 
It may be pointed out that problems such as parallel proceedings, the ineffectiveness 
of declaratory judgments, the inconsistent treatment of judgments rendered in spite of 
arbitration agreements, and the varying treatment of judgments setting aside or 
confirming arbitral awards exist as a matter of course in the world beyond the Brussels 
Regime. There are, however, three major differences between the European situation 
and that in the world at large. Firstly, outside the territorial scope of the Brussels 
Regime, the courts do not face an obligation to enforce judgments; they have discretion 
to allow or refuse recognition and enforcement by granting or denying comity as they 
see fit. Within Europe, courts faced with such a judgment are bound to recognise and 
enforce judgments under the Brussels Regime.263 Where a judgment is rendered in 
spite of an arbitration agreement, the court is equally bound under the New York 
Convention to recognise and enforce what it views as a valid arbitration agreement, or 
a valid arbitral award if one has been rendered.264 This creates a potential conflict of 
international duties not generally existing in the rest of the world. Secondly, the 
European Union recognises and has the remit to address these problems. Finally, 
within Europe, there is supposed to be a spirit of judicial co-operation and mutual trust, 
which does not exist in the world at large, and which these problems undermine. This 
notion of mutual trust will be examined at length in Chapter 5, but it is mentioned here 
simply by way of explanation that the situation described above is undesirable and 
different in nature from the status quo in the world at large. 
C. Preliminary conclusions 
It has been shown that the scope of the arbitration exclusion has proved a controversial 
issue and has necessitated litigation before the Court of Justice. This litigation has only 
gone as far as partially defining the scope of the exclusion, with certain difficult 
questions remaining undecided. Furthermore, the scope as defined has created its own 
problems. Many of these problems could potentially be solved by a rethinking of the 
Brussels Regime’s relationship with arbitration. Such a rethinking at last became a 
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realistic prospect during the process of recasting the Brussels I Regulation. This thesis 
will now move on to consider the process of reform, the proposals presented, and the 





4. THE EXCLUSION WITHIN EUROPE PART 2 – THE BRUSSELS 
I RECAST 
The previous chapter argued that the interface between the Brussels I Regulation and 
arbitration was causing practical problems and was subject to much scrutiny when the 
recasting process began in 2005. With the EU’s having legislative authority over 
jurisdiction and a lengthy review of the Regulation’s provisions ahead, the ground was 
fertile for the Brussels Regime’s relationship with arbitration to be reformed.  
This chapter charts the process of recasting the Brussels I Regulation, from the 
Heidelberg Study to the adoption of the Recast in late 2012. The chapter shall first 
describe briefly the process of recasting, identifying the important milestones, 
documents, and travaux préparatoires that defined that process. It shall then identify 
the main proposals for reform, both legislative and in scholarship, and offer an 
evaluation of each. The next section shall present the relevant changes in the Brussels 
I Recast as passed, together with an assessment of these changes and their implications. 
The final section of this chapter shall offer some brief criticism of the minimal 
substantive reform in the Recast, leading to the conclusion that the Recast represents 
little-to-no real progress on the situation under the Brussels I Regulation. 
A. The recasting process 
In summary, the path by which the Recast became law is as follows. As mentioned 
earlier in this thesis, the Heidelberg Study was conducted in 2005 and included a 
question on whether the member state respondents thought arbitration should be 
brought within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. Most, but not all, member states 
answered negatively, but several identified problems at the interface between the 
Regulation and arbitration. These problems have been extensively discussed and the 
member-state responses cited in the previous chapter. 
The member state responses also formed the basis of the Heidelberg Report. The 
Heidelberg Report is very lengthy, thorough, and considers many aspects of the 




to the arbitration problem.265 The Heidelberg Report proposed sweeping reform of the 
Regulation’s relationship with arbitration, including deletion of the arbitration 
exception at Art 1 (2) (d), bringing court proceedings and judgments concerning 
arbitration within the scope of the Regulation.266 It would supplement these changes 
with a number of bespoke rules about the interface between the Regime and 
arbitration.267 These suggestions will be considered in more detail in the next section, 
but it is worth noting that one of the proposed provisions was the inclusion of a 
mandatory stay provision in favour of the courts of the seat of arbitration, regardless 
of the order in which the courts were seised.268 The Commission prepared a short 
report269 and circulated a Green Paper270 proposing roughly the changes advocated by 
the Heidelberg Report. 
Although this approach received some positive responses from Member States, the 
proposal was also harshly criticised, both by Member State respondents to the Green 
Paper and in literature, and ultimately a drastically scaled back proposal for reform 
was made.271 The proposal was to maintain the arbitration exclusion, but to insert a 
new lis pendens rule at (proposed) Art 29 (4), requiring a mandatory stay of 
proceedings on the merits when a court in proceedings ancillary to arbitration or an 
arbitral tribunal had been seised at the seat.272 This proposal shall again be considered 
in more detail in the following section. 
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The Parliament replied with a short Report strongly opposing the inclusion of 
arbitration in the Regulation to any extent.273 This was justified on the familiar basis 
that the New York Convention was thought to ‘satisfactorily deal with’ this area, and 
that no agreement could be reached between the member states on the Commission’s 
proposed lis pendens rule.274 The Parliament proposal even went so far as to suggest 
the reinstatement of the anti-suit injunction, fully reversing West Tankers.275 This 
proposal too will be considered in more detail in the following section.  
The Recast as passed is very close to the Parliament’s proposal. As will be 
demonstrated below, however, it could not be said to reverse West Tankers to the 
extent that the anti-suit injunction would be reinstated. 
B. Proposals for reform 
(1) Abolition of the arbitration exclusion 
It has been suggested that ‘pure and simple abolition of the arbitration exclusion’ is 
one of the possible solutions to the difficulties at the interface between the Brussels I 
Regulation and arbitration.276 ‘Abolition’ in this context means the deletion of Art 1 
(2) (d) without the insertion of any specialised rules for jurisdiction over court actions 
relating to arbitration. Solutions in which the exception is deleted and specialist rules 
added are known as ‘partial abolition’ of the exclusion.277 
Simply to delete the arbitration exclusion and let proceedings related to arbitration fall 
under the general jurisdictional rules of the Brussels I Regulation would be to take no 
account of the ‘peculiarities of arbitration’.278 The general rule of jurisdiction, for 
example, in the Brussels I Regulation is that a defendant may be sued in the courts of 
its domicile.279 In matters relating to arbitration, this would make little sense. Parties 
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tend to eschew each other’s places of business as venues for arbitration, the neutrality 
of the forum being one of the most attractive features of arbitration as a form of dispute 
resolution.280 The likely result is that courts other than those in the place in which the 
arbitration is set to take place would have jurisdiction over applications for ancillary 
measures, which makes no sense at all. Even if an arbitration agreement were viewed 
as a simple contract, and the courts at the place of the performance of the obligation in 
question – the place of arbitration in cases concerning the performance of an obligation 
to arbitrate – were to have jurisdiction under the Regulation, this would not provide a 
complete or workable solution.281 Not every arbitration agreement specifies where the 
arbitration is to be performed, and in such a situation the general rule of jurisdiction 
falling to the courts at the defendant’s domicile would be the only possibility to found 
jurisdiction.282 This would again mean the parties were forced into a court action in a 
forum that makes little practical sense. Furthermore, the courts of the parties’ 
domiciles would have jurisdiction over set-aside actions, which does not align with 
Art V (1) (e) New York Convention.283 This would be all the more troublesome given 
the likely fear of litigants that national courts hearing international cases tend to favour 
parties from their country. In short, the general rules of jurisdiction of the Brussels I 
Regulation are woefully ill-suited to allocate jurisdiction in court actions relating to 
arbitration. 
These examples are some of many reasons that the simple deletion of the arbitration 
exclusion would be unworkable. In a very thoroughly-referenced survey article, 
Radicati does not cite one serious advocate of this option.284 It was nevertheless 
discussed and is therefore raised in this thesis for completeness’s sake. 
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(2) Partial abolition of the arbitration exclusion 
However, various groups have seriously advocated the solution of ‘partial deletion’ of 
the arbitration exclusion in the sense described above. These include the authors of the 
Heidelberg Report and the Commission, through its Report and Green Paper. 
The Heidelberg Report proposes deletion of the arbitration exclusion at Art 1 (2) (d), 
bringing judgments concerning arbitration within the scope of the Regulation.285 It 
would supplement this with a number of bespoke rules at the interface between the 
Regime and arbitration. The first of these would be to add a paragraph 6 to Article 26 
(ex Art 22), giving exclusive jurisdiction in ancillary proceedings to the courts at the 
place of the arbitration.286 The Report also proposes adding to the Regulation a new 
lis pendens rule at Art 27A, requiring a mandatory stay of proceedings where the 
existence of an arbitration agreement is alleged and a court at the designated place of 
arbitration has been seised for declaratory relief.287 The final recommendation is the 
insertion of a recital defining the place of arbitration for the purposes of Arts 26 (6) 
and 27A.288 The Report proposes maintaining the prevalence of the New York 
Convention under Art 71, while providing for the non-enforcement of a Regulation 
judgment on the basis of a pre-existing arbitral award, as had been suggested in some 
of the literature.289 The Commission Green Paper argued for the adoption of these 
proposals,290 and several member states supported them in their responses to the Green 
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289 Heidelberg Report, above, see especially paras 129-131. See also van Houtte, above, 519-520. 




Paper.291 Such a solution had been suggested in earlier scholarship, and was also 
supported in later academic writing.292 
The argument in favour of this position is simple: the exclusion of arbitration has 
caused or exacerbated several problems, such as those outlined above, which deletion 
of that exclusion could solve.293 The argument is appealing for its simplicity, and it 
forms part of the argument for the partial deletion of the arbitration exclusion that will 
be presented later in this thesis. 
The Heidelberg Report and Commission proposal on the partial abolition of the 
exclusion has, however, been strongly criticised in the literature, as well as in some of 
the member state responses to the Green Paper.294 The criticism largely focused on 
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West Tankers and the EU green paper’ (2009) 12(4) Int ALR 56 (‘Pullen’); The Arbitration Committee 
of the IBA, ‘IBA Submission to the European Commission on Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001’ (2009) 10 
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om_en.pdf (last accessed: 21 April 2015), 7; Hungarian Response to the Commission’s Green Paper 





fears that the proposals would have caused arbitration law in progressive, pro-
arbitration countries to regress towards the mean, eroded arbitral competence-
competence, and undermined the operation of the New York Convention. This is 
because one member state with particularly strict requirements for, for example, the 
validity of an arbitration agreement could force other member states to apply those 
restrictions indirectly by issuing a Brussels I Regulation judgment on the validity of 
the arbitration agreement or setting aside an award. This state of affairs would be 
anathema to a pro-arbitration country such as France, which, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, does not recognise the judicial annulment of awards in another 
country under any circumstances.295 This proposal received scathing criticism in 
scholarship, including that it ‘would have backhandedly rammed through a pervasive 
regulation of arbitration that would have prematurely stifled the freedom of Member 
States…’.296 
The UK Ministry of Justice response to the Commission’s Green Paper also criticises 
these proposals on the basis that it believes their implementation ‘would inevitably 
entail ceding external competence on arbitration matters to the Community.’297 Whilst 
this criticism is more measured, its accuracy is questionable: the Regulation contains 
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rules on jurisdiction for contracts and torts,298 yet no one could argue this to mean the 
EU is competent to legislate in these substantive fields of law.  
It is important to note for the purposes of this thesis, which will advocate the partial 
deletion of the arbitration exclusion in a different form, that many of the criticisms 
aimed at the proposals in the Heidelberg Report and Commission Green Paper are not 
criticisms of the idea of partial abolition per se; rather they are criticisms of those 
specific proposals. Some of the criticisms, such as the concern that partial deletion 
would in some circumstances force pro-arbitration member states to accept the more 
conservative approach to arbitration of other member states, apply equally to any 
proposal for partial deletion. This criticism shall be addressed later in this thesis, by 
reference to principles underlying ongoing European integration and the New York 
Convention, which will be outlined in the coming chapters.299 This section, however, 
is concerned more with introducing the concepts of the proposed solutions, how they 
were justified when proposed, and how they were received by the legal community. It 
is therefore not the place for a detailed justification of this solution for the purposes of 
this thesis. 
(3) A ‘true’ arbitration exclusion 
The UK Government’s response to the Commission’s Green Paper consultation 
process proposed maintaining the exclusion, but wording it more broadly, to the extent 
that it would revive the anti-suit injunction and render West Tankers irrelevant.300 The 
exact proposal from the UK falls into three parts.  
Firstly, it would reword the arbitration exclusion at Art 1 (2) (d), making its scope 
absolutely clear. The reworded exclusion would read: ‘arbitration, and in particular an 
action in respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement within the 
meaning of Article II of the New York Convention; an action or judgment on the 
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validity, effect or scope of such an agreement; and ancillary proceedings in relation to 
such an agreement or any aspect of the arbitral process’.301 
It would then include a recital that a court may refuse recognition and enforcement of 
a judgment irreconcilable with an arbitration agreement.302 Finally, it would insert a 
provision stating: ‘Nothing in this Regulation affects the application of the New York 
Convention’.303 
This approach also found support in the European Parliament Report.304 The policy 
reasons for this proposal – insofar as it would reinstate the anti-suit injunction – are 
summarised in the judgments of Lords Hoffmann and Mance in the West Tankers 
preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, discussed above.305 They reason that 
denying European courts the right to issue anti-suit injunctions to protect arbitration 
puts European arbitral seats at a competitive disadvantage, and is unfair to the party 
relying on the arbitration agreement. 
This proposal would in general be favoured by those who support the anti-suit 
injunction and resisted by those who oppose the remedy. The controversy surrounding 
the anti-suit injunction in general and its turbulent relationship with the Brussels 
Regime was examined in the previous chapter. The Court of Justice took a strong 
stance against the anti-suit injunction in Turner and West Tankers as being an anti-
European remedy that undermines the spirit of trust and co-operation between member 
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states. Legislative reversal of this rule has therefore always been an unlikely prospect. 
As shall be shown below, however, this proposal appears to have influenced the 
ultimate approach taken in the Brussels I Recast, though not to the extent that it could 
be argued to reverse West Tankers. 
(4) Ad hoc harmonisation of arbitration law at the EU level 
Another possibility that has been discussed is the ad hoc harmonisation of arbitration 
law through European legislation.306 This would improve the interface between the 
Brussels Regime and arbitration in the fashion described in chapter 2 in the discussion 
of the European Uniform Law Convention: by ensuring a uniform standard for the 
validity of arbitration agreements, set-aside standards, and so on. This proposal would 
be more effective, however, than the European Uniform Law Convention, because it 
would have a supranational body – the Court of Justice – to ensure uniform 
interpretation and application. This proposal could therefore feasibly solve, or at least 
drastically reduce the effect of, the problems caused by the exclusion of arbitration 
from the Brussels Regime. 
This proposal has been criticised as both legally and practically unviable. This is 
because the EU has no legal basis to legislate, and the legislation would at any rate 
likely result in a less arbitration-friendly law than that currently in place at major 
European arbitral centres.307 The law would be less arbitration friendly than might be 
desired because it would represent a compromise position between the traditionally 
pro-arbitration jurisdictions, such as France and the UK, and those with less 
involvement in and trust of international arbitration. The compromise would inevitably 
be less progressive than the former group of member states would like, but would 
disproportionately affect the arbitration business conducted within their borders. This 
makes such a plan practically very unappealing, as well as lacking in legal basis. 
                                                 





(5) A lis pendens mandatory stay rule 
Following Member State responses to its Green Paper, the Commission radically 
scaled back its proposal. It proposed only to include a new lis pendens rule at Art 29 
(4), together with a definition of when an arbitral tribunal would be considered ‘seised’ 
at Art 33 (3).308 
The lis pendens rule differed from the mandatory stay provision included in the 
Heidelberg Report and the Green Paper in that it would require a stay where either the 
courts at the seat or the arbitral tribunal itself had been seised. This was an important 
amendment to that provision, because it would mean parties would not have to go to 
court before commencing arbitration; an onerous requirement which would have 
delayed the proceedings and added expense in cases where, for example, institutional 
rules would obviate any need for court involvement.  
This proposal finds support in the writings of several commentators. Radicati took the 
view that this would solve the most significant problem with the Brussels I 
Regulation’s relationship with arbitration – parallel proceedings – without being 
overly intrusive into the domestic arbitration law of member states.309 Bennedettelli 
was broadly supportive of the Commission Proposal, whilst arguing that there 
remained room for further inclusion of arbitration-related court action in the Brussels 
Regulation, whilst Harris supported the mandatory stay provision, but would extend 
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its effects to any arbitration agreement, not only agreements to arbitrate within a 
member state.310 
The obvious criticism of this proposal is that it would allow the bad-faith tactical 
litigant to delay or ‘torpedo’ potential court proceedings by attempting to begin 
arbitration proceedings where no arbitration agreement had been concluded, thereby 
obstructing the court proceedings. It is therefore submitted that this proposal needed 
more thought – thought that is hopefully reflected in the lis pendens rule put forward 
by this thesis – but that the goal of eliminating parallel proceedings is nonetheless 
admirable. 
(6) A European protocol to the New York Convention 
It has been suggested in scholarship that EU member states could conclude a protocol 
to the New York Convention to govern the validity of arbitration agreements.311 A 
protocol is seen as the necessary instrument because it is unlikely that the New York 
Convention itself could be amended, given it is so widely in force.312 Van Houtte also 
suggests such a protocol could provide for the possibility of appeal to the Court of 
Justice to ensure it is interpreted and applied in the same fashion in each member 
state.313 
This proposal has faced the criticism that it is doctrinally similar to the calls for ad hoc 
harmonisation of arbitration law within the EU, and therefore open to the same 
practical criticisms.314 That view is hard to argue with, as a treaty protocol would be 
subject to agreement and compromise to an even higher degree than legislation passed 
by a supranational legislature. For this reason it is an unlikely solution to the problems 
caused by the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels I Regime, even if the problem 
of legal basis does not present itself. 
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(7) Further Court of Justice decisions 
The Italian response to the Heidelberg Study, as well as the Slovenian Green Paper 
Response, requested further Court of Justice decisions to resolve the issues at the 
interface between the Brussels Regime and arbitration.315 Such an approach cannot 
provide a workable, long-term solution for three main reasons. First, such decisions 
could serve as a stopgap, short-term solution, but would be lacking the 
comprehensiveness and coherence of a legislative overhaul of the Regulation. Second, 
the Court of Justice can only decide the matters brought before it. The solutions to the 
problems would therefore be piecemeal, incomprehensive, and may in fact never 
arrive. Finally, it is highly difficult to see how the Court of Justice could resolve some 
of the issues raised without overturning its existing case law. This is true of parallel 
arbitration and court proceedings, which must be allowed under the combined case 
law of Marc Rich and West Tankers. It is therefore submitted that waiting and hoping 
for the right cases to come before the Court of Justice at the right time, and for the 
court to reach appropriate solutions was never a viable option. 
(8) Maintain the status quo 
There were those who argued that the problems discussed above were not sufficiently 
serious to warrant reform and that the best option was to leave things as they were.316 
This ‘if it’s not broken, don’t try to fix it’ approach became untenable for political 
reasons, the Commission being determined to come up with some kind of reform.317 
For this reason, those who originally favoured that approach tended to begin to favour 
more minimalist reforms, such as the Commission Proposal of nothing but a lis 
pendens rule. Nonetheless the intervention of the Parliament eventually meant that the 
Recast approach, of all the proposals discussed above, is actually closest in form to 
this. 
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In summary, there were a number of hotly debated options for the EU legislature to 
decide between in its recasting of the Brussels I Regulation, though some were more 
realistically viable than others. The next section shall introduce the Brussels I Recast 
as passed, together with an analysis of the changes it brought in. 
C. The Recast as passed 
The Brussels I Recast was passed in late 2012 and came into effect in January 2015.318 
The Recast maintains the exclusion of arbitration at Art 1 (2) (d). It makes, however, 
two main changes relevant to arbitration. The first is the insertion of the rather lengthy 
Recital 12, which contains four paragraphs concerning the Recast’s relationship with 
arbitration. The second is the insertion of Art 73 (2), which expressly preserves the 
supremacy of the New York Convention over the Recast. This section shall first 
consider why the majority of the changes have been introduced by way of a recital 
rather than enacting provisions and the effects this might have. It shall then examine 
the changes in each paragraph of Recital 12 and in Art 73 (2) in turn. Finally, it shall 
consider the question of how the Recast will handle anti-suit injunctions. 
(1) Choice of recital over enacting provision 
The majority of the relevant changes made in the Brussels I Recast are made in the 
form of Recital 12. Why a recital was chosen is not entirely clear, but one might 
conjecture that it was to maintain the simple exclusion of arbitration in the enacting 
provisions without any additional explanation.  
At any rate, to understand the potential effects of the changes contained in Recital 12, 
it is necessary as preliminary questions to ask what the legal nature of a recital is, and 
how it should interact with the enacting provisions. The legal nature and extent of 
effect of a recital could have a key bearing on interpretation of that recital, rendering 
its meaning and implications different from its plain wording. 
                                                 





Most commentaries on the Brussels I Recast and arbitration do not consider this 
question, simply assuming that Recital 12 is operative in its entirety.319 Carducci, a 
vocal scholar in this field, briefly considers the question in his comment on the 
provisions of the Recast.320 He concludes that Art 288 TFEU renders an EU regulation 
in its entirety, including its preamble where relevant, binding on member states.321 
This explanation rather oversimplifies what is admittedly a complex matter. What is 
more, it does so in a fashion that could impact upon the proper interpretation of Recital 
12. 
The purpose of recitals in EU legislation, according to the EU institutions’ drafting 
guide, is to set out reasons for the enacting provisions, without reproducing them or 
containing normative provisions.322 This is in line with the academic view that recitals 
should lend context to the enacting provisions.323 
In so doing, recitals can help in the judicial interpretation of unclear enacting 
provisions.324 The Court of Justice has developed a number of principles regarding the 
effect of recitals to EU legislation.325 It has been held that the language of a recital 
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cannot restrict a right granted by the enacting provisions.326 Furthermore, the Court 
has held that a recital cannot confer a right otherwise clearly not granted or denied by 
the enacting provisions.327 The court is, however, ready to use recitals to interpret the 
scope of enacting provisions.328 This makes sense given its usual purposive approach 
to statutory interpretation.  
The relevance to the discussion of Recital 12 is obvious. The recital will be capable of 
giving context to a provision whose meaning is unclear from its wording, such as the 
arbitration exclusion. It will not, however, be able to grant any sort of right not 
contained in the enacting provisions, nor to restrict access to any right contained in the 
enacting provisions. This may prove relevant to the discussion of the enforcement of 
a Brussels Regime judgment rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement. With this 
in mind, the following sections shall introduce the provisions of Recital 12 Brussels I 
Regulation. 
(2) Recital 12, first paragraph 
The first paragraph of Recital 12 states: 
‘This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regulation should 
prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a matter in respect 
of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from referring the 
parties to arbitration, from staying or dismissing the proceedings, or from examining 
whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed, in accordance with their national law.’ 
The first sentence of this paragraph merely restates the arbitration exclusion at Art 1 
(2) (d), adding no wider context to the exclusion. The second sentence essentially 
enshrines the Marc Rich principle: that an action on the merits in one member state 
falling within the scope of the Regulation cannot prevent a court of another member 
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state from hearing proceedings ancillary to arbitration, such as for the appointment of 
an arbitrator.  
The new recital, however, makes one subtle but potentially important change to the 
Marc Rich rule. Under Marc Rich, the applicability of the Regulation was decided 
using a subject matter test.329 The right of the court seised of proceedings ancillary to 
arbitration to continue in spite of merits proceedings in another Member State was 
contingent on the very fact that those proceedings were ancillary to arbitration. 
Conversely, according to Marc Rich and West Tankers where the main subject matter 
before the court was a merits action, those proceedings in their entirety, including 
incidental questions as to the validity of an arbitration agreement, would fall within 
the scope of the Regulation.330 This would mean that, where a court in one member 
state was seised of a merits action and another court in a second member state was 
subsequently seised of another action on the merits of the same dispute, the second 
court would have been bound under the Regulation’s lis pendens rules to dismiss or 
stay the action pending resolution of the action in the court first seised, including the 
decision as to the validity of the arbitration agreement. The second court would not be 
able to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement for itself and indeed would 
be bound to recognise the decision of the first court. 
Under the new version of the Marc Rich rule in the first paragraph of Recital 12, this 
would no longer be the case. Recital 12, paragraph 1 provides: ‘Nothing in this 
Regulation should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a 
matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, from 
referring the parties to arbitration…’.331 This would mean that a court second seised 
of a merits action could consider the validity of the arbitration agreement before, if 
appropriate, staying the merits action and referring the parties to arbitration. 
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The first paragraph of Recital 12 therefore tweaks the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence 
in a subtle, arbitration-friendly fashion, allowing arbitration agreements to function 
more effectively. The Recital in this way provides guidance on the interpretation of 
the scope of the enacting provision at 1 (2) (d). 
In his comment on the new recital, Carducci argues that the rules of jurisdiction of the 
Regulation still apply in cases concerning arbitration, only the rules on recognition and 
enforcement of judgments being excluded by Art 1 (2) (d).332 He reaches this 
conclusion by reference to the language of paragraphs two and three of Recital 12, 
which will be discussed in detail below. Paragraph two refers to the fact that judgments 
on the validity of an arbitration agreement cannot be recognised and enforced under 
the Regulation, whilst paragraph three refers to a court ‘exercising jurisdiction under 
this Regulation’ determining that an arbitration agreement is invalid. He reasons that 
this means the exclusion applies only to recognition and enforcement, whilst 
jurisdiction is not excluded. Carducci therefore argues that the lis pendens rule in the 
Regulation can apply where the court of one member state is seised for the purpose of 
rendering a declaratory judgment on the validity of the arbitration agreement and the 
court of another is later seised for the same purpose.333 
This interpretation cannot be accepted. It blurs the lines between actions on the merits 
and actions ancillary to arbitration in a fashion contrary to Marc Rich. More seriously 
still, it interprets paragraphs 2 and 3 of Recital 12 in a fashion clearly inconsistent with 
paragraph 1, which is why discussion of the argument has been included in the analysis 
of that paragraph. Paragraph 1 states that ‘[n]othing in this Regulation should prevent 
the courts of a Member State from referring the parties to arbitration […] or from 
examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable 
of being performed’.334 This must exclude the lis pendens rule, as something in the 
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Regulation, from preventing a court from doing these things. It is submitted that 
paragraphs two and three of Recital 12 should be read in a fashion consistent with 
paragraph one if at all possible. Carducci’s interpretation must therefore fail. 
Finally, it is also interesting that paragraph 1 of recital 12 mentions that courts may 
assess ‘whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
being performed, in accordance with their national law’. The reference to national law 
seems to be at odds with the New York Convention’s provisions, which would imply 
that the question should be judged according to the law chosen by the parties, failing 
which the law of the juridical seat of the arbitration, failing which, the law determined 
by the international private law rules of the forum as properly applicable to the 
arbitration agreement.335 This may mean that, in their desire not to interfere with the 
operation of the New York Convention, the European legislators have in fact impliedly 
created a new rule entirely at odds with it. 
In conclusion, the first paragraph of Recital 12 makes a slight change to the Marc Rich 
rule by defining the scope of the vague and general exclusion of arbitration more 
clearly. 
(3) Recital 12, second paragraph 
The second paragraph of Recital 12 states: 
‘A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be 
subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, 
regardless of whether the court decided on this as a principal issue or as an incidental 
question.’ 
This paragraph overturns the rule in West Tankers that judgments on the validity of an 
arbitration agreement will be subject to the Regulation where the main subject matter 
of the proceedings is also covered by the Regulation. Thus in a scenario where a court 
is seised on the merits of a dispute allegedly subject to an arbitration agreement, the 
judgment of that court as to the validity of the arbitration agreement will no longer fall 
within the scope of the Recast and will not be capable of directly binding another 
                                                 




Member State court under the Recast. This is a departure from the ‘predominant 
interpretation’ of the arbitration exclusion before the Brussels I Recast, and would 
mean that if National Navigation II were decided today, the English court would be 
free to reach a different result.336 Here again Recital 12 gives a slightly different 
meaning to the arbitration exclusion by clarifying its intended scope. 
(4) Recital 12, third paragraph 
The third paragraph of Recital 12 states: 
“On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction under 
this Regulation or under national law, has determined that an arbitration agreement is 
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this should not preclude 
that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from being recognised or, as the 
case may be, enforced in accordance with this Regulation. This should be without 
prejudice to the competence of the courts of the Member States to decide on the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance with the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York on 
10 June 1958 (‘the 1958 New York Convention’), which takes precedence over this 
Regulation.” 
The first sentence of this paragraph provides that when a court renders a judgment in 
spite of an alleged arbitration agreement, holding that arbitration agreement not to be 
valid or applicable, its judgment on the merits (but not the arbitration agreement, 
according to paragraph 2, above) will remain enforceable under the Brussels I Recast. 
The effect of the second sentence is somewhat less clear.  
The second sentence addresses the relationship between on the one hand the duty to 
enforce under the Regulation judgments in which the issuing court has considered a 
jurisdictional challenge on the basis of an arbitration agreement and found the dispute 
not to be subject to arbitration, and on the other the duty to enforce an arbitral award 
under the New York Convention.337 Recital 12 states that the duty to enforce such 
judgments will be ‘without prejudice to the competence of the court’ to decide on its 
New York Convention obligations to enforce arbitral awards.  
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It has been suggested in scholarship that the effect is that a court faced with a 
conflicting judgment and arbitral award in the same dispute can recognise and/or 
enforce the arbitral award in preference to the judgment.338 This suggestion is not 
consistent with a plain-text reading of the Brussels I Recast. The existence of a 
contradictory arbitral award is not a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement 
of a judgment under the Recast. 339 Therefore a court faced with a conflicting judgment 
and arbitral award would be considered bound to recognise and/or enforce both the 
judgment under the Brussels Regime and the arbitral award under the New York 
Convention.  
Two arguments support this view. The first is the legal nature of Recital 12, which, as 
set out above, means it is not capable of creating rights not contained in the enacting 
provisions, nor capable of causing derogation from any right expressly contained in 
the enacting provisions. The enacting provisions of the Brussels I Recast give a litigant 
the right to have Regulation judgments recognised and enforced virtually 
automatically in the courts of other member states.340 They also contain an exhaustive 
list of grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement.341 Those grounds for refusal 
do not include the existence of a contradictory arbitral award. Recital 12, by its legal 
nature, is not capable of changing these facts.  
The second argument is that, although the New York Convention is given precedence 
over the Regulation in the enacting provisions in Art 73 (2), discussed below, the New 
York Convention does not in any way provide rules for the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, only arbitral awards. In that sense, its precedence means 
little; that precedence has a much more obvious application, for example, in terms of 
the effect of an arbitration agreement on court jurisdiction, as will be discussed in more 
detail below under the heading of Art 73 (2).342 
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For these reasons, the contention that Recital 12, paragraph 3 allows the refusal of 
enforcement of a Regulation judgment on the basis of the existence of a contradictory 
arbitral award is to be rejected. More plausible is Camilleri’s argument that courts 
could, in the above situation, justify refusal of enforcement of the judgment under the 
public policy exception.343 This is no different to the situation before the conclusion 
of the Brussels I Recast, although Camilleri’s point that Recital 12 adds force to the 
argument that enforcement of arbitral awards is an element of international public 
policy is well made.344 
Still less clear is the approach to the recognition and enforcement under the Brussels I 
Recast and Recital 12, paragraph 3 of a judgment rendered in spite of what the 
enforcing court considers a valid agreement to arbitrate. The proper approach to this 
issue is no clearer under the Brussels I Recast than it was under the Brussels I 
Regulation. 
The reason is that the first sentence of Recital 12, paragraph 3 states that, where another 
court has rendered a judgment in spite of an arbitration agreement, its judgment on the 
merits is enforceable under the Recast. The second sentence qualifies this rule as not 
prejudicing the competence of courts to decide on the enforcement of arbitration 
awards under the New York Convention, which takes precedence over the Recast. Art 
73 (2), discussed below, states expressly in the enacting provisions that the New York 
Convention should take precedence over the Recast.  
As mentioned above, the New York Convention also provides a jurisdictional rule: 
that a court ‘…seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made 
an agreement [to arbitrate] shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties 
to arbitration…’.345  
Recital 12, paragraph 3 does not in any way address the correct approach for a court 
to take in the situation where it is asked to enforce a judgment rendered in spite of 
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what it views to be a valid arbitration agreement (not award), and is therefore incapable 
of altering the correct approach to this situation. The first sentence of paragraph 3 
states that the court judgment on the merits should be enforceable. The court will find 
itself facing conflicting obligations under the Brussels I Recast, as interpreted 
according to Recital 12, paragraph 3 of the Recast and Article II New York 
Convention, if it considers the enforcement of a judgment on the merits to constitute 
‘a matter in respect of which’ the parties have made an arbitration agreement, which 
will be discussed in more detail below in the context of Art 73 (2). It is submitted that 
the difficulties posed by a judgment rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement will 
continue to trouble courts under the Recast regime. 
(5) Recital 12, fourth paragraph 
The final paragraph of Recital 12 states: 
‘This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings relating to, in 
particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers of arbitrators, the 
conduct of an arbitration procedure or any other aspects of such a procedure, nor to 
any action or judgment concerning the annulment, review, appeal, recognition or 
enforcement of an arbitral award.’ 
This is simply a restatement of the meaning given to the arbitration exclusion in Marc 
Rich,346 but gives no indication that the exclusion has been strengthened in the fashion 
desired by the UK to reinstate the anti-suit injunction in such proceedings.347 That said, 
it should be noted that Advocate General Wathelet in his opinion in the Gazprom case 
cites this paragraph in support of the contention that anti-suit injunctions in support of 
arbitration are once again permitted under the Recast.348 The debate about anti-suit 
injunctions goes beyond a simple paragraph in Recital 12, so shall be considered 
separately below. 
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(6) Article 73 (2) 
Art 73 (2) states: 
‘This Regulation shall not affect the application of the 1958 New York Convention.’ 
This provision makes express what many would have argued was, or ought to have 
been, true under Article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation:349 that the New York 
Convention takes precedence over the Regulation.350 It has been argued that the 
judgments in Marc Rich and West Tankers falsify any claim that the New York 
Convention retained ultimate supremacy over the Regulation, at least in so far as 
conflicts between court and arbitration procedure are concerned.351 Furthermore, 
although never tested before the Court of Justice, the alleged supremacy of the New 
York Convention would likely have been subject to the same narrow interpretation of 
Article 71 supremacy given to the CMR352 in the TNT case: that the CMR was held 
only to be supreme insofar as it was consistent with the principles underlying the 
Brussels I Regulation.353 
The express precedence provision in Art 73 (2) could be interpreted to mean that the 
New York Convention takes precedence over the Recast completely, not only insofar 
as it is consistent with the underlying goals of the Recast. This could possibly include 
giving precedence to the obligation to enforce an arbitral award over the obligation to 
enforce a Brussels Regime judgment on the same matter, as mentioned above. This 
argument falls foul of the analysis that there is no actual substantive conflict between 
the New York Convention and the Brussels I Recast: the New York Convention does 
not provide any rules concerning the enforcement of court judgments in matters in 
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respect of which the parties have made an arbitration agreement, nor does the Brussels 
I Recast contain provisions to deal with conflict between a Regime judgment and a 
contradictory arbitral award or an arbitration agreement, as did the Hague Convention 
1971.354 
The New York Convention has always been treated as supreme in respect of its rule 
on the effect on court jurisdiction where the parties to a dispute have concluded an 
arbitration agreement. That is to say: where the parties have concluded an arbitration 
agreement, a court will never have jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute, even 
if it otherwise would under the Brussels Regime. The New York Convention will 
presumably retain this supremacy under the Recast. 
A separate question, introduced above, is whether the jurisdiction provision of Art II 
(3) New York Convention, requiring courts ‘seised of’ a matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an arbitration agreement to refer those parties to arbitration, could 
be used to justify refusal of enforcement of a judgment rendered in spite of an arbitral 
agreement. This argument that it could is weak, especially because the court asked for 
enforcement of a Regime judgment in respect of a matter would be unlikely to view 
itself as ‘seised of’ the matter which forms the substance of the judgment. This view 
is supported by the rule in the Brussels I Recast that a foreign judgment may not be 
reviewed as to its substance in a court asked for recognition and enforcement, and with 
the rule naming the recognition and enforcement of a judgment as a subject matter 
capable of founding exclusive jurisdiction in itself, distinct from the matter that forms 
the subject of the judgment.355 These two rules make clear that the enforcement 
proceedings are distinct from the underlying subject matter of the dispute, and 
therefore that a court ‘seised of’ recognition and enforcement proceedings is not 
‘seised of’ the matter that forms the substance of the award, in respect of which the 
parties have made their arbitration agreement. 
Any other interpretation of the precedence of Art II (3) New York Convention would 
lead to impossible conclusions, such as a court asked for recognition and enforcement 
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of a Brussels Regime judgment having to found jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
the substance of the judgment before being able to grant such recognition and 
enforcement. It is therefore submitted that a court asked for the recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment is ‘seised of’ a request for recognition and enforcement of 
a judgment – a matter in respect of which the parties would be incapable of forming 
an arbitration agreement, given it entails a decision about the exercise of national 
sovereign power, and must surely be considered not to be capable of settlement by 
arbitration. 
Furthermore, the Brussels I Recast provides that the jurisdiction of the court of origin 
may not be reviewed, unless jurisdiction was taken in violation of one of the rules of 
exclusive jurisdiction.356 To refuse enforcement of a judgment on the basis that an 
arbitration agreement had been concluded between the parties entails would either be 
to review the jurisdiction of the issuing court, or effectively to raise the jurisdictional 
rule in Art II (3) New York Convention to the level of a rule of exclusive jurisdiction 
in favour of the arbitral tribunal under the Brussels I Regulation, placing the judgment 
of the enforcing court on jurisdiction paramount to that of the originating court. This 
would make little sense, because the implementation of Art II (3) New York 
Convention relies upon the court’s assessment of the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, does not provide which court has jurisdiction to make that assessment, or 
that such a decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement should be enforceable 
in any other country. If this approach were taken, it would lead to the possibility of 
divergent approaches amongst member states to the question of whether a rule of 
exclusive jurisdiction has been breached, with judgments being refused enforcement 
in some member states and not in others. There would be obvious and direct conflict 
between those countries that have arbitration-friendly laws and those that more strictly 
regulate arbitration. Such an eventuality would hardly be possible in respect of, for 
example, exclusive jurisdiction over rights in rem in immovable property.357 Such 
divergent approaches to recognition and enforcement are exactly the sort of thing the 
Brussels Regime’s pro-enforcement bias is designed to eliminate. Opportunities to 
second guess the jurisdiction of the originating court are kept to the bare minimum for 
                                                 
356 Art 45 (1) (e) (2) and Art 45 (3) Brussels I Recast. 




good reason, preferring certainty and finality to the endless litigation and relitigation 
of the same issues that review of jurisdiction upon enforcement could precipitate. 
Accordingly it cannot be argued that Art II (3) New York Convention justifies the 
refusal of recognition and enforcement of a Brussels Regime judgment rendered in 
spite of an arbitration agreement, even if the New York Convention takes absolute 
precedence over the Brussels I Recast. In conclusion, therefore, it is difficult to see 
how the specific provision for the precedence of the New York Convention in the 
Brussels I Recast makes any difference to the general supremacy it had been granted 
under the Brussels I Regulation.358 
(7) The Recast and anti-suit injunctions 
A large amount of attention has been given to the question of whether the provisions 
of Recital 12 are strongly-worded enough to resurrect the anti-suit injunction in 
support of arbitration. As mentioned above, the consensus amongst most 
commentators is that it has not. This comfortable analysis has been somewhat upset 
by the opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in the Gazprom case, the judgment in 
which was discussed above.359 In a remarkable opinion going far beyond the scope of 
the question referred, the Advocate General argues that the Brussels I Recast has 
reinstated the anti-suit injunction in support of arbitration. The Court of Justice’s 
eventual decision has not gone nearly so far, holding that enforcement of at least 
arbitral anti-suit injunctions that do not impose penalties for non-compliance is 
compatible with the Brussels I Regulation, and making no mention of the Brussels I 
Recast.  
Advocate General Wathelet, however, applied the Brussels I Recast to the questions 
referred, arguing that Recital 12 has an effect similar to a ‘retroactive interpretative 
law’, making clear how the exclusion of arbitration should always have been 
interpreted.360 The Court of Justice applied the Brussels I Regulation rather than the 
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Recast, so it is appropriate to consider Wathelet’s analysis separately, because he 
considers how the Recast would address the issue of the anti-suit injunction. 
Assuming the question were to be decided under the Brussels I Recast, there is a strong 
argument that recognition and enforcement of any arbitral award tantamount to an anti-
suit injunction is now compatible with the Brussels I Regulation. This is because, as 
discussed above, Recital 12 and Art 73 (2) make very clear that the New York 
Convention takes precedence over the Recast, and that the provisions of the Recast are 
‘without prejudice to the competence of the courts’ to recognise and enforce arbitral 
awards under the New York Convention.361 Together, these provisions make it 
tolerably clear that the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards exists entirely 
outside, and free from interference from, the Brussels Regime. It is therefore submitted 
that the Recast would permit enforcement of any arbitral anti-suit injunction. Moses 
in her article on the Brussels I Recast adopts this position, but points out that the Court 
of Justice may nonetheless proscribe the anti-suit injunction in a purposively-reasoned 
judgment that equates an arbitral anti-suit injunction with a court-issued anti-suit 
injunction in its effects.362 Wathelet’s Opinion is, it is submitted, correct in this regard. 
Wathelet’s analysis in his Opinion goes one step further than this, arguing that the 
Brussels I Recast has reinstated the anti-suit injunction in court actions ancillary to 
arbitration, even though this question was not referred to the Court of Justice. He does 
so with reference to the legislative history, arguing that this makes clear that the 
European legislature meant to extend the scope of the arbitration exclusion and fully 
reverse West Tankers.363 He points to the fact that Recital 12 makes clear that decisions 
on the existence, validity, and scope of an arbitration agreement are not subject to the 
rules of recognition and enforcement of the Regulation, which he argues means the 
Regulation does not apply to jurisdiction in foreign merits proceedings where the 
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existence of an arbitration agreement is alleged (such as the Italian proceedings in West 
Tankers) until such time as the court has decided that the arbitration agreement is void 
or not applicable.364 He concludes that this means that the court seised on the merits is 
not entitled to the protection of the Regulation until such time as it decides there is no 
valid or applicable arbitration agreement, and states that the fact that its judgment on 
the substance could be enforced under the Regulation cannot change this analysis, 
because it would deprive Recital 12 of the effect the European legislature intended it 
to have.365  
This analysis is astonishing, given the legislature barely expressed the intention to 
reverse the decision in West Tankers in its entirety. Advocate General Wathelet does 
not cite an express statement of that intent in his lengthy and thorough opinion. Rather, 
he relies on the wording of Recital 12 and the resolution that the Parliament ‘[s]trongly 
oppose[d] the (even partial) abolition of the exclusion of arbitration from the scope’ of 
the Recast.366 It is submitted that the wording of Recital 12 itself is far too vague to 
lead to that conclusion, and that the Parliament’s resolution is much more likely aimed 
at the Commission’s proposed lis pendens rule than the West Tankers decision. It is 
true that the preamble to the Resolution cited by Wathelet mentions that the Parliament 
may wish to restore the pre-West Tankers status quo,367 but the Resolution also 
suggests adding a paragraph to Art 31 Brussels Regulation stating that a judgment 
granting provisional or protective measures will not be recognised if it violates the 
arbitration law of the country requested to enforce the document.368 The Parliament 
Resolution is a shopping list, and clearly a list from which not all items were bought.  
                                                 
364 Ibid, para 133. A similar point about the ongoing relevance of West Tankers is raised in a slightly 
different way in R Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation (2nd edn, 2015), 535-537, although 
the author points out that Court of Justice may well nonetheless refuse to allow anti-suit injunctions on 
different reasoning. 
365 Ibid, para 136. For the contrary position, see Camilleri, above, 904-905, which argues that the 
mutual-trust-based rationale for the West Tankers decision still applies as long as there is the potential 
for a court seised on the merits to issue an enforceable Regulation judgment if it declines to enforce the 
arbitration agreement. Moses, ‘The European Debate’, above, 24-25, points out that the practical 
reasons for banning the anti-suit injunction in West Tankers- in the form of the controversy caused by 
the remedy – persist under the Recast. 
366 Ibid, para 120. Parliament Report, above, paras 9-10. 
367 Parliament Report, above, Preamble para M. 




Wathelet’s argument that, because under paragraph 2 of Recital 12, the judgment of a 
court seised of merits proceedings on the validity of an arbitration agreement is not 
subject to the Recast’s rules of recognition and enforcement, those court proceedings 
are also not entitled to the protection of the Regulation until such time as the court 
decides there is no valid or applicable arbitration agreement is equally astonishing. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this would mean that, if a court were seised of merits 
proceedings in respect of a dispute in which there was clearly no arbitration agreement, 
but a recalcitrant litigant alleged that there was, putting the preliminary question of the 
existence of an arbitration agreement before the court, those proceedings would cease 
in their entirety to be covered and protected by the Regulation’s jurisdictional rules 
until such time as the court rejected the challenge to its jurisdiction. It would then be 
open to either party to start parallel merits proceedings in another court, because there 
would be, on Wathelet’s view, no Regulation proceedings to trigger the application of 
the lis pendens rules until such time as the original court had decided that the 
arbitration agreement did not exist or apply.369 This is a profound departure from the 
rules of the Regulation, which consider a court ‘seised’ for the purposes of the lis 
pendens rule when the documents initiating the proceedings are lodged with the 
court.370 Such an outcome surely cannot have been intended by the legislature. The 
flaw in Wathelet’s analysis in this respect is that it presupposes the arbitration 
agreement must be valid and applicable, thereby lending it too much power. 
Furthermore, paragraph 1 of Recital 12 provides that ‘[n]othing in this Regulation 
should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a matter in 
respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement from[…] 
examining whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable 
of being performed, in accordance with their national law’. Wathelet’s wide 
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interpretation of para 2 to allow anti-suit injunctions could be used to prevent the court 
whose proceedings are subject to the anti-suit injunction from doing just that. In fact, 
reading the Recital to allow every court to rule on its own jurisdiction and no court to 
rule on any other court’s jurisdiction is consistent with its established case law that no 
court is better place to rule on a court’s jurisdiction than the court whose jurisdiction 
is challenged.371  
Finally, West Tankers is perhaps the most controversial and debated decision of the 
Court of Justice under the Brussels Regime, or at least the Brussels Regulation. To 
suggest that the legislature would reverse a high-profile decision such as West Tankers 
without further debate, or clear and express language, beggars belief. By contrast, the 
language reversing the Gasser decision on choice of court agreements and lis pendens, 
both in the enacting provisions and the preamble to the Brussels I Recast, is completely 
clear as to its effect and purpose.372 
It is submitted that there is a good reason to draw a distinction between the enforcement 
of an arbitral anti-suit injunction and the issuing of an anti-suit injunction in support 
of arbitration by a court. The reason is that the enforcement of an arbitral anti-suit 
injunction involves the direct exercise of obligations under the New York Convention 
– recognising and/or enforcing an arbitral award – which is clearly stated to be a 
process not prejudiced by the rules of the Brussels I Recast.373 Furthermore, it involves 
the fulfilment of obligations under an instrument that clearly takes precedence over the 
Brussels I Recast. The system of enforcement of arbitral awards is clearly intended to 
exist independently from and outside the Brussels Regime. 
On the other hand, issuing an anti-suit injunction in court proceedings in accordance 
with domestic procedural laws does not in any way involve the exercise of New York 
Convention obligations: the New York Convention obliges the court only to recognise 
as valid the arbitration agreement and refer the parties to arbitration. No question of 
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supremacy of a New York Convention obligation ever arises, and so there is thus no 
reason to believe the court does not face a duty to act in a way that does not interfere 
with the operation of the Brussels Regime. 
It is therefore submitted that Advocate General Wathelet’s argument that the Brussels 
I Recast has returned the anti-suit injunction in court proceedings ancillary to 
arbitration will not be adopted by the Court of Justice if the issue is referred. At any 
rate, even if it is and the anti-suit injunction is revived, this will not comprehensively 
solve any of the problems at the interface between the Brussels Regime and arbitration. 
Although it will provide English and Scottish courts with a mechanism to prevent 
parallel court proceedings to arbitrations seated in those countries, the majority of EU 
countries whose courts will not issue anti-suit injunctions will be left without a 
solution. Furthermore, such a remedy, rooted in unilateralism and uncooperativeness, 
is hardly an appropriate solution for parallel proceedings within Europe. Even if the 
anti-suit injunction is back, it will change little and should not be welcomed. 
D. Criticism of the Recast approach 
Various criticisms can be made of the Brussels I Recast’s approach to arbitration. The 
most obvious is that it makes only minor and relatively insignificant changes to the 
Brussels I Regulation’s relationship with arbitration, failing to address the many 
problems that had been identified and the proposals made in an attempt to address 
these.  
 One might very reasonably wonder why the proposals for reform were dropped so 
quickly. The original Heidelberg Report and Commission proposals were obviously 
scaled back in the face of member state opposition after the circulation of the 
Commission’s Green Paper. The scaled back proposal of a mandatory stay provision 
was rejected following strong opposition in Parliament. The Parliament Report states 
that: ‘it appears from the intense debate raised by the proposal to create an exclusive 
head of jurisdiction for court proceedings supporting arbitration in the civil courts of 
the Member States that the Member States have not reached a common position 




this area, to try to force their hand’.374 Anecdotal evidence, as well as the reference to 
competition for arbitration business, suggests that the UK and French representatives 
were the main stumbling block. The Council’s press release upon the conclusion of 
the Recast also chooses to focus on other issues, such as the abolition of exequatur, 
and to address these urgently as a priority.375 This may have left no time to reach a 
more far-reaching compromise on arbitration. 
The addition of Recital 12, as outlined above, has changed next to nothing and 
addressed none of the previously identified problems at the interface between the 
Brussels Regime and arbitration. To be particularly regretted is the failure to restrict 
parallel proceedings. As stated above, this had been identified as the most significant 
problem with the relationship between the Brussels I Regulation and arbitration. It was 
also clearly identified by the Commission as a priority for reform, given it was the 
focus of the scaled back proposal following the Green Paper consultation. 
The failure to eliminate parallel proceedings will be discussed in more detail in the 
context of the principle of the promotion of legal certainty and predictability, presented 
in the next chapter.376 In short summary, however, allowing parallel proceedings runs 
contrary to the principle of mutual trust between member states of the European Union; 
it undermines the predictability of and certainty provided by the Brussels Regime; it 
is inconsistent with the Regime’s approach to lis pendens in other matters; and it does 
not align with the principles enshrined in the Recast’s provisions on choice of court 
agreements, which expressly promote party autonomy. These criticisms will be 
addressed in greater detail as part of the justification for this thesis’s proposal for 
reform, which will follow the introduction over the next three chapters of certain key 
principles. It would seem, however, incomplete to conclude this chapter’s presentation 
of the Brussels I Recast changes without some evaluation of their worth. 
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E. Preliminary conclusions 
In summary, because of legislative inertia and the vested interests of states with a large 
arbitration practice, the Brussels I Recast makes little to no change to or progress on 
the relationship between the instrument and arbitration. It does not address any of the 
problems at that interface, as had been identified by member states and commentators 
well in advance of the recasting process. This is to be regretted, as there was scope for, 
and even proposals tabled to effect, change for the better. But problems still exist at 
the interface between the Brussels Regime and arbitration, and this thesis will now 





5. PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 
So far, this thesis has looked back at the arbitration exclusion: from its original drafting 
to its survival of numerous, sometime extensive, proposals for reform. Attention will 
now move from the past to the future. Having established what the arbitration 
exclusion is, why it was included, what it means, and what problems it causes or 
exacerbates, the new focus is on what can be done to improve the situation. 
Before making a proposal on the changes that could improve the relationship between 
the Brussels Regime and arbitration, a preliminary issue is to identify the relevant goals 
and principles that should be taken into account in drafting any changes. The first of 
these will be the principles underlying European international private law, or often 
more specifically the European law of jurisdiction, which will be set out in this chapter. 
The second investigation will concern international commercial arbitration more 
generally, which will be the subject of the next two chapters. 
The focus in this chapter remains on European international private law, as it is a 
developed system of international private law and has been the main subject of the 
thesis so far. This thesis is still concerned with jurisdiction conventions more generally 
as well as within Europe, and it is recognised that not all those principles that underlie 
European international private law may well be relevant to the subject in the world at 
large.  
This chapter will first discuss briefly the aims of the project of creating a European 
law of jurisdiction. It will then consider the principles underlying that law as it operates 
today. The principles identified will include: mutual trust, a principle of fundamental 
importance in both European international private law and EU law more generally; 
legal certainty and predictability; and respect for party autonomy. This chapter will 
conclude that goals of and the principles underlying the European law of jurisdiction 





A. The purpose of a European law of jurisdiction 
The purpose of the Brussels Regime – the European law of jurisdiction – is clear, 
undisputed, and needs relatively little discussion. Of far more relevance are the 
principles that have been used to achieve that goal, and analysis of these will form the 
bulk of this chapter. It is, however, relevant to consider the ultimate goal of the 
Brussels Regime: why it was created and what it was supposed to achieve. This lends 
context to the discussion of its underlying principles. 
As mentioned in chapter two, the Brussels Convention was concluded under Art 220 
Treaty of Rome. The purpose of Art 220 was to obligate the member states to enter 
into various multilateral agreements to serve a variety of purposes.377 The conclusion 
of such agreements ‘uniformly interpreted and applied, is necessary to make the free 
movement of persons, goods, services and capital fully effective and to ensure equality 
of competitive conditions’.378 It can therefore be seen that the higher purpose of the 
creation of the Brussels Regime was to facilitate the implementation of the four 
fundamental freedoms and thereby the creation of a common market. This makes 
sense, because a common market could not properly function if the various courts 
within that common market clashed over jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments: this would create considerable uncertainty and undermine cross-border 
business.379  
The goal of supporting the common market will remain relevant throughout this 
chapter, and should be borne in mind when considering the principles that have been 
relied upon to achieve this goal. 
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B. Principle one – mutual trust 
The principle of mutual trust has become one of the defining features of European 
international private law in recent years. Although never specifically mentioned in any 
of the treaties from Rome to Lisbon, it has proved the decisive factor in a number of 
high-profile international private law judgments handed down by the Court of Justice, 
both before and after its first appearance in relevant legislation in the preamble to the 
Brussels I Regulation.380 
Mutual trust does not, however, exist only as a principle in international private law; 
in fact, it was already ‘a widespread postulate’ of other areas of EU and EEC law long 
before it took on major significance in European international private law.381 The 
prevalence of the concept in case law and legislation concerning the fundamental 
freedoms reflects the almost constitutional significance mutual trust has come to hold 
within the EU, whether it be trust in court systems, the implementation of directives, 
regulatory law, or certification and inspection procedures. Indeed, the case law can be 
said to require member states to place trust in the exercise of the powers of state by 
other member states, whether judicial power such as taking jurisdiction and rendering 
judgment in a civil case; legislative power such as implementing an EU directive in 
domestic law; or executive power such as ensuring compliance with EU law within 
that state’s territory.  
It may not at first glance be obvious why the use of mutual trust in other areas of EU 
law is relevant to a discussion of mutual trust in the context of the European law of 
jurisdiction. The reason is that mutual trust is often used in the context of the 
‘fundamental freedoms’ – those things that are supposed to enjoy free movement 
within the EU. The fundamental freedoms are so called because they are absolutely 
central to the proper functioning of the common market. The European law of 
jurisdiction is also commonly referred to as creating the ‘free movement of 
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judgments’.382 Free movement of judgments is increasingly seen as a further essential 
free movement for the successful functioning of a common market, albeit one that may 
not have been politically expedient to enunciate in the early stages of the EEC, because 
judicial authority is inherently linked to sovereignty and therefore jealously guarded 
by states. Mutual trust is a principle that underpins free movement, specifically by 
preventing invasive review that undermines free movement, thereby supporting the 
common market. It is submitted for this reason that the same principle of mutual trust 
is used in the European law of jurisdiction and the fundamental freedoms. This 
underlines the importance of free movement of judgments, the role played by the 
principle of mutual trust, and demonstrates the relevance of discussion of mutual trust 
in other areas of European Union law to a discussion of mutual trust in the European 
law of jurisdiction: it is the same principle used for the same reason.  
Without mutual trust, the whole common market could collapse in a mire of inefficient 
review procedures. The concept has therefore come to be used as a restriction on 
member state behaviour: effectively a prohibition of state behaviour that demonstrates 
distrust. It may be noted that it somewhat ironic that mutual trust only needs to be 
called upon as a normative concept when one member state demonstrates mistrust of 
another. 
Finally, mutual trust is incredibly important and is given detailed attention in this 
chapter because it is precisely what makes Europe different. As will be elaborated 
upon in more detail in Chapter 8 of this thesis, the other principles underlying the 
Brussels Regime – such as legal certainty, party autonomy, and the sound 
administration of justice – are likely equally relevant principles in the world at large. 
The most likely reason that similar conventions have not developed worldwide is that, 
in the world at large, mutual trust does not exist, and at any rate there is no 
supranational body to compel states to act in accordance with its spirit. As will be 
demonstrated below, mutual trust is the principle that is constantly relied upon to 
compel member states to act in a way necessary to support the common market, 
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including in the context of the European law of jurisdiction. This is why mutual trust 
is not simply important in general, but vitally important to this thesis. 
This section will outline the use of mutual trust as a guiding principle in European 
international private law, before drawing parallels with mutual trust as used in wider 
European Union law. This will serve to underline the importance of mutual trust not 
only to European international private law, but also to the common market and the 
project of European unification as a whole. 
(1) Mutual trust in European international private law 
Over the past 20 years, mutual trust has become one of the defining principles of 
European international private law, especially in judicial decision making. Its 
influence was originally indirect and frequently not expressly articulated, but in recent 
years its use has become far more overt.  
In the international private law context, mutual trust has at its heart the notion that the 
courts of every member state should respect the courts of every other member state: 
respect those courts’ ability to rule on their own jurisdiction, and respect the judgments 
they ultimately render by enforcing them without review. The principle of mutual trust 
has even been equated to each member state placing ‘blind trust’ in the legal systems 
of the other member states.383 This principle underlies the Brussels Regime, even if it 
has only recently come to be known consistently by the name ‘mutual trust’. Indeed, 
the Jenard Report on the Brussels Convention recognises the same principle in its 
explanation that Convention’s rules on virtually automatic recognition and 
enforcement of judgments is based on ‘complete confidence in the Court of the State 
in which the judgment was given’ and the assumption that that court correctly applied 
the rules of jurisdiction.384 Confidence in this context is synonymous with trust.  
The principle thus underlies the substantive provisions of the Brussels Regime, but has 
also been used as a normative principle in interpreting and applying those provisions. 
The normative aspect of mutual trust began to show in the Overseas Union judgment 
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handed down by the Court of Justice under the Brussels Convention in 1989. This case 
centred on the interpretation of the lis pendens rule at Art 21 of the Convention. 
Proceedings were pending in the same dispute before the courts of France and the UK, 
having been started in that order. The English Court of Appeal referred several 
questions to the Court of Justice, including whether, if the court second-seised does 
not choose to decline jurisdiction, it is obliged to stay proceedings, or whether it can 
review the jurisdiction of the first-seised court under the Convention or otherwise. The 
Court of Justice ruled firmly that no review of jurisdiction could be permitted under 
the Convention, stating:  
‘…in no case is the court second seised in a better position than the court first seised 
to determine whether the latter has jurisdiction. Either the jurisdiction of the court first 
seised is determined directly by the rules of the Convention, which are common to 
both courts and may be interpreted and applied with the same authority by each of 
them, or it is derived, by virtue of Article 4 of the Convention, from the law of the 
State of the court first seised, in which case that court is undeniably better placed to 
rule on the question of its own jurisdiction.’385 
This line of reasoning is clearly doctrinally rooted in what would later become known 
as mutual trust. It clearly expresses the same principles: that courts must be allowed to 
assess their own jurisdiction and their assessment respected by other courts. Although 
mutual trust was not expressly mentioned, the same concept underpins the holding. 
Around the same time, the doctrine of mutual trust was expressly referred to in an 
Advocate General’s opinion on an international private law case, but not expressly 
applied by the Court of Justice.386 
In the Gasser v Misat case, however, the Court of Justice did turn to the language of 
‘mutual trust’ to assist it in reaching its decision. The case was referred to the Court of 
Justice from the Austrian Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck (Higher Regional Court of 
Innsbruck). Gasser brought a claim for payment of outstanding invoices against 
MISAT before the Austrian court, which was designated in an exclusive choice of 
court agreement contained within invoices and accepted by conduct. Some eight 
months earlier, MISAT had brought proceedings before the Tribunale Civile e Penale 
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di Roma (Civil and Criminal District Court of Rome) for a declaration that the contract 
had been terminated. The Italian proceedings were still pending at the time the 
Austrian proceedings were started, so the Austrian proceedings should have been 
stayed under the lis pendens rule at Art 21 Brussels Convention.387 
The Austrian court referred two questions relevant to this thesis to the Court of Justice: 
whether it was permitted to review the jurisdiction of the court first seised because, 
unlike in Overseas Union, it was nominated in a choice of court agreement; and 
whether the fact that the proceedings in the court first seised were taking an 
‘unjustifiably long’ time could allow the court second seised to proceed, 
notwithstanding the lis pendens rule at Art 21. 
The Court of Justice answered both questions in the negative: the first in the spirit of 
mutual trust; and the second expressly invoking the principle to justify the decision. 
The court refused to raise a choice of court agreement to the level of a rule giving 
exclusive or protective jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention, in which review of 
jurisdiction is permitted. The court cited Overseas Union in holding that ‘the court 
second seised is never in a better position than the court first seised to determine 
whether the latter has jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is determined directly by the rules 
of the Brussels Convention, which are common to both courts and may be interpreted 
and applied with the same authority by each of them’.388 The court continues ‘[t]hus… 
it is incumbent on the court first seised to verify the existence of the agreement and to 
decline jurisdiction if it is established, in accordance with Article 17, that the parties 
actually agreed to designate the court second seised as having exclusive 
jurisdiction’.389 This approach places legal certainty paramount to party autonomy and 
achieving a fair result in the given dispute, using what would become the principle of 
mutual trust between the legal systems of member states to justify this approach.390 
In addressing the second question, concerning the delay in the Italian proceedings, the 
Court of Justice was explicit in invoking the principle of mutual trust. The court 
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reasoned ‘the Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the 
Contracting States accord to each other's legal systems and judicial institutions. It is 
that mutual trust which has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be 
established, which all the courts within the purview of the Convention are required to 
respect’.391 The court also supported the decision with the principle of legal certainty 
and predictability, as it had its answer to the first question.392 As will be discussed 
below, legal certainty and predictability often seem to go hand in hand with mutual 
trust in the court’s reasoning.393  
In Gasser, therefore, the principle of mutual trust was used explicitly to aid the court 
in reaching its decision. This represents a development from the position that existed 
before, where mutual trust was invoked in spirit but not in name, and set a precedent 
for the use of mutual trust as a decisive judicial tool in future international private law 
cases. 
The Advocate General and the Court of Justice would again turn to mutual trust to 
support their conclusions in the Turner case, the case in which the Court of Justice 
effectively banned the use of the anti-suit injunction within Europe. Advocate General 
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer believed that the use of the anti-suit injunction casts doubt on 
‘the reciprocal trust established between the various national legal systems’.394 He 
argued that this should be decisive as the Brussels Convention represents an important 
milestone in European judicial co-operation, a project ‘imbued with the concept of 
mutual trust, which presupposes that each State recognises the capacity of other legal 
systems to contribute independently, but harmoniously, to attainment of the stated 
objectives of integration’.395 The Court of Justice agreed, using the principle of mutual 
trust as the foundation for its judgment.396 The Court went on to state that it is in the 
interference with the foreign court’s ability to determine its own jurisdiction – that 
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central, trust-based rule of the Convention – that meant the anti-suit injunction was 
incompatible with the Convention system.397  
The decision in Turner was severely criticised in England, perhaps most notably by 
Lord Mance, who was then a Lord of Appeal, soon to be elevated to the House of 
Lords. However, the case also received favourable appraisals.398 Lord Mance argued 
that the post-Gasser system postulates a lack of trust in the ability of the court second 
seised to restrain abusive litigation and undermines the ability of courts to do practical 
justice in any given case.399 In so arguing, Lord Mance raises a point that will be 
discussed later in this thesis: that mutual trust can often seem like a blunt decision-
making instrument when applied to individual cases. In its promotion of an ideal of 
European unification, mutual trust often takes precedence over what may seem like 
pressing concerns of individual fairness in a given case. The same could be said of 
Gasser, and indeed Lord Mance and others make this criticism of the use of the 
principle in each case.400 In most cases, however, there is a balancing of competing 
principles to be performed, and cases of mutual trust are no different. This is why 
courts are allowed to review the jurisdiction of the courts of another member state for 
compliance with rules of exclusive and protective jurisdiction despite the wide-ranging 
principle of mutual trust, which yields in the face of particularly strong connections 
between the subject matter of the dispute and a given legal system, or the need to 
protect a specific class of vulnerable litigant.401 The difficulty of drawing the 
appropriate borders to cases in which mutual trust should be decisive is underlined by 
the decision of the EU legislature to reverse Gasser in the Brussels I Recast, discussed 
in more detail below.402 Nonetheless, while its weighting of principles is often 
criticised, the court clearly appreciates the value of the principle of mutual trust as a 
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decision-making tool, even if the principle is not absolute and should not be considered 
a ‘trump card’. 
Since 2001 the principle of mutual trust has been enshrined in legislation, albeit in 
recitals. Recital 16 of the Brussels I Regulation provides ‘[m]utual trust in the 
administration of justice in the Community justifies judgments given in a Member 
State being recognised automatically without the need for any procedure except in 
cases of dispute’, whilst Recital 17 states ‘By virtue of the same principle of mutual 
trust, the procedure for making enforceable in one Member State a judgment given in 
another must be efficient and rapid’. The regulation thus enshrines the principle of 
mutual trust as it had begun to be expressed in case law, although with the emphasis 
on its role in the recognition and enforcement rather than the jurisdiction aspects of 
the Regulation, which often seem to prove the more controversial in practice. This 
expression of the principle of mutual trust is repeated in similar terms in the Brussels 
I Recast.403 
Since the inclusion of the principle in the Brussels I Regulation, and especially in the 
last five years, the principle of mutual trust has been used by the Court of Justice with 
increasing regularity to justify its international private law decisions. Perhaps the most 
famous instance of the use of mutual trust came in the West Tankers case in 2009, 
when the Court held, as mentioned above, that the use of anti-suit injunctions to protect 
arbitration agreements within the European Union ‘runs counter to the trust which the 
Member States accord to one another’s legal systems and judicial institutions and on 
which the system of jurisdiction under Regulation No 44/2001 is based’.404 The Court 
cites Turner in support of this statement, although the statement in West Tankers is 
wider than that in Turner, which limited itself to saying that mutual trust underpins 
certain jurisdictional rules. In West Tankers, trust is stated to underpin the entire 
Brussels Regime. This assessment is hardly controversial, but represents a 
development in the importance the court is willing to ascribe to mutual trust in its 
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judgments, perhaps precipitated by the enshrinement of the principle in the recitals to 
the Brussels Regulation. 
Following West Tankers, the principle of mutual trust has been used frequently by the 
Court of Justice in its international private law cases. In the TNT case referred to above, 
the Court held that the jurisdiction provisions of the CMR took precedence over the 
Brussels Regulation only in so far as those provisions aligned with the key principles 
underlying the Regulation. This meant that provisions of the CMR permitting the 
review of the jurisdiction of the originating court by an enforcing court could not be 
applied because they run contrary to the Regulation system of recognition and 
enforcement and its founding principles. The judgment refers repeatedly to mutual 
trust as a crucial principle underlying the Regulation that must be respected by other 
sets of jurisdictional rules, notwithstanding that they seem on a literal reading of Art 
71 (1) to take precedence over the Regulation.405 Again this judgment raises the profile 
of mutual trust still higher, in effect saying that promoting and maintaining mutual 
trust between the member states is itself a goal more important than the enacting 
provisions of the Brussels Regulation. This means that the importance of mutual trust 
goes beyond its inclusion in a recital, because as has been discussed above, recitals are 
not capable of displacing enacting provisions. Maintaining mutual trust in the TNT 
case therefore ceases to be an underlying, guiding principle, instead becoming an end 
in itself. 
In Prism Investments, the Court of Justice relied on the doctrine of mutual trust to 
justify its holding that an automatic declaration of enforceability made under Art 41 
Brussels I Regulation may only be appealed under Art 45 on the grounds listed in Arts 
34 and 35.406 The fact that there may be other good reasons not to enforce the judgment 
– such as the fact that it has already been complied with where issued – do not have 
any bearing upon its enforceability per se, only the actual process of enforcement.407 
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The court expressly referred to recitals 16 and 17 in providing legal context to its 
decision.408 Again, mutual trust was vital in steering the court towards its holding. 
In the Trade Agency case, the Court of Justice referred to mutual trust, which favours 
automatic recognition of foreign judgments, as a principle pulling against concerns of 
procedural fairness, though ultimately the Court found that the procedural safeguards 
included in Art 34 (2) Brussels I Regulation should take precedence.409 Once more, 
the judgment emphasises the crucial importance of mutual trust in the European law 
of jurisdiction, even if that importance was not in this case decisive. 
In the Wolf Naturprodukte case, the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic asked the 
Court of Justice whether, for a judgment to be enforceable under the Brussels I 
Regulation, it was necessary that the Regulation was in force in both the issuing and 
recognising state at the time when the issuing court rendered judgment.410 The court 
referred to the mutual trust in reasoning that the Regulation’s strict rules of jurisdiction 
and relatively liberal rules of recognition and enforcement are closely linked, with the 
former helping foster trust for the purpose of the latter.411 It is therefore necessary that 
the Regulation was in force in both member states at the time the judgment was issued 
for a state to be bound to recognise the judgment.412 Mutual trust is again referred to 
as effectively underpinning the entire Brussels Regime.  
The principle of mutual trust continues to be referred to by the Court of Justice in its 
international private law decisions, for example in deciding that a court must recognise 
a judgment whereby the court of another member state declines jurisdiction under a 
choice of court agreement.413 The Court has also referred extensively to mutual trust 
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in justifying its decision that Art 34 (4) of the Regulation does not apply to 
irreconcilable judgments given by the courts of the same member state414 as well as in 
decisions regarding recognition of family law judgments rendered under the Brussels 
II Regulation.415  
Mutual trust has clearly become a defining principle of the European law of 
jurisdiction. Its application is not always popular, nor does it necessarily lead to the 
fairest results in any given case, but it is in general necessary to ensure the proper 
circulation of judgments within the European Union. The free movement of judgments 
in turn aids the common market by allowing business to take place in an atmosphere 
of legal certainty. Indeed, the language of mutual trust in European international 
private law bears a striking resemblance to language used in cases concerning the 
fundamental freedoms, suggesting that mutual trust is a vital tenet of European Union 
and the common market. The following section will explore the use of the principle of 
mutual trust in other areas of EU law, with a focus on the law concerning the 
fundamental freedoms. 
(2) Mutual trust in European Union law 
Long before assuming central importance in European international private law, the 
principle of mutual trust was being used expressly and decisively by the Court of 
Justice in other areas of European law. The doctrine is most often used to support the 
so-called fundamental freedoms: namely the free movement of goods, workers, and 
                                                 
such a jurisdiction clause to be valid, it would in principle be contrary to the principle of mutual trust 
between the courts of the European Union to allow a court of the Member State in which recognition is 
sought to review that very same issue of validity.’  
414 Case C-157/12 Salzgitter Mannesmann Handel GMBH v SC Laminorul SA [2014] ILPr 6, paras 31-
40. The rule in Art 34 (4) requires a member state court to refuse recognition and enforcement of a 
judgment irreconcilable with an enforceable judgment of another member state or of a third state in the 
same cause of action between the same parties. In this case, the German Federal Court of Justice referred 
the question of whether Art 34 (4) could be applied by analogy to situations where the courts of the 
same member state have issued what the enforcing court considers to be irreconcilable judgments. Para 
36 of the judgment directly states that such an application would be inconsistent with the principle of 
mutual trust. See Weller, above, 86-87. 




services.416 The principle has also been invoked in cases concerning the administration 
of criminal justice. This section will consider cases in each of these areas in turn. 
(a) The free movement of goods 
The area of European Union law in which the principle of mutual trust has had the 
greatest impact, other than perhaps international private law, is the free movement of 
goods. It can be seen, for example, in the judgment of the Court of Justice in the 
seminal Cassis de Dijon case, which remains an important element of European free 
movement of goods law to this day.417  
By way of background, Art 30 of the Treaty of Rome prohibited quantitative 
restrictions on trade (quotas, tariffs, taxes, charges) and measures having equivalent 
effect (‘MEQRs’), which had been given a broad definition in the Dassonville 
judgment.418 It was clear that national standards on product features like packaging, 
labelling, and composition would fall under Art 30 as MEQRs, whether directly or 
indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally discriminatory.419 Such measures could 
nonetheless be justified under Art 36 for a broad range of reasons, provided they were 
neither ‘a means of arbitrary discrimination’ nor ‘a disguised restriction on trade’.420 
A plain reading of articles 30 and 36 would suggest that, where a national product 
standard is an MEQR, but it served one of the legitimate goals enunciated in Art 36 
and was genuinely made in furtherance of that goal and not for reasons of 
discrimination or protectionism, the standard would be permitted. The Court in 
Dassonville laid the groundwork for the Cassis de Dijon decision, which would turn 
this understanding on its head, with profound effects on the common market. 
                                                 
416 The fourth fundamental freedom is the free movement of capital, which will not be addressed in this 
section because no relevant case law could be found. 
417 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR I-649 
(‘Cassis de Dijon’); P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th Edn, 2008) (‘Craig 
and de Burca’), 677-679; D Chalmers, C Hadjiemmanuil et al, European Union Law: Text and 
Materials (2006) (‘Chalmers et al’), 676-678. 
418 Case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
419 Ibid, paras 5-9. 
420 ‘The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports 
or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection 
of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic 




The case concerned the importation of cassis to Germany from France. German 
national law contained a rule that liqueurs must have a minimum alcohol content of 
25%; the cassis in question was around 15-20%. The cassis could therefore not legally 
be marketed in Germany. The German government argued that the provision could be 
justified under Art 36 on the grounds of the protection of public health and of 
consumers. The Court of Justice rejected these arguments before making the landmark 
holding that: ‘there is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been 
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages 
should not be introduced into the market of any other Member State…’.421 
This would become a central principle of free movement of goods law known as ‘the 
rule of mutual recognition’.422 The Court recognised in its judgment that, in principle, 
product standards in areas not regulated by EU law were within the purview of the 
Member States.423 Far from placing the states’ rights to regulate product standards 
paramount, however, the court required each Member State to recognise the validity 
of the regulatory systems of its peers, allowing derogation from this principle only to 
the extent that one of the mandatory requirements of Art 36, narrowly construed as 
exceptions, could be proven.424 
This reasoning is remarkably similar to the application of the principle of mutual trust 
in international private law cases, as discussed above. In fact, it could be said to be the 
operation of the same principle in a different area of law, with goods that pass national 
product standards substituted for judgments rendered after the national courts of one 
member state have accepted jurisdiction under the Regulation. This argument finds 
support in the opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Commission v France in 
which he expressly equates the Cassis de Dijon rule of mutual recognition to the 
“principle of ‘mutual trust’”.425 Although Cassis de Dijon was decided ‘without 
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explicit reference’ to the principle, academics have argued that ‘mutual trust is an 
important part of the philosophy’ of the judgment.426  
This certainly seems to be the case, especially when the decision is viewed in light of 
the comments of Advocates General and the Court of Justice itself in later cases. In 
the Denkavit case, Advocate General Marco Darmon reasoned that German legislation 
requiring animal foodstuffs to have a veterinary certificate either from Germany or 
from the country of production ‘far from subjecting imports to double controls, … [is] 
based on mutual trust between member-States, since the German authorities accept as 
sufficient proof the production of a Dutch veterinary certificate.’427 
As in the Waidmann international private law case, the Court of Justice did not apply 
Advocate General Marco Darmon’s wording in Denkavit.428 It would not be long, 
however, before the Court of Justice would itself turn to the language of ‘mutual trust’ 
to help decide free movement of goods cases. In the 1988 Bouchara case the Court of 
Justice considered Member State rules for the certification of the composition of 
textiles. The Court considered a French regime for ascertaining the composition of 
textiles by requiring re-testing of the materials, holding that: 
‘…although member-States are not prohibited from requiring prior approval of certain 
products, even if those products have already been approved in another member-State, 
the authorities of the State of importation are however not entitled unnecessarily to 
require technical or chemical analyses when the same analyses or tests have already 
been carried out in another member-State and their results are available to those 
authorities. That rule is a particular application of a more general principle of mutual 
trust between the authorities of the member-States’.429 
This principle is clearly very similar to the principle of mutual trust as applied in 
international private law, except that it is certificates rather than judgments that must 
be recognised, and the decision to issue the certificate rather than the decision to take 
jurisdiction that must be trusted.  
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Further similarities can be seen in the judgment in R v Ministry of Agriculture, when 
the Court of Justice again used the language of mutual trust with respect to checks 
carried out under a harmonising directive, in this case rules for the protection of farm 
animals. The Court stated that ‘the Member States must rely on mutual trust to carry 
out checks [for compliance with the Directive] on [sic] their respective territories.’430 
The trust in this case must be placed in different exercises of the powers of state: 
legislative power that has been used to implement the directive correctly and executive 
power has been properly used to ensure that the implementing legislation is properly 
enforced. The trust in international private law cases must be placed in the exercise of 
judicial power to accept or decline jurisdiction where appropriate.  
The principle of mutual trust clearly underlies much of European free movement of 
goods law. It is visible in spirit underlying the court’s approach to the seminal case of 
Cassis de Dijon and expressly in later cases. Mistrust could have impeded the 
functioning of the common market in goods even after the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions and MEQRs: whether mistrust of regulatory systems, certificatory systems, 
or the implementation of relevant EU law. The common market could only develop 
freely if member states as a rule put trust in one another’s systems, with derogation 
from this rule of trust permitted only in very limited circumstances.431 The Court of 
Justice has used the principle of mutual trust to compel member states to act in this 
fashion. The similarities between its approach to that problem and the similar 
international private law problems it would later face are striking. 
(b) The free movement of workers 
The principle of mutual trust most commonly arises in this field in decisions and 
judgments concerning recognition of workers’ training and qualifications. The 
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European Communities had passed certain directives on these topics, including one 
relating to dental qualifications432 and one concerning medical qualifications.433  
These two directives are similarly structured, with Art 2 reading: 
‘Each Member State shall recognize the diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications… awarded to nationals of Member States by the other Member 
States… and which are listed in Article 3 of this Directive, by giving such 
qualifications, as far as the right to take up and pursue the activities of a doctor [/dental 
practitioner] is concerned, the same effect in its territory as those which the Member 
State itself awards.’ 
In article 3, the Directives set out a list of qualifications that entitle those professionals 
to practise. Elsewhere they set out minimum standards for those qualifications to be 
awarded.434  
Cases under these similar Directives came before the Court of Justice, both concerning 
the extent to which a Member State is bound by another Member State’s decision to 
recognise foreign qualifications as equivalent to those listed in Art 3. In the Tawil-
Albertini case, the court held that France was not bound under the Dental qualifications 
Directive to recognise Belgium’s decision to accept Lebanese qualifications as 
equivalent to Belgian.435 In advising the court, Advocate General Marco Darmon 
quoted a Commission official in stating that the Dental qualifications Directive is 
based on the principle of mutual trust as should be its application.436 
Although the Court did not adopt the Advocate General’s approach, it would in a later 
case. The Tennah-Durez case concerned the Medical qualifications Directive.437 In this 
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case an Algerian trained as a doctor in Algeria for six years, before obtaining Belgian 
citizenship and being admitted to the seventh year of studies in a Belgian medical 
school. She completed this year and was awarded a basic medical diploma before 
receiving a specific medical diploma in general practice: a qualification covered by the 
Medical qualifications Directive. The question before the court was whether the 
French authorities were obliged to recognise her qualification.  
The Court of Justice relied heavily on the principle of mutual trust in its reasoning, 
stating: 
‘Recognition is automatic and unconditional in that Member States are obliged to 
accept the equivalence of certain diplomas and cannot require the persons concerned 
to comply with requirements other than those laid down by the relevant directives. It 
is underpinned by the Member States' mutual trust in the adequacy of the medical 
diplomas awarded by other Member States...’438  
The judgment continues to hold that the host member state was bound under the 
Directive to recognise the qualification: 
‘The diploma at issue in the main proceedings is in fact not a diploma awarded in a 
third country but a diploma awarded by a university in a Member State in accordance 
with its own rules. The fact that the diploma is of Community origin entitles the other 
Member States to conclude that the competent authority of the Member State which 
awarded it has complied with its obligations of verification under Directive 93/16, so 
that the mutual trust underlying the system of mutual recognition established by 
Directive 93/16 is not jeopardised.’439  
The Court then considered the question of whether the host state would be entitled to 
look behind the qualification to establish it conformed with the substantive training 
requirements of the Directive. The Court held that this was not permitted, 
‘[s]ince the aim of the Community system… is that qualifications should be given 
automatic and unconditional recognition, the system would be seriously jeopardised 
if it were open to Member States at their discretion to question the merits of a decision 
taken by the competent institution of another Member State to award the diploma.’440 
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Again, the language and content of the holding are strikingly similar to that used in 
international private law cases, especially those concerning the unconditional 
recognition of a judgment without review of the issuing court’s decision on its 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the decision in Tawil-Albertini also mirrors the Brussels Regime, 
with a decision to recognise a foreign qualification not requiring mutual trust, whereas 
the decision to issue a qualification itself in Tennah-Durez did demand recognition. 
This is similar to the distinction between judgments on judgments and judgments on 
the merits under the Brussels Regime, briefly discussed in Chapter 4. In cases 
concerning the free movement of workers, therefore, as with the free movement of 
goods, the focus is on mutual trust in the exercise of legislative and executive power 
rather than judicial power. 
(c) The free movement of services 
The impact of mutual trust can also be seen in cases concerning the free movement of 
services. The 1995 Commission v Belgium case441 concerned the application of the 
Broadcasting Directive.442 The Broadcasting Directive provides at Art 2 (2) that 
‘Member States shall ensure freedom of reception and shall not restrict retransmission 
on their territory of television broadcasts from other Member States for reasons which 
fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive’. The Directive also sets down 
certain broadcasting standards.443 
Belgian regulators pursued a policy of prior authorisation of all broadcasts from other 
member states. The Court of Justice had to consider, inter alia, whether this policy 
was a valid implementation of the Directive.  
The Belgian Government argued that it should be for each Member State to verify 
whether the state of origin of the broadcast is actually complying with the provisions 
of the Directive at the time of broadcasting.444 The court did not accept this logic, 
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stating that ‘the Member States must have mutual trust in each other as far as controls 
carried out on their respective territories are concerned.’445 The court also ruled that 
the protection of public policy, public morality, or public security could not justify a 
general requirement for prior approval, as this would effectively ‘entail abolition of 
the freedom to provide services.’446 
Again, parallels can be drawn between the court’s approach to this issue and its 
approach to international private law cases. The concept that a lack of trust between 
the member states could undermine the entire piece of legislation is familiar, as is the 
use of the principle of mutual trust to ensure the member states behave as if they trust 
one another. 
(d) The administration of criminal justice 
One final area in which the Court of Justice has applied the principle of mutual trust is 
the relationship between the criminal justice systems of the Member States. The 
Gözütok case is worth noting not only because it evinces the Court’s willingness to use 
mutual trust in a wide array of contexts, but also because of Advocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer’s espousal of the doctrine as something more fundamental, more far 
reaching than simply a way to resolve the instant dispute.447 The Advocate General’s 
opinion, considering the goal of creating an area of freedom, security and justice, 
stated: 
“This shared goal cannot be achieved without the mutual trust of the Member States 
in their criminal justice systems and without the mutual recognition of their respective 
judgments, adopted in a true ‘common market of fundamental rights’. Indeed, 
recognition is based on the thought that while another State may not deal with a certain 
matter in the same or even a similar way as one's own State, the outcome will be such 
that it is accepted as equivalent to a decision by one's own State because it reflects the 
same principles and values. Mutual trust is an essential element in the development of 
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the European Union: trust in the adequacy of one's partners' rules and also trust that 
these rules are correctly applied.”448 
The Advocate General has here succinctly expressed the concept of mutual trust as an 
overarching principle of the European Union. The Court itself used the language of 
mutual trust in its judgment, but confined its application of the principle to the facts at 
issue in the case at hand, stating: 
‘…the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each 
of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States even when the 
outcome would be different if its own national law were applied.’449 
Gözütok demonstrates once more the far-reaching nature of the principle of mutual 
trust. The Court’s application of mutual trust to criminal matters shows how wide-
ranging the principle has become. The Advocate General – ever a proponent of mutual 
trust – expressed the principle with a breadth and importance not usually seen in 
official materials, even if such breadth and importance can be inferred by analysis such 
as this chapter.  
(3) Importance of mutual trust 
It has been shown that the Court of Justice has used a very similar principle of mutual 
trust in case law concerning international private law, the fundamental freedoms, and 
the administration of criminal justice. Mutual trust has been utilised by the Court to 
ensure member states place the necessary level of trust in the exercises of the powers 
of state in other member states. The relevance of this discovery to this thesis is clear: 
it underlines the crucial importance of mutual trust not just in international private law, 
but EU law as a whole. Indeed, the fact that mutual trust is a central principle in case 
law concerning the fundamental freedoms demonstrates its importance to the common 
market and the project of European economic integration as a whole. It is therefore a 
principle that should be given a lot of weight in drafting laws, albeit that weight will 
not always be decisive. This is true in the context of the European law of jurisdiction 
when, for example, a court is given exclusive jurisdiction, the grant of which implies 
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some other supervening principle taking precedence over mutual trust and the usual, 
heavily trust-centric legal structure.450 It can also be seen in the reversal of Gasser in 
the Brussels I Recast, which will be discussed below, showing that party autonomy 
can take precedence over inter-member-state mutual trust, albeit within an already 
inherently trust-based structure. This balancing of mutual trust and other principles 
will be crucial to the proposals for reform presented in this thesis. 
C. Principle two – legal certainty and predictability 
Both the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Recast contain recitals stating that 
‘[t]he rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable’.451 The Brussels Regime has 
always sought to provide clear rules as to where jurisdiction should lie and a simple 
lis pendens procedure – perhaps too simple – for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction.452 
Simplicity, predictability, and legal certainty are given even more importance at the 
recognition and enforcement stage. This is achieved by making virtually all bases of 
indirect jurisdiction ‘required’ bases, regardless of whether they are required, 
permitted, or even excluded as indirect bases.453 This asymmetric structure with a 
strong emphasis on enforcement of judgments is clearly designed to enhance legal 
certainty.454 
Indeed, the strict lis pendens rule in Art 29 Brussels I Recast455 is and always has been 
concerned with the prevention of parallel proceedings and attendant risk of 
irreconcilable judgments, which are considered to undermine legal certainty and 
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predictability.456 The law is focused on preventing parallel proceedings and keeping 
the system predictable457 to the extent that it can be criticised for being overly rigid, 
encouraging tactical litigation, and for being unduly unfair.458 
It may in fact be argued that legal certainty and predictability are principles as 
important as mutual trust in the sphere of international private law. The two certainly 
seem to go hand in hand in many of the cases concerning mutual trust cited above. In 
the Gasser judgment, for example, it is expressly stated that the trust-based system of 
compulsory jurisdiction ‘seeks to ensure legal certainty by allowing individuals to 
foresee with sufficient certainty which court will have jurisdiction’.459 Furthermore, in 
the recent TNT case, the Court of Justice expressly stated that the principles underlying 
the Brussels I Regulation included ‘predictability as to the courts having jurisdiction 
and therefore legal certainty for litigants, sound administration of justice, 
minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings, and mutual trust in the 
administration of justice in the European Union’.460 
A further example of the importance of predictability under the Brussels Regime, and 
how it can be rigidly applied to the potential detriment of fairness, is the infamous 
Owusu case.461 In this case, a UK national suffered a serious injury when using a 
private beach on holiday in Jamaica. He had access to the beach after renting a villa 
from another British national, domiciled in the United Kingdom. He brought 
proceedings in England against the UK-domiciled lessor, founding jurisdiction under 
Art 2 Brussels Convention, as well as various Jamaican companies as co-defendants. 
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The defendants argued that the English courts should decline jurisdiction under the 
local doctrine of forum non conveniens, on the basis that Jamaica had closer 
connections with and was therefore the more appropriate forum for the resolution of 
the dispute. The English Court of Appeal made a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice on the whether the English court could decline Brussels Convention 
jurisdiction on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine. The Court of Justice 
held that it could not, holding that that, in relevant part: 
‘[a]pplication of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which allows the court seised a 
wide discretion as regards the question whether a foreign court would be a more 
appropriate forum for the trial of an action, is liable to undermine the predictability of 
the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, in particular that of Art 
2, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of 
the Convention.’462 
Once again, it can be seen that legal certainty and predictability are emphasised over 
reaching a fair or appropriate result in the given case. This serves once again to 
underline the overriding importance of the principles. 
The emphasis placed on predictability and legal certainty in recitals, case law, and 
academic commentary demonstrates the fundamental importance the principle has 
come to hold in the European law of jurisdiction. Perhaps most telling is the frequency 
with which the principle is elevated to the level of mutual trust, which has already been 
shown to be a central principle of European law more generally. It is therefore 
submitted that clear jurisdictional rules creating predictable results and enhancing 
legal certainty are to be preferred. 
D. Principle three – upholding party autonomy 
With the passing of the Brussels I Recast, the importance placed on the principle of 
respect for party autonomy was clearly increased. That principle had previously been 
placed secondary to mutual trust and legal certainty in the Gasser judgment, which 
was legislatively reversed in the Recast’s new provisions on choice of court 
agreements.463  
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The Gasser judgment had been strongly criticised for the lack of importance it placed 
on party autonomy, as well as for creating a ‘torpedo’ power for parties opposed to 
litigation in the chosen forum.464 Furthermore, the way in which the judgment 
disregarded party autonomy is odd given the central importance placed on the principle 
in the rules of the Rome Regulations on the applicable law to disputes concerning both 
contractual and non-contractual obligations.465  
The provisions of the Brussels I Recast reversing Gasser create a new lis pendens rule 
that gives priority to the court designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement 
over the courts of any other member state, effectively raising the status of exclusive 
jurisdiction conferred on a court by the parties to almost the same level as exclusive 
jurisdiction under the Brussels Regime itself.466 The reason for the change was stated 
to be ‘to enhance the effectiveness of exclusive choice-of-court agreements and to 
avoid abusive litigation tactics’.467  
In reversing Gasser and choosing to protect choice of court agreements, the European 
legislature has demonstrated that party autonomy is an important principle in 
contemporary European international private law.468 The fundamentally important 
principles of both mutual trust and legal certainty had formed the bedrock of the Court 
of Justice’s holding in Gasser that the designated court, if second seised, should stay 
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proceedings pending the judgment of the first-seised court.469 In Gasser, those 
principles were placed paramount to concerns about abusive tactical litigation and 
party autonomy. It is submitted that the reversal of Gasser shows a change in the 
ranking of these principles, albeit applicable only to the specific situation and within a 
broader system still based on principles of mutual trust and ensuring legal certainty. 
The overall priorities and founding principles of the Brussels Regime have not 
changed, but in an evolving legal climate, party autonomy has taken on comparable 
importance where relevant. 
On one view the Gasser decision has been reversed because of concerns about tactical 
litigation as well as party autonomy, with the potential for torpedo actions to frustrate 
exclusive choice of court agreements. It is submitted, however, that prevention of 
tactical litigation should not be seen as the driving force behind the reform. This is 
because tactical litigation is still permitted – some would argue encouraged – by the 
structure of the Brussels I Recast in other areas. For example, if a seller from one 
member state delivers goods to a buyer at the buyer’s place of business and domicile, 
then needs to sue the buyer for non-payment, it is clear that the only court having good 
jurisdiction under the Brussels I Recast to hear his action would be the courts at the 
buyer’s place of business.470 If the buyer, anticipating being sued, begins a spurious 
action against the seller in the slow-moving courts of another member state, he has 
torpedoed the seller’s action using the strict first-in-time lis pendens rule at Art 29 
Brussels I Recast. The Recast has made no changes to help this disadvantaged litigant.  
It is therefore submitted that what makes the choice of court scenario special, justifying 
the application of a different lis pendens rule, is the exercise of party autonomy in 
concluding a choice of court agreement, and by extension the clear bad faith shown in 
going back on that agreement. It must therefore be concluded that party autonomy, 
rather than the restraint of tactical litigation, was the main principle underlying the 
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legislative reversal of Gasser, and party autonomy is thus a significantly important 
principle of the European law of jurisdiction. 
E. The ranking of these principles 
It is also necessary to consider whether and to what extent these relevant principles 
can be ranked against one another. The relationship between these principles could be 
important in assessing the extent to which each principle should be taken into account 
in the proposals advanced by this thesis. 
It is difficult to rank mutual trust and legal certainty against one another, because they 
so often point in the same direction. This is because mutual trust requires respect for 
the courts of other member states’ ability to determine their own jurisdiction, and the 
recognition and enforcement of the judgments they ultimately render. The former 
feature is manifest in the strict, first-in-time lis pendens rule, which also aids legal 
certainty by preventing parallel proceedings and the possibility of irreconcilable 
judgments. The latter feature is visible in the rule that judgments of member state 
courts should be virtually automatically recognised in other member states, which 
obviously aids legal certainty and predictability.  
Party autonomy is relevant to the European law of jurisdiction in relatively limited 
circumstances, such as the enforcement of choice of court agreements. Considerations 
of mutual trust and legal certainty clearly took precedence over the exercise of party 
autonomy in the conclusion of a choice of court agreement at the time of the Gasser 
judgment, as has been discussed above. However, the reversal of the Gasser judgment 
indicates a shift in priorities, with party autonomy taking precedence over mutual trust 
and, perhaps to an extent, legal certainty.471 
It is therefore clear that there is no obvious ranking of these principles: different 
principles will rank more highly depending on the circumstances. There is no one-size-
fits-all approach. On the other hand, what is clear is that all three principles are highly 
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important to the European law of jurisdiction. It is therefore submitted that an ideal 
solution would respect all three of these principles if possible. 
F. Preliminary conclusions 
This chapter has outlined some of the main principles underlying the Brussels Regime. 
It first identified mutual trust, which is a principle of fundamental importance not only 
in the European law of jurisdiction, but also in EU law more generally, having been 
used extensively in cases concerning the fundamental freedoms. Legal certainty is 
frequently mentioned by the court as going hand-in-hand with the trust-based system 
of jurisdiction and must also be viewed as a vital principle in the European law of 
jurisdiction. Finally, recent developments in the Brussels I Recast indicate the 
increasing importance of respect for party autonomy, to the extent that Gasser decision 
has been legislatively reversed. 
None of these principles is absolute and none can be applied to resolve every case of 
disagreement about the law or its application. Indeed, sometimes these principles stand 
in direct opposition to one another, like when applied to choice of court agreements 
and lis pendens. But they are all clearly important, and should all play into the 
balancing of principles that must be performed in considering the appropriateness of 
current rules or the drafting of new rules. 
It is also true that other principles are mentioned frequently in cases concerning the 
European law of jurisdiction, such as the principle that judgments should have ‘free 
movement’ or be widely enforceable (‘favor executionis’); the sound administration 
of justice; and minimisation of the risk of concurrent proceedings.472 It is submitted 
that the principle of automatically enforceable judgments without formality or review 
is simply a more specific example of the application of the principles of mutual trust 
and legal certainty, as is the principle of minimising concurrent proceedings, with all 
the uncertainty raised when one court questions whether another is the appropriate 
forum. Because these principles can be seen as specific applications of larger umbrella 
principles, they have not been singled out for discussion, but discussed under the 
                                                 




relevant general principles. The sound administration of justice is clearly a broad and 
malleable term and has been used by the court of justice to justify a common sense 
application of the law.473 The principle, however, is not frequently referred to, and still 
less rarely in isolation of the other aforementioned principles, to decide a case. It is 
therefore submitted that, especially because of its generality and use secondarily to 
other principles, this principle does not need to be considered in its own right. 
It is therefore concluded that the principles of mutual trust, predictability and certainty, 
and upholding party autonomy are the main relevant principles in the European law of 
jurisdiction. These principles will therefore be taken into account in this thesis’s 
proposals for reform of the relationship between the Brussels Regime and arbitration. 
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6. PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PART 1 – 
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
Having considered the major principles underlying the European law of jurisdiction 
and the Brussels Regime, this thesis will now turn its attention to the legal context and 
guiding principles in international commercial arbitration. This investigation will be 
split into two parts: first an analysis of the principles underlying the New York 
Convention, in a similar fashion to the previous chapter; and second a discussion of 
the ongoing ‘delocalisation’ debate in international commercial arbitration, and this 
thesis’s place within that discussion. The former will be the subject of this chapter, 
whilst the latter will be considered in the next chapter. 
Discussion of the New York Convention and its underlying principles is appropriate 
for two main reasons. First, the New York Convention has come to enjoy significant 
importance in the world of international commercial arbitration. It is very widely in 
force, and the ease it lends to international recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards is the principal reason for arbitration’s popularity as a form of dispute 
resolution in international commercial cases.474 Second, as was discussed in Chapter 
2, the existence of the New York Convention has often been advanced as a reason for 
the arbitration exclusion in the Brussels Regime. As argued earlier, this justification is 
weak, but it nonetheless shows the importance placed on the New York Convention 
by the drafters of the Brussels Convention. Even if there would not be substantive 
overlap, it is submitted that the principles of the New York Convention should, if 
possible, be respected by the Brussels Regime in its approach to arbitration. 
This chapter will first briefly address the goals of the New York Convention project, 
to lend context to the discussion of principles that follows. It will then analyse six key 
principles underlying the New York Convention: (1) a pro-enforcement bias; (2) 
home-country control; (3) respect for party autonomy; (4) a special role for the law of 
the seat of the arbitration; (5) harmonisation and autonomous application; and (6) 
maintaining fairness and due process. This chapter shall conclude by considering the 
                                                 




extent to which it is possible to rank the importance of these principles in the New 
York Convention regime. 
A. The goals of the New York Convention 
As when discussing the Brussels Regime, it is important to bear in mind the aims of 
the New York Convention project in discussing the principles upon which the 
achievement of those aims has been built. The Convention’s aims give context to the 
its provisions and the principles. 
The overarching goal of the New York Convention project was to develop 
international trade by facilitating the recognition and enforcement of awards rendered 
in international commercial arbitration.475 This goal was to be achieved while ‘at the 
same time maintain[ing] generally recognised principles of justice and respect[ing] the 
sovereign rights of States’.476 That said, the aim of improving the enforceability of 
awards is visible in everything from the Convention’s full title and its description of 
scope to its substantive provisions on the recognition and enforcement of awards, all 
of which will be discussed in more detail below.477 It is an aim in which the 
Convention, now in force in 154 states, has enjoyed significant success. Yet it is 
important to remember that the promotion of enforceability of arbitral awards was not 
a goal to be achieved at all costs, but only insofar as reconcilable with principles of 
justice and the sovereign rights of states. The aim is balanced against these sometimes 
competing principles, resulting in a cleverly drafted Convention, which has been 
successful, hugely improving the prospects of recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards across the world. It might be suggested that this success has come in large part 
because of the Convention’s provisions to protect states’ rights, which have given it a 
very broad-based appeal, encouraging states to implement the Convention even if they 
are not in general particularly arbitration friendly.  
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B. Principles underlying the New York Convention 
The New York Convention, as mentioned in previous chapters, contains rules on both 
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements. The 
principles underlying the Convention will be discerned from both sets of rules, 
although the Convention contains far more, and more detailed, rules concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.  
This imbalance may be a product of the Convention’s drafting. Arbitration agreements 
were originally intended to form the subject of a separate protocol,478 as had been the 
case with the New York Convention’s predecessors, the Geneva Protocol on 
Arbitration Clauses (1923)479 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (1927).480 The Art II provisions were added at the very end of the 
drafting process,481 when it was realised that such separation might undermine the 
effectiveness of the system, for example if the instruments were subscribed to by 
different groups.482 This has led to concerns that the drafting of Art II might have been 
slightly rushed and not perfectly thought out, especially as regards its relationship with 
other parts of the Convention.483 As will be discussed below, slightly creative legal 
reasoning has been required to enhance the effectiveness of the Convention’s 
provisions on arbitral awards. For this reason the analysis of the principles underlying 
the Convention’s provisions on arbitral awards will be based in the first place on a 
textual analysis of the Convention, especially the provision of Art V on reasons for 
non-recognition and enforcement of awards, which have been described as ‘the heart 
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of the Convention’.484 The analysis of the principles underlying the provisions on 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards will not rely too heavily on textual 
analysis and will instead place more weight on the leading cases and commentary. The 
relevant principles will now be considered in turn. 
(1) Home-country control 
An important reason for the success of the New York Convention is the emphasis it 
places on an enforcing country’s ability to control which arbitral awards will be 
granted recognition and enforcement. States have broad discretion in this respect, both 
to allow and to refuse recognition and enforcement. It could be said that the New York 
Convention in fact places strict controls on when the parties to an arbitration 
agreement may challenge the award, as will be discussed below, but there are no such 
onerous restrictions on states, either to recognise and enforce or to refuse to do so. This 
dichotomous approach makes sense: it ensures parties are held to their agreements 
without limiting too greatly the sovereignty of implementing states. This in turn makes 
the Convention more appealing to states that may mistrust arbitration and look for a 
‘safety valve’ to allow refusal of recognition and enforcement, whilst allowing states 
where arbitration is an established form of dispute resolution to go as far as they wish 
in enacting pro-enforcement laws. This section shall consider the various ways in 
which courts retain discretion to recognise and enforce or refuse to recognise and 
enforce both arbitral awards and arbitration agreements. 
(a) Discretion to refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
The main ‘safety valve’ for states to refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards is found in Art V (2) New York Convention, which states: 
‘Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under 
the law of that country; or 
                                                 





(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of that country.’485 
The first point to note is that the chapeau of Art V (2) allows the court to find either 
of these grounds of its own accord, without their having to be raised or argued by the 
parties. This contrasts with those grounds for non-recognition and enforcement 
contained in Art V (1), sometimes called procedural grounds for non-recognition and 
enforcement, which must be alleged and proved by the party resisting recognition and 
enforcement. This underlines that the Art V (2) grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement are designed to protect the rights of states rather than the rights of the 
individual parties to the dispute.  
A second important point is that both provisions V (2) (a) and (b) refer expressly to 
the domestic law of the state where recognition and enforcement is sought, unlike any 
of the V (1) provisions. The provisions allow the forum court to refuse recognition and 
enforcement on the basis that it considers the subject matter of the award not to be 
capable of settlement by arbitration, or that recognition or enforcement of the award 
would violate its public policy.486 In this way Art V (2) provides states with a so-called 
‘safety net’ to reassure them that their public policy will not be circumvented or 
violated when parties avoid the court system by choosing arbitration.487  
It is quite clear on the basis of a textual analysis that the public policy referred to in 
Art V (2) (b) is the public policy of the state where recognition and enforcement is 
sought. Some commentators have, however, argued that courts should nonetheless 
apply as a matter of ‘best practice’ a more narrowly-defined, international version of 
their public policy to cases under the New York Convention.488 This would help reduce 
the impact of an obvious potential problem arising from Art V (2) (b): that application 
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of domestic public policy would lead to unpredictable and inconsistent results.489 It is 
however submitted that this standard is aspirational and cannot necessarily be expected 
to be complied with by all signatories, as it does not follow directly from the text of 
the Convention.490 Various states have applied their own domestic standards of 
subjects capable of settlement by arbitration and public policy to New York 
Convention cases.491 What can therefore certainly be said is that Art V (2) gives states 
wide discretion to refuse recognition and enforcement of awards to protect their public 
policy, should they choose to interpret it in that fashion. 
(b) Discretion to recognise and enforce arbitral awards 
On the other hand, the New York Convention also gives states wide discretion to allow 
recognition and enforcement of awards. This can be seen in two main places: the fact 
that refusal of recognition and enforcement under Art V is always at the discretion of 
the court asked for recognition and enforcement; and the ‘more favourable right’ 
principle in Art VII. 
The chapeau to Art V (1) provides: 
‘Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party 
against whom it is invoked, only if…’492 
while the chapeau to Art V (2) begins: 
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‘Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if…’493 
This means that the courts are not required to refuse recognition and enforcement even 
if they find that one of the grounds under Art V is present. Examples of this would be 
where a national law requires substantial detriment to have resulted from the violation 
of the Art V standard in order to refuse recognition or enforcement,494 or where a party 
is estopped from raising an issue at the recognition and enforcement stage that it could 
have raised earlier before the arbitral tribunal.495 
This discretion is often read in conjunction with the more favourable right principle of 
Art VII (1), which reads as follows: 
‘The provisions of the present Convention shall not… deprive any interested party of 
any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the 
extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to 
be relied upon.’ 
Thus, whilst the New York Convention provides in effect a minimum level for 
enforceability of awards, states are free to go beyond that level and allow awards to be 
recognised and enforced under less restrictive conditions. An example of this is the 
French approach to awards set aside where rendered, mentioned in chapter three in 
connection with the Putrabali cases, but which pre-dates those cases by some margin. 
The French Civil Code provides five grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards by the French courts, including those listed under Art 
V (1) (a)-(d) and V (2), but excluding the V (1) (e) ground that the award was set aside 
where rendered.496 In the Hilmarton case, recognition and enforcement of an award 
could not be resisted on the basis that it had been set aside in Switzerland. The French 
Supreme Court ruled:  
‘[T]he lower decision correctly held that, applying Art VII of the [New York 
Convention], OTV could rely upon the French law on international arbitration 
concerning the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards 
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rendered abroad, and especially upon Art. 1502 [French Code of Civil Procedure], 
which does not list the ground provided for in Art V [(1) (e)] of the [New York 
Convention] among the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement.’497  
The fact that an award has been set aside where rendered therefore can never be a 
reason to refuse recognition and enforcement of that award in France. This in turn is a 
particular application of the ‘more favourable right’ rule of Art VII of the New York 
Convention. The Hilmarton case is one famous example, but article VII has been 
invoked in countless other cases to justify the application of a more favourable right 
to have an arbitral award recognised or enforced.498 
It can therefore be concluded that the court requested to recognise and enforce an 
arbitral award has wide discretion to allow recognition or enforcement, even where the 
New York Convention would allow, or even seem to require, non-recognition or 
enforcement.  
(c) Discretion to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements 
Article II (1) New York Convention states that contracting states shall recognise 
arbitration agreements within the meaning of the Convention ‘concerning a subject 
matter capable of settlement by arbitration’. The question whether a subject matter is 
capable of settlement by arbitration is often referred to as ‘arbitrability’. The issue of 
the law applicable to arbitrability at the agreement enforcement stage of arbitration 
proceedings is relevant here because it allows national courts a measure of control over 
which arbitration agreements they will recognise.  
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Art II (1) New York Convention is not clear on which law should govern arbitrability, 
so discerning the prevailing, or most appropriate, approach to this question is of vital 
importance. The following discussion is limited to the approach to arbitrability that 
should be taken by a national court applying the New York Convention to a request to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, not the approach that should be taken by an arbitral 
tribunal considering the same problem. 
Article V (2) (a) New York Convention contains standardised rules for the law under 
which arbitrability should be assessed at the stage of recognition and enforcement of 
the award: the law of the country in which recognition and enforcement is sought, as 
discussed above. Some of the rules on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, 
such Art V (1) (a), can be applied by analogy to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, as will be discussed in more detail below. This cannot, however, be true 
of Art V (2) (a), for the simple reason that before an award is rendered, there is no way 
of telling with any certainty the court or courts in which recognition and enforcement 
of the award will be sought. As a result, courts applying the rule by analogy could face 
the choice between applying the law of the place where the award is most likely to be 
recognised or enforced, or cumulatively assessing arbitrability under the laws of all 
the countries where the award might be recognised or enforced.499 This solution is 
undesirable for many reasons, including the uncertainty it creates as well as the fact 
that the greater the number of laws under which arbitrability is assessed, the more 
likely one of those laws will hold the dispute not to be arbitrable. This would sit 
uneasily with the general principle of the New York Convention to favour the 
enforceability of arbitral agreements and awards, discussed below. Furthermore, as 
arbitrability is inherently linked with public policy,500 it makes better sense for this 
question to be left to home-country control at the recognition and enforcement stage. 
No country need recognise or enforce an award that it considers, for reasons of its own 
domestic public policy, to concern a subject matter not capable of settlement by 
arbitration. At the same time, that country’s conception of arbitrability should not 
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necessarily bind the courts of other countries to the same conclusion.501 Several courts 
have approached this question along these lines.502  
That being said, in light of the public policy concerns inherent in an assessment of 
arbitrability, the best approach may well be for the court asked to enforce an arbitration 
agreement to apply its own domestic conception of arbitrability, albeit cautiously. This 
approach has been adopted in various courts and by leading commentators.503 Born 
points out that this approach ‘does not mean that the particular substantive non-
arbitrability rules of the judicial enforcement forum should be applied 
mechanically’.504 Rather, just as the court has discretion under V (2) (a) to allow 
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award that it considers concerns a non-
arbitrable subject-matter, the court should exercise the same discretion to enforce an 
arbitral agreement in similar circumstances. To borrow an example from Born: if 
parties from Germany and France decide to arbitrate a dispute concerning conduct in 
Germany and France in England, there is no compelling reason for the English courts 
to apply the English domestic concept of arbitrability to that dispute.505 Any domestic 
conception of arbitrability should be held back and used only when there is a domestic 
interest at stake in the dispute. 
A slightly more thorny issue arises when the applicable substantive law would hold 
the dispute non-arbitrable. Born posits that the best approach to this issue is for the 
forum court to enforce the otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement,506 noting that 
this is in line with the practice of most courts.507 This still allows the courts of other 
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states the opportunity to review the arbitrability of the dispute at the recognition and 
enforcement stage.508 It should be noted once more that this approach does not 
encourage the application of the forum’s law without considering the totality of the 
circumstances,509 including especially having regard to the international character of 
the dispute.510 
Those are far from the only approaches to the question, with others including the 
application of the law of the place of arbitration, the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, or the application of a transnational standard of arbitrability.511 The lex 
arbitri, or law of the place of arbitration, is ill-suited to be applied by a foreign court 
in determining arbitrability, and its application has been described as ‘premature’ 
because the arbitrators and/or the forum court will likely have the chance to examine 
the arbitrability under that law at a later stage, and are better-placed to apply it.512 
Similarly, it has been argued that the arbitral tribunal is best placed to determine 
arbitrability by applying the law chosen by the parties to govern their agreement.513 
The application of an internationalised standard of arbitrability has been criticised as 
impractical, especially because it means little without uniform international 
application: although a foreign court may be willing to refer the parties to arbitration 
on the basis of an internationalised standard of arbitrability, others may not and may 
take jurisdiction, or the courts at the seat of the arbitration may refuse to offer support, 
undermining the arbitral process before it has begun.514 These approaches are therefore 
less appropriate than a forum court applying its own law. 
The relationship between the arbitrability of disputes and the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement, due to its inherent public policy considerations, is thus best 
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decided according to the law of the forum, with the proviso that the forum should 
exercise its control in this respect sparingly, and only when it has a direct interest in 
the dispute. This seems to fall in line with prevailing international opinion and 
practice.515 In turn, this demonstrates a measure of home-country control over the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
(d) Discretion to enforce arbitration agreements 
The more favourable right principle of Art VII (1) discussed above, which allows 
parties to rely on pro-enforcement national law or other treaties in place of the New 
York Convention, clearly states that it concerns the right of a party ‘to avail himself of 
an arbitral award’, but makes no mention of arbitration agreements. It may be asked 
whether this was a deliberate exclusion or simply an example of Art II’s imperfect 
relationship with the other provisions of the Convention caused by its eleventh-hour 
insertion. 
The question whether the more favourable right principle applies to arbitral 
agreements as well as awards was an important one and could have had considerable 
effects. To give one extreme example, Art II – the article of the New York Convention 
concerning enforcement of arbitration agreements – states that it applies only to 
agreements ‘in writing’. Article II (2) defines ‘in writing’ by setting out fairly 
restrictive requirements for formal validity based on the prevailing attitudes to 
arbitration and the common methods of communication available in 1958, including 
that the agreement must be ‘signed by the parties’ or ‘contained in an exchange of 
letters or telegrams’.  
It was inevitable that, sooner or later, these rules would fall out of step with commercial 
practice and available technology.516 When this happened, some courts were forced to 
resort to creative reasoning to allow the enforcement under the New York Convention 
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of arbitration agreements, for example, not signed by the parties517 or accepted by 
conduct rather than in writing.518 
This was plainly an undesirable, uncertain state of affairs, but given the extremely high 
number of parties to the New York Convention, it would likely prove very difficult or 
impossible to find a mutually acceptable update to the Convention by renegotiation. 
UNCITRAL therefore took the approach of liberalising the writing requirements at Art 
7 of its Model Law519 and issuing two recommendations on the interpretation of Art II 
and Art VII of the New York Convention.520 These recommendations were: first, the 
conditions listed in Art II (2) for the formal validity of an arbitration agreement be 
applied as a non-exhaustive list of examples;521 and second, that the more favourable 
right provision in Art VII (1) should apply to arbitration agreements as well as arbitral 
awards.522 This approach had been suggested in scholarship before being adopted by 
UNCITRAL,523 and has been broadly welcomed in commentary.524 It has also been 
followed in case law.525 
So the New York Convention provisions on arbitration agreements are also subject to 
the more favourable right rule of Art VII (1), despite the fact that this does not follow 
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from a plain-text reading of the Convention. This demonstrates clearly the broad 
discretion allowed to national lawmakers and courts to enforce arbitration agreements. 
It is submitted that this approach makes a great deal of sense, as Art VII has always 
operated to allow recognition and enforcement of an award rendered under an 
arbitration agreement that does not meet Art II standards but meets more liberal 
standards in the national or treaty law of the enforcing state. It would seem strange to 
allow a country to recognise and enforce an award based on its own conception of an 
arbitration agreement, but not to judge arbitration agreements themselves by the same 
standard at the pre-award stage. This again underlines the importance of home-country 
control over the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
(e) Summary 
It is submitted that it is clear from the above discussion that a court asked for 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement or recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award retains a substantial measure of control over the process of enforcement. This 
control allows the court discretion either to refuse enforcement to protect its own, 
domestic public policy interests, or to allow enforcement under a more liberal 
conception of enforceability than that contained in the New York Convention. There 
is an argument, discussed below, that the New York Convention should be subject to 
autonomous interpretation and harmonious application, to aid legal certainty for 
parties who choose arbitration to settle their disputes. The argument in favour of this 
view is that a disparate interpretation and application of the convention in the 
contracting states would undermine the achievement of the stated goals of the New 
York Convention project. Nonetheless, the preservation of state sovereignty was an 
important proviso to that aim, and the scope for home country control under the 
Convention’s rules allows contracting states to protect their sovereign interests. 
Indeed, it may be that this flexibility in the application of the Convention has actually 
attracted some of the contracting states, safe in the knowledge that their public policy 
interests would remain protected under the Convention regime. In this sense, it may 
be argued that the possibility of the inconsistent application of the Convention serves 




enforceable arbitration agreements and awards are on a global scale, notwithstanding 
that they may be less easily enforceable in one contracting state than another.  
Two conclusions are certain. The first is that home country control exists and its use 
is widespread, even if it is unpopular in some pro-arbitration countries and with some 
pro-arbitration commentators. The second is that this home country control is a vitally 
important principle of the New York Convention: one arguably central to its success. 
(2) Maximising enforceability 
It has already been mentioned that the purpose of the New York Convention was to 
enhance international trade by promoting the enforceability of arbitral awards. It can 
also be said that the New York Convention is based on principles of maximising the 
enforceability of awards.526 This principle is reflected in several provisions of the 
Convention, though always ultimately yielding to home-country control.  
The principle of maximising enforceability can be seen in the wide discretion allowed 
to states to recognise and enforce awards more freely than the New York Convention 
requires. As discussed above, this is achieved especially by giving the enforcing court 
discretion to recognise or enforce an award that violates an Art V standard, and by the 
inclusion of the more favourable right principle in Art VII.527 
The principle is also present in the provisions of Art V that set harmonised, minimum 
standards for the enforceability of arbitral awards. A Convention award is 
presumptively enforceable, unless one of the Art V grounds for refusal of enforcement 
can be proved. 
A further specific example is Art V (1) (c), which provides that where the arbitral 
tribunal decides some matters submitted to arbitration by the parties and some going 
beyond the scope of submission, that part of the award dealing with matters submitted 
to arbitration by the parties should remain enforceable; only those parts of the award 
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going beyond the scope of submission to arbitration may be refused recognition. The 
principle that underlies this provision is that enforceability of the award should be 
promoted to the extent possible, the drafters having been concerned that any small 
detail of the award falling outside the scope of submission to arbitration should not 
undermine the enforceability of the entire award.528 
This pro-enforcement tendency of the New York Convention has led to the 
development of a principle known as favor arbitrandum: that the Convention, parties’ 
agreements, and so on, should be given the interpretation most favourable to 
arbitration.529 The principle has been suggested as amongst the most important guiding 
principles in interpreting the Convention.530  
The principle of maximising enforceability has therefore taken on a life beyond what 
can be read directly from the Convention. It is, however, submitted that the principle 
relies on and yields to home-country control. That is to say that a pro-enforcement 
approach under Art VII requires a more favourable national provision to take 
precedence, and any country that wishes to take an anti-enforcement approach is free 
to do so, within the limits it has agreed to in the Convention, though with the general 
‘escape clause’ of national public policy. Nonetheless, the principle of maximising 
enforceability seems to be gaining popularity internationally, and should be borne in 
mind as a key aspect of the New York Convention. 
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(3) Party autonomy 
The importance of party autonomy in international arbitration is self-evident. 
Arbitration is a creature of contract, and every arbitration is, or should be, a direct 
result of the exercise of party autonomy to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts and 
opt for arbitration.531 In that sense, in pursuing the goal of making arbitration 
agreements and awards more internationally enforceable, the New York Convention 
promotes party autonomy. But party autonomy also plays an important role in the 
provisions of the Convention relating to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards in Art V.  
Article V (1) (a) provides a choice of law rule for the law to be applied at the 
recognition and enforcement stage to the validity of the arbitration agreement, which 
makes ‘the law chosen by the parties’ paramount. This is in line with standard practice 
concerning contracts in international private law.532 Article V (1) (d) meanwhile 
provides that an award may be refused recognition or enforcement if ‘the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties’. In both instances, 
the will of the parties is given special importance, indicating a respect for party 
autonomy. 
The situation is not quite so clear where arbitration agreements are concerned, 
specifically the question of what law should apply to the decision whether an 
arbitration agreement is ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’ 
under Art II (3). It seems logical, and the prevailing view is, that this should be 
determined by applying the law applicable to the arbitration agreement: the law chosen 
by the parties.533 But the New York Convention does not give clear guidance as to 
what law is properly applicable to an arbitration agreement at the agreement-
enforcement stage of proceedings. Art V (1) (a) does provide choice of law rules for 
the decision whether, at the recognition and enforcement stage, ‘the agreement is not 
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valid’ (see above). Although some have argued that the semantic distinction between 
‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’ and ‘not valid’ means the 
two cannot be analogised,534 the prevailing view certainly seems to be that the V (1) 
(a) conflicts rules can and should be applied by analogy.535 
This approach makes sense; an alternative approach which saw a court apply a 
different law to the question whether it should enforce an arbitration agreement before 
proceedings start than to its assessment of the validity of that same arbitration 
agreement at the recognition and enforcement stage has little to recommend it. Put 
differently, it would make little sense for a court to conclude that an agreement was 
valid under the law it applies pre-arbitration, when it and every other court would 
ultimately be likely to refuse recognition and enforcement to any award once rendered 
for invalidity of the agreement under a different law at the recognition and enforcement 
stage. This approach would not preclude different standards of review of validity of 
the arbitration agreements at different stages, such as under the French doctrine of the 
negative effect of competence-competence;536 indeed, the language of the New York 
Convention might be argued positively to encourage such a system of review.537 The 
application of the V (1) (a) conflicts rule at the stage of enforcement of the agreement 
therefore makes sense, which means in turn that the rule of autonomy has wider effects 
than can be established from a plain-text reading of the Convention. 
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The rule in Art V (1) (a), as discussed above, is that in the first place the validity of the 
agreement should be assessed under the law that the parties have designated as 
applicable to the agreement. In order to maximise respect for party autonomy, it has 
been argued that any choice of law to govern the whole contract should also be read to 
include a choice of law to govern the arbitration agreement.538 This has been described 
by van den Berg as a ‘rule of autonomy’, and indeed demonstrates the importance of 
the parties’ choice.539 
Art V (1) (c) provides that recognition and enforcement may be refused where: ‘[t]he 
award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of 
the submission to arbitration…’ This ground for refusal of recognition enforcement is 
rarely pleaded and, when it is, rarely with success, but it clearly places great 
importance on respect for the parties’ agreement as to the subjects to be resolved by 
arbitration.540  
It is therefore submitted that party autonomy is a principle clearly underlying the New 
York Convention as well as the Brussels Regime.541 The importance of respect for 
party autonomy for the proposals advocated later in this thesis is therefore abundantly 
clear. 
(4) Special role for law of seat of arbitration 
As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, there is an ongoing debate about the 
proper role to be played by the courts and law of the seat of an arbitration. This larger 
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theoretical question warrants a full discussion in its own right, and will therefore not 
be considered in this section. This section will only consider what role for the seat of 
arbitration emerges from the provisions of the New York Convention. 
That role is relatively active, or at least important, and is visible in two main ways: 
first, the set-aside provision of Art V (1) (e); and second, the conflicts rules of Arts V 
(1) (a) and (d). 
Article V (1) (e) allows refusal of recognition and enforcement when: 
‘The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or 
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made.’542 
The majority view is that the phrase ‘the country in which, or under the law of which’ 
refers to the juridical seat of the arbitration.543 This provision therefore gives potential 
international force to a decision by the courts of the seat to set-aside or vacate an award. 
This means that the decision of a court at the seat has greater international preclusive 
force than an ordinary action for refusal of recognition and enforcement.544 This 
provision has been criticised for potentially exporting domestic standards of 
enforceability where international standards may be more appropriate.545 However, the 
potentially pervasive effect of this provision is blunted by the discretion afforded to 
domestic courts in its application, as discussed above in the section on home-country 
control.546 It is at any rate clear that this provision implies an important, supervisory 
role for the courts of the seat of the arbitration, a role which has long been recognised 
in this area.547  
The conflicts rules in Arts V (1) (a) and (d) New York Convention also give an 
important role to the law of the seat of the arbitration. These rules were mentioned 
above in the discussion of party autonomy, as the rule of autonomy takes precedence 
in establishing the law applicable to the validity of the arbitration agreement and the 
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procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. Failing a designation by the parties, 
these questions are to be determined by the law of the place ‘where the award was 
made’, or in other words, the law of the seat of arbitration.548 This is described by van 
den Berg as a ‘rule of territoriality’, which serves to further underline the importance 
of the seat of the arbitration.549 
It is clear that the New York Convention implies a relatively important role in the 
arbitral process for the seat of the arbitration. The extent to which this is appropriate 
shall be discussed in the next chapter, in the context of the delocalisation debate. 
(5) Harmonisation and autonomous application 
One of the crucial ways in which the New York Convention achieves its goals is by 
creating harmonised minimum standards of enforceability for arbitral agreements and 
awards. This harmonisation is achieved through a mix of substantive rules and 
conflicts rules, for the recognition of arbitral awards and agreements, as well as the 
circumstances under which recognition may be refused. The potential for 
harmonisation is intensified by arguments for an autonomous application of the 
Convention, which would use international rather than national standards where the 
Convention calls for the application of national law.  
The New York Convention sets minimum standards for formal validity of arbitration 
agreements at Art II (2). This article provides “The term ‘agreement in writing’ shall 
include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties 
or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”. This rule was intended to create 
harmonised minimum standards for the formal validity of arbitration agreements 
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across contracting states, demonstrating the importance of eliminating the disparate 
standards of formal validity in national law.550 
As discussed above, the Convention provides ‘full’ conflicts rules for the substantive 
validity of the arbitration agreement, pointing directly to the country whose law is to 
be applied. This is determined according the rule of autonomy, with a fall-back 
position of a rule of territoriality. The provision concerning the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement changed during the drafting process to provide a clear choice of 
law rule, taking the choice of relevant law entirely out of the hands of the court hearing 
recognition and enforcement proceedings.551 This serves to underline the importance 
of a harmonious, consistent approach to the application of the Convention. It was 
feared that the application of inconsistent national laws to inter alia the validity of the 
arbitration agreement could lead to unnecessarily inconsistent approaches to 
recognition and enforcement, undermining the entire New York Convention regime.552 
The Convention also provides a conflicts rule for the capacity of parties to enter into 
arbitration agreements. Article V (1) (a) provides that the capacity of a party to enter 
into an agreement to arbitrate is to be governed by ‘the law applicable to’ that party, 
sometimes referred to as the party’s ‘personal law’. This has been described as a ‘half-
way conflict rule’, as it leaves the question of how to determine the personal law to the 
conflict rules of the forum, dictating only which conflict rule should be applied.553 In 
this way, the rule seeks to promote uniformity to an extent, by discouraging the forum 
court’s application of its own conception of capacity. 
The drive for harmony has in turn led to debate about the autonomous, 
internationalised application of the New York Convention. This will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter, under the heading ‘delocalisation’, but the provisions 
of Art V (1) (b) provide an illustrative example. 
Art V (1) (b) states that recognition and enforcement may be refused if ‘[t]he party 
against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of 
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the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his 
case’. 
This provides for some basic protection of adversarial proceedings and procedural 
fairness. Some argue that this should be read as an international rule to be given 
uniform interpretation, though most courts agree with the US Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation that V (1) (b) ‘essentially sanctions the application of 
the forum’s standards of due process’.554 This led to fears of parochialism amongst 
authors, but courts have generally been consistent in holding that not everything that 
would be a violation of due process under domestic law could be considered a violation 
of Art V (1) (b).555 So although V (1) (b) must be read as protecting the domestic 
procedural fairness rules of the forum because of the absence of an international 
standard,556 the approach of courts has generally been to refuse recognition or 
enforcement only where there is a serious irregularity.557 This may include, for 
example, cases where the violation of due process may have materially affected the 
outcome of the arbitration.558 Therefore, although domestic standards of procedural 
fairness are ostensibly protected, it may be argued that a less-stringent, 
internationalised standard of procedural fairness is effectively applied.559 This in turn 
demonstrates a movement towards a consistent, international, autonomous application 
of the Convention. 
In summary, the New York Convention is clearly based on a principle of broad 
harmonisation, both direct and indirect, which promotes uniformity and lessens the 
chances that the effectiveness of the Convention could be undermined by inconsistent 
and parochial interpretation and application. This in turn has led to a broader 
movement towards an autonomous interpretation of even those provisions that point 
to a relevant national law, as pointing to a more internationally-acceptable standard. 
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This movement, known as ‘delocalisation’ shall be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
(6) Maintaining fairness and due process 
As stated above, maintaining due process was mentioned in the preparatory materials 
of the New York Convention as being a principle restricting the pursuit of the goal of 
improving the enforceability of arbitral awards. It is protected directly through Art V 
(1) (b) and indirectly through Art V (1) (d), as well as, if need be, through the public 
policy exception at Art V (2) (b).560 
This principle, whilst important, shall not be covered in detail in this thesis, because it 
will be assumed that the Brussels I Regulation already adequately protects due process 
in its provisions. Indeed, EU member states should by definition trust that the courts 
of other member states operate according to due process, or at least within an 
acceptable range of derogation from the principle as understood by any other member 
state. It is therefore hoped that the inclusion of arbitration in the Brussels Regime 
would have no major effect on the protection of due process with respect to arbitration 
within Europe, and this thesis need not consider the principle further. It is mentioned 
simply because it is given such central importance in the New York Convention and 
preparatory materials that this chapter would be incomplete if it failed to mention it. 
C. Ranking of these principles 
As in the previous chapter, it is important to consider how these principles relate to 
one another, and whether any hierarchy can be established. Whilst it may not be 
possible to list the above principles in a strict descending order, it is submitted that 
some patterns can nonetheless be identified. 
The first question is to consider what is the most important of these principles, if any. 
It is submitted that this is best achieved by looking back to the goal of the Convention, 
which was to promote international trade by ‘facilitating’ the recognition and 
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enforcement of arbitral awards. Because of this, and the ‘pro-enforcement bias’ 
supposedly demonstrated by Art VII, it has often been said that ‘favor arbitrandum’, 
or maximising enforceability of arbitral awards and agreements is the most important 
principle underlying the New York Convention.561 However, this position fails to take 
account of two points. The first is that, from the very beginning, this goal was 
mentioned whilst ‘at the same time’ preserving basic principles of justice and the 
sovereign rights of states. The wording ‘at the same time’ suggests these principles 
should be considered at least on an equal footing. The second derives from the 
structure of the Convention itself. As outlined above, the states are given very broad 
discretion, both to enforce and not to enforce awards and agreements. This suggests 
that state sovereignty, or what has been referred to in this paper as ‘home-country 
control’, is the supreme principle, taking precedence over the ‘favor arbitrandum’ 
principle. It is hard to say exactly where the basic principles of justice – or due process 
– fits in, but they certainly come second to home-country control, and are probably on 
a par with maximising the recognition and enforcement of awards. In any given case, 
this balancing would be at the discretion of the enforcing court, which further 
underlines the importance of home-country control. In any event, as explained above, 
the ensuring due process is not a principle or particular relevance to the proposals in 
this thesis. 
Party autonomy will rarely conflict with the above principles, but it is submitted that 
it should be considered as coming behind home-country control, due process, and 
maximising enforceability. This is true in respect of the former two because the parties 
to a dispute could not exercise their autonomy to circumvent the public policy of an 
enforcing country, nor, in most systems, to get around the fundamental tenets of due 
process, for example by agreeing on the appointment of a partial arbitrator. 
Maximising enforceability may be seen as promoting party autonomy by upholding 
their agreement to arbitrate and the result the process reaches. However, even where 
the arbitral process deviates from the parties’ agreement, many courts would require a 
showing that this has caused some real detriment before refusing to recognise or 
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enforce the award.562 Furthermore, upholding party autonomy was not stated as an aim 
or leading principle of the Convention by the drafters. 
The special role for the law of the seat of the arbitration that emerges from the New 
York Convention is lower down this hierarchy still. In the conflicts rules of V (1) (a) 
and (d), the law of the seat expressly comes second to the agreement of the parties. 
Under Art V (1) (e), it is for the court asked to recognise and enforce an award to 
decide whether or not it will recognise the set-aside judgment of the courts at the seat. 
So although there is clearly a special role for the courts at the seat, it carries less 
importance than the principles mentioned above.  
The ongoing move towards harmonisation through an internationalised and 
autonomous interpretation and application of the New York Convention relies on 
national legislatures and courts adopting that approach. It is therefore clearly 
subordinate to home-country control. Indeed, the autonomous interpretation of the 
Convention does not directly follow from its text, which often points to national law 
rather than international standards. The value of this kind of harmonisation will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, under the name ‘delocalisation’. 
Some picture of the relationship between these principles can therefore be discerned. 
Home-country control certainly appears to be the most important, on a textual analysis 
of the provisions of the New York Convention. 
D. Preliminary conclusions 
A number of relevant principles have been identified as underlying the New York 
Convention. These include home-country control, maximising the enforceability of 
arbitral awards, promoting party autonomy, a special role for the law of the seat, and 
the autonomous interpretation of the Convention are important principles, and rank 
roughly in that order. These principles shall be taken into account in the proposals 
advanced by this thesis. 
  
                                                 




7. PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PART 2 – 
THE ‘DELOCALISATION’ DEBATE 
A broader background to this thesis is the ongoing debate about the so-called 
‘delocalisation’ of arbitration. Its relevance to this thesis is that both concern the proper 
relationship between national legal systems, national courts, and the arbitral process. 
Delocalisation, and the literature surrounding it, defies any attempt at simple summary, 
but its pivotal point is the question: from where does arbitration draw its binding force 
and legal legitimacy? Is it from the agreement of the parties? From a transnational 
legal order similar to the lex mercatoria? Or is arbitration only effective and binding 
insofar as permitted by the municipal law of the country in which it takes place? 
The last is the traditional view: that arbitration is permitted by, and therefore also 
subject to regulation under, the law of the seat of the arbitration. This view, undeniably 
correct before the conclusion of the New York Convention, has in the past half century 
come to be challenged by proponents of delocalisation, who to varying extents view 
the arbitral process as part of a transnational legal firmament,563 legitimised by party 
autonomy and international law, and capable of detachment from any given municipal 
legal system.  
There are two distinct phases to the development of the delocalisation challenge to the 
traditional view. The first began in the 1970s and 1980s, when supporters of 
delocalisation argued that international arbitration should be detached from parochial 
restraint by mandatory provisions of the domestic law of the seat of arbitration. This 
view still holds that international arbitration should necessarily be subject to some 
degree of control at its seat, but that such control should be exercised only to protect 
internationally accepted norms, such as the parties’ rights to due process. The second 
phase of the delocalisation argument has roots in the 1980s, but has come to 
prominence in the last two decades, and has seen commentators argue and, even some 
courts hold, that arbitration can and often should be entirely detached from the control 
                                                 




of any one domestic court or legal system. These phases of the delocalisation argument 
shall be referred to as ‘weak delocalisation’ and ‘strong delocalisation’ respectively. 
This chapter will first set out the development of the traditional, territorial view of 
arbitration. It will go on to describe the weak and strong versions of delocalisation in 
turn, before drawing some conclusions on where the delocalisation debate currently 
stands. Finally, the chapter will consider the relationship between delocalisation theory 
and the interface between jurisdiction conventions and arbitration. 
A. Territorial arbitration 
The territorial view of arbitration has long been the norm, and before the conclusion 
of the New York Convention, was the only logically supportable approach. With the 
success of the New York Convention, territoriality is no longer an invulnerable 
concept, and legitimate arguments can be raised for a more delocalised conception of 
arbitration. This sections charts the development of the territorialism narrative in both 
the pre- and post-New York Convention eras. It shall then consider the narrative of 
pluralism, and how this competes with the territorialist perspective. 
(1) Before the New York Convention 
Before the conclusion of the New York Convention, an equivalent function was 
performed by two League of Nations instruments: the Geneva Convention of 1927564 
and the Geneva Protocol of 1923.565 The former related to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards, the latter to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  
These instruments without doubt enshrined a territorial approach to arbitration. This 
can be seen in any number of examples, including most obviously the full title of the 
convention, which refers to the execution of ‘foreign’ arbitral awards rather than 
‘international awards’. This language clearly implies the belief that an arbitral award 
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has some national character.566 The substantive rules of each instrument also 
demonstrate a strictly territorial approach.  
The Geneva Protocol provides that ‘arbitral procedure, including the constitution of 
the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of the parties and by the law of the 
country in whose territory the arbitration takes place.’567 The same article provides that 
each contracting state shall provide support to the arbitral process in accordance with 
the arbitration law in force within the territory of that state.568 Each of these rules 
demonstrates a territorial view of arbitration: arbitration shall be subject to the law of 
the country in which it takes place, and procedural support will also be granted in 
accordance with the law of the forum. In each case, the arbitral process can only 
proceed insofar as permitted by the municipal law of a contracting state. 
The Geneva Protocol further emphasises a territorial approach by providing that 
contracting states shall recognise those arbitral agreements made ‘between parties, 
subject respectively to the jurisdiction of different Contracting States’.569 Again, this 
demonstrates a highly territorial view of arbitration – agreements to arbitrate will only 
be recognised insofar as they are concluded by parties subject to the jurisdiction of a 
country which has conferred on them permission to arbitrate.  
The Geneva Convention demonstrates a territorial approach still more clearly. The 
most obvious example is in the so-called ‘double exequatur’ requirement, which is 
seen in several places in the Geneva Convention. For instance, Art 1 provides that, for 
execution of an award, the award must conform to the procedural law governing the 
arbitration570 and that the award has become final in the country in which it was made, 
meaning that it is not open to appeal or set-aside proceedings and that no such 
proceedings are ongoing.571 Article 2 provides that execution ‘shall’ be refused where 
the enforcing court is satisfied that the award has been set aside in the country in which 
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it was made.572 Article 4 provides that, in order to obtain execution, the party relying 
on the award must provide a copy authenticated according to the standards of the law 
of the place where the award was made573 and proof that the award has become final 
in the country in which it was made in the sense of Art 1 (d), i.e. that it is neither being 
appealed nor capable of being appealed in that country.574 
All this effectively led to the requirement that a party must have the award certified 
enforceable by the courts in the country in which the arbitration took place before it 
could rely on that award in any other contracting state to the Geneva Convention. This 
requirement of ‘double exequatur’ was one of the driving factors behind the reform in 
the New York Convention.575 
The double exequatur system and the rules underlying it reflect a highly territorial 
approach to arbitration. They vest in the courts of the place of the arbitration absolute 
control over the validity and enforcement of an arbitral award. This fits perfectly with 
the territorial theory that arbitration as a process derives its authority from the 
municipal law of the country in which it takes place, and any award only obtains 
international enforceability insofar as legitimised by that law.576 
It is easily seen that the Geneva Convention and Protocol provided the grounding for 
the territorial conception of international arbitration. Looking back almost a century 
on, their rules can seem limited, parochial and understandably dated,577 but it is 
important to remember that the Geneva instruments were the first step towards truly 
international arbitration and the vital progress they made in the development of 
arbitration as a viable form of international commercial dispute resolution.578 
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(2) The New York Convention 
The New York Convention, which was concluded in 1958, marks the beginning of the 
modern age of international commercial arbitration.579 The creation of the New York 
Convention can certainly be seen as a seminal moment in the development of 
international commercial arbitration, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the 
Convention retains a quasi-constitutional significance in the field to this day.580 
The abolition of the double exequatur of arbitration awards under the Geneva 
Convention was a driving force in the drafting of the New York Convention. In 
changing this and in other ways the New York Convention moved the law of 
international arbitration further away from the overt territoriality enshrined in the 
Geneva instruments. 
One of the ways in which the New York Convention achieves this is to put the law of 
the country where the award was made secondary to the will of the parties, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. This is the case in assessing irregularities in the constitution 
of the tribunal or in the arbitral procedure,581 as well as assessing the validity of the 
arbitration agreement.582  
Furthermore, under the New York Convention, the fact that an award has been set 
aside where rendered is no longer, on a plain-text reading, a mandatory ground for 
refusal of recognition and enforcement of that award, albeit some would argue that it 
is.583 True, recognition and enforcement may still be refused on the basis that the award 
has been set aside, but this is no longer an absolute bar to recognition and enforcement. 
More importantly still, the double exequatur requirement has been abolished, with 
arbitration awards automatically recognised as binding and enforceable584 and the 
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party seeking recognition and enforcement required to provide nothing more than 
originals or copies of both the award and the arbitration agreement.585 
All these rules indicate the lessening importance of the seat of the arbitration. The seat 
still plays a vitally important role in the New York Convention scheme, but its 
importance is no longer absolute, as it effectively was under the Geneva instruments. 
This has in turn left room for the development of a theory of delocalised international 
arbitration,586 which would have been logically unsupportable before the conclusion 
of the New York Convention. Before considering that theory, however, the following 
section shall briefly set out the territorial theory of international arbitration, as 
applicable in the modern, or post-New-York-Convention, era, as well as the modern 
pluralist theory. 
(3) The territorial theory of international commercial arbitration 
The territorial theory of international arbitration was most famously advanced by 
Francis Mann in his seminal and oft-cited essay, ‘Lex Facit Arbitrum’.587 The essay is 
so much the fundamental expression of the territorial conception of arbitration and so 
regularly forms the basis for any discussion of the legal nature of arbitration that its 
arguments call for description and frequent quotation in this section. 
For Mann, the delocalisation debate is one about ‘the supremacy of the law in the field 
of arbitration’ and those who support delocalisation ‘advocate the freedom of 
arbitrators from the shackles of the law’.588 In introducing the discussion, he quotes 
distinguished authors who were arguing for the possibility of arbitration detached from 
any system of municipal law even as early as the 1960s.589  
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In one of the most frequently quoted passages of his essay, Mann argues: 
‘Although […] it is not uncommon and, on the whole, harmless to speak […] of 
international arbitration, the phrase is a misnomer. In the legal sense, no international 
commercial arbitration exists. Just as, notwithstanding its notoriously misleading 
name, every system of private international law is a system of national law, every 
arbitration is a national arbitration, that is to say, subject to a specific system of national 
law’.590 
He also argues that an international instrument such as the New York Convention:  
‘…applies only by reason of the fact that the State controlling the arbitration has 
become a Party to it. […T]he fact that the […] arbitration is an international one, does 
not by any means deprive the arbitration as a whole of its strictly and necessarily 
national character, or prejudice the supremacy of the municipal law applicable to it’.591  
Similarly, exercises of party autonomy are only valid and carry legal force to the extent 
permitted by the municipal law to which the parties are subject.592 ‘It is primarily the 
law of the seat that decides whether and on what conditions arbitration is permitted at 
all. No country other than that of the seat has such complete and effective control over 
the arbitral tribunal’.593 
Mann’s argument, though strongly put and compellingly made, cannot be said to be 
complete, nor to remain entirely relevant in the modern day. First of all, the definition 
of the seat remains slightly elusive throughout the essay. It generally assumes the seat 
is the state in whose territory the arbitration takes place, but also accepts that ‘[t]he 
existence of a seat does not mean that all hearings will necessarily have to be held in 
the seat’ and that for convenience, hearings may be held elsewhere, but does not 
delineate the point at which a hearing held in a country other than the proper seat 
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becomes a hearing subject to the arbitration law of the state in which it is held.594 
Furthermore, much of Mann’s analysis has been superseded by recent developments, 
including most notably the modern popularity of the New York Convention and 
movements towards harmonisation of national arbitration law. Nonetheless, Mann’s 
remains the most concise, powerful statement of the territoriality theory. 
There is support for such a conception of arbitration in literature, though few argue in 
such strong terms as Mann.595 Park’s 1983 article shows the beginnings of the 
arguments that characterise the weak version of the delocalisation process, arguing 
that the local judge should limit his intervention in international arbitrations,596 whilst 
maintaining the fundamental narrative of legitimisation and control over arbitral 
proceedings by the courts at the seat.597 His arguments shall be considered in more 
detail in the following section.  
Van den Berg demonstrates support for territorialist theory, emphasising the 
importance of set-aside by arguing ‘an award that has been set aside in the country of 
origin no longer exists legally. It is not possible that an arbitral award that has been set 
aside would be brought back to life during an enforcement procedure under the 
Convention in its country of origin or abroad.’598 Sanders, one of the so-called 
‘founding fathers’ of the New York Convention shared this view, stating that when an 
award has been set aside in the country of origin ‘there does not longer [sic] exist an 
arbitral award and enforcing a non-existing arbitral award would be an 
impossibility’.599 
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The territorial approach to arbitration therefore views the authority of arbitrators as 
rooted in the municipal law of the place of arbitration. It also allows for extensive 
control of the arbitral process and arbitral awards by the courts of the seat. It does so 
to prevent arbitration being used to circumvent the mandatory rules or public policy of 
the forum. As it was put in one English Court of Appeal case: ‘there must be no Alsatia 
in England where the King’s writ does not run’.600 
(4) Pluralist theory 
Paulsson advances an alternative to strict territorialism, which he refers to as ‘the 
pluralistic thesis’.601 Under this theory, arbitration draws its legal legitimacy from a 
potential variety of national legal systems. This is because the New York Convention 
leaves room for an arbitral award set-aside where rendered to be recognised and 
enforced by courts other than those of the seat of the arbitration via the chapeau to Art 
V (1) (e) and the Art VII more-favourable-right principle, even if this rarely occurs in 
practice.602  
So, for example, where an arbitration takes place in Country A, and is immediately 
set-aside by the courts of that country, it may still be taken for recognition and 
enforcement in Countries B, C, and D. Country B may respect the set-aside decision 
of Country A and refuse to recognise and enforce the award. Country C may ignore 
the set-aside decision but decline to recognise and enforce the award under the New 
York Convention for its own reasons. Country D may ignore the set-aside decision and 
decide to enforce the award under its own national law and Art VII New York 
Convention. It is clear, therefore, that the award in this scenario is subject to four 
different systems of law. Furthermore, it becomes enforceable by virtue of a law other 
than that at the seat of the arbitration. The argument that an arbitration draws its legal 
legitimacy from, and is subject to effective control by, the courts at the seat of the 
arbitration is belied the by practical developments in the field. 
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This argument is true in as far as it goes. The possibility for enforcement of annulled 
arbitral awards clearly lessens the power of the courts at the seat of the arbitration over 
arbitration proceedings conducted within the territory of the seat. On the other hand, 
the seat of the arbitration nevertheless can still play a significant part in the arbitral 
process. The courts at the seat of the arbitration are the only ones that can meaningfully 
appoint or remove arbitrators and, crucially, are the only ones with valid supervisory 
jurisdiction to set-aside an award. Whether or not, when a court takes that set-aside 
jurisdiction, it is respected by the courts of other countries is another question; it does 
not change the fact that the seat plays a special, more significant role. 
Furthermore, because the vast majority of the world’s countries subscribe to the New 
York Convention, those countries could be said to have willingly abdicated their 
absolute control over arbitral awards rendered in their territories. They are signatories 
to the Convention and know its terms. They have decided to exercise their sovereignty 
in a way that allows arbitral awards rendered and set-aside in their territory to be 
recognised and enforced in other Convention countries. Indeed, 73 of the parties to the 
New York Convention have made an Art I (3) reservation, providing that only awards 
rendered in Convention countries shall be enforced under the Convention.603 This 
underlines the importance of the sovereign act of becoming party to the Convention, 
further emphasising the importance of the seat of the arbitration. 
Finally, leaving aside the French approach, which will be discussed below, the general 
approach to set-aside judgments seems to be one of respect. Courts will generally 
recognise a set-aside judgment (thus refusing enforcement under Art V (1) (e) New 
York Convention) unless there is some obvious flaw in the set-aside judgment, such 
as corruption.604 This again points to the fact that the judgment of the courts of the seat 
of the arbitration retain special significance. 
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Pluralism has not been given a great deal of attention because it does not defeat the 
proposals advanced in the next chapter of this thesis. Unlike delocalisation, pluralism 
does not say argue that the arbitral process should be detached from the supervision 
and support of the courts at the seat of the arbitration. Indeed, it does not argue for any 
particular approach at all; it is merely an observation of developments in practice.605 
In other words, it is descriptive rather than normative. It does not deny that the role of 
the seat is important, and it does not argue that the importance of the seat should not 
be increased. It is perfectly compatible with the reallocation of priorities proposed in 
the next chapter. It is therefore of little relevance to the broader arguments of this 
thesis, unlike the delocalisation theory. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that pluralist theory holds to the extent that an arbitral 
award does not draw its only legitimacy from the municipal law of the seat of the 
arbitration, but also from potential enforcement forums. On the other hand, the seat of 
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the arbitration retains special significance in terms of set-aside jurisdiction and the 
control and support of the arbitral process. Furthermore, the plurality of potential 
enforcement jurisdictions itself arises from the sovereign acts of various individual 
countries. Finally, pluralism is an observation rather than a theory, is descriptive rather 
than normative, can be viewed as a modification of territorialist theory, and does not 
stand in the way of the broader arguments presented in this thesis. 
(5) Conclusion on territorialism 
In conclusion, territorialism as originally understood – the absolute control of arbitral 
proceedings by the courts at the seat of the arbitration – has not wholly survived the 
New York Convention. An arbitral award in the world at large can draw its legitimacy 
from a plurality of sources. On the other hand, the arbitration remains uniquely 
connected with the seat, which retains special powers over the arbitration. It is 
therefore fair to say that, although pure territorialism no longer exists, arbitrations and 
arbitral awards are still to a large extent territorial in nature.  
B. ‘Weak’ delocalisation 
‘Delocalisation’ may in fact be a misnomer to refer to what is here called ‘weak’ 
delocalisation’. This is because these arguments do not propose complete detachment 
of the arbitral process from the supervision of any national court, nor do they expressly 
contradict territorialism. Rather they promote a use of the territorial supervisory 
authority in a limited way where international arbitrations are concerned. Nonetheless, 
as many of the authors supporting this position refer to it as ‘delocalisation’, this thesis 
shall adopt the same language.  
As mentioned above, Park shows the beginnings of a weak delocalisation argument in 
his 1982 article, though he does not once use the word ‘delocalisation’ or any variant 
of it, nor does he actively advocate the separation of arbitration from national court 
supervision. He argues instead that the then Arbitration Act 1979 (England) allowed 
courts too broad a scope for intervention in the arbitral process,606 leaving arbitrators 
caught ‘between the Scylla of ill-defined autonomy and the Charybdis of unknown 
                                                 




judicial supervision’.607 For him, judicial intervention should be reserved to 
safeguarding the arbitral process against ‘enumerated procedural deficiencies’, in the 
same fashion as French and US law, and safeguarding the rights of third parties.608 It 
is this proposition – that judicial intervention to set aside an award at the seat of 
arbitration should only occur to protect internationally recognised standards of fairness 
and not parochial local concerns – that is central to the first phase of the delocalisation 
movement.  
Others have put the case more strongly than Park. Julian Lew describes the ‘ideal and 
expectation’ that international arbitration should be ‘established and conducted 
according to internationally accepted practices, free from the controls of parochial 
national laws’.609 He argues that the court should assist and support the arbitral 
process, and ‘not exercise its powers to review issues of substance.’610 Nonetheless, 
he concedes that courts at the seat will ensure that mandatory rules of the place of 
arbitration are respected, and that due process is respected during the course of the 
arbitration.611 In choosing this way of formulating the argument, Lew accepts that the 
court at the seat has – or is capable of having – extensive powers to review arbitral 
awards; he simply argues for a specific exercise of that power. 
This theme runs throughout literature supporting weak delocalisation: an appeal to the 
better angels of the national court’s nature to exercise its discretion in a particular, 
limited fashion, and not to let in the demons of judicial overreaching. Jan Paulsson in 
his earlier scholarship added his voice to those insisting that the courts of the seat must 
attempt to ensure the compliance of the arbitral process with internationally-accepted 
standards.612 
As argued above, this is not a view in any way inconsistent with the territorial theory 
of international commercial arbitration. In fact, it is quite the opposite: it is an 
argument that accepts territoriality as its starting point and argues for the use of the 
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seat’s territorially-grounded authority in a particular way. It can be called 
denationalisation in the sense that it argues for national courts to apply international 
norms to the international arbitral process in recognition of its non-national character, 
but it cannot be considered full denationalisation, as it urges the court to do so as a 
matter of national law. 
The idea that international arbitrations should be subject to less stringent judicial 
control at the place of arbitration is a relatively uncontroversial one in the modern 
world. As has been described in detail in the previous chapter, the New York 
Convention began the process of significant harmonisation, both of the process for 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and arbitration agreements.  
A second step in this process has been harmonisation of the internationally 
recognisable grounds for set-aside at the seat of arbitration. This has happened in two 
main ways. The first is at an international level, through treaties such as the European 
Convention,613 which limit the grounds available for set-aside capable of international 
recognition amongst the contracting states.614 The second is at a domestic level, 
through the development and spread of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration. The Model Law was designed in 1985 with the purpose, as 
its name suggests, of acting as a model for countries creating or reforming their 
international arbitration law. The Model Law harmonises the substantive grounds 
available for set-aside, limiting them to the grounds for refusal of recognition and 
enforcement under Art V of the New York Convention.615 In this way, the Model Law 
promotes the application of a harmonised, internationally accepted standard of 
recourse against international arbitral awards. The Model Law, or legislation based on 
the Model Law, has to date been adopted in some form in 68 states.616 Even many of 
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those jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Law have adopted similar 
standards on set-aside.617 Finally, most national laws have come to distinguish between 
international and domestic arbitration, allowing a broader range of court intervention 
in wholly domestic arbitrations.618  
These developments taken together demonstrate a forceful global movement towards 
the delocalisation of international commercial arbitration by promoting the application 
of international rather than domestic norms to the arbitral process. Yet this movement 
has happened in a fashion that still recognises that control over the arbitral process 
vests in the courts of the seat of arbitration, entirely consistently with Mann’s territorial 
conception. Treaties are only effective insofar as they are subscribed to and ratified by 
states; a country’s arbitration law only reflects these principles insofar as they are 
accepted by the legislature. So this movement towards delocalised arbitration has come 
on the initiative of individual seats themselves, and not by virtue of a new conception 
or understanding of arbitration. There is, however, another delocalisation movement, 
which argues that arbitration is an autonomous process, separate and independent from 
the municipal law of countries until recognition and enforcement. This ‘strong 
delocalisation’ forms the subject of the next section. 
C. ‘Strong’ delocalisation 
This section will examine the alternative ‘strong delocalisation’ argument: that 
delocalisation of arbitration could or should entail complete separation from the 
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municipal legal system of any country.619 The section will be split in two: first, laying 
out the proposition, what it means, and what it would look like; and second, 
considering some of the criticisms of this approach. 
(1) The proposition 
Strong delocalisation of the arbitral process is best demonstrated through the 
examination of case law from France, which could justifiably be called the cradle of 
the movement. This discussion will start in the 1980s with the Götaverken case (a 
decision since reversed by legislation, but nonetheless useful for purposes of 
illustration),620 and finish with the recent Putrabali decision, as already discussed in 
chapter 3 of this thesis.621  
In Götaverken, the General National Maritime Transport Company (‘GMTC’) of 
Libya refused to take delivery of three oil tankers from the Swedish shipyard, 
Götaverken, on the basis that they had been constructed using materials that violated 
the Libyan boycott of Israel. The shipyard obtained an award in ICC arbitration in 
Paris, signed by a majority of the arbitrators (not that appointed by GMTC), ordering 
GMTC to pay the final contractual instalment of around $30m US and take delivery 
of the vessels.622  
The shipyard sought, and ultimately obtained, enforcement of the award in Sweden,623 
and GMTC began proceedings for set-aside before the Paris Court of Appeal. GMTC 
argued inter alia that the award violated public policy by failing to take into account 
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the Libyan boycott of Israel. The shipyard in turn argued that the Paris court did not 
have jurisdiction to set aside the award, because inter alia the award, despite having 
been made in Paris, was not subject to French law.  
The Parisian court refused to take jurisdiction over a set-aside action for the following 
reasons. The parties had agreed that ‘[t]he arbitration will be conducted in accordance 
with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration then in force of the international 
Chamber of Commerce. Where the Rules are silent, the arbitrators will settle the rules 
governing the proceedings.’ 624 The ICC Arbitration Rules in force at the time provided 
that the arbitral procedure should be governed by those rules, and where the rules were 
silent, by any rules upon which the parties agreed, and failing such agreement, upon 
which the arbitrators decided.625 The Rules expressly extended this autonomy of the 
parties to designate ‘whether or not reference is thereby made to a municipal 
procedural law to be applied to the arbitration.’626 
In this case, the parties had not expressly agreed on a municipal procedural law to 
govern the arbitration, and nor did the arbitrators designate one applicable.627 Under a 
territorialist conception, the parties would have submitted themselves to French 
municipal arbitration law, including French set-aside jurisdiction, by choosing Paris 
as the venue for their arbitration. The Paris Court of Appeal dealt with this argument 
in two parts. First, it stated: ‘having regard to the very clear provision of the ICC 
Rules… the place of arbitration, which is chosen only for the purposes of assuring its 
neutrality, is of no importance and cannot be considered as an expression of the 
implicit will of the parties to submit themselves to French procedural law, not even 
subsidiarily’.628 Secondly, it added that ‘no decisive argument can be drawn from the 
[New York] Convention for holding that the procedural law of the country where the 
arbitration takes place must be applied subsidiarily’.629 The court therefore concluded 
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the action for set aside of the award. 
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The reasoning of the court bears further examination. The court held that seating an 
arbitration in a given country does not constitute implied choice of the procedural law 
of that country to govern the arbitration, to the extent that that court also lacks set-
aside jurisdiction. This conclusion is diametrically opposed to the territorialist 
conception of arbitration. But how did the court reach that conclusion? There was a 
direct reference to the provisions of the ICC Rules, but these are clearly not capable 
on their own of displacing the otherwise applicable law. The force vested in the 
provisions of the ICC Rules comes from the choice of the parties that they should 
apply. Equally, the court has placed high importance on the agreement of the parties. 
It is therefore clear that party autonomy is the key delocalising factor in this case. It is 
by virtue of the parties’ agreement that the French court’s jurisdiction is ousted and 
the arbitration takes on a non-national character.  
The second holding, that ‘no decisive argument’ follows from the New York 
Convention that the law of the country where the arbitration takes place governs the 
arbitral procedure is probably correct, at least insofar as the argument is not decisive. 
There certainly is a strong argument that Art V (1) (e) implies that only the courts at 
the seat of arbitration should be capable of setting aside an award. On the other hand, 
that does not mean that the courts of the seat of the arbitration must take set-aside 
jurisdiction – they are simply entitled to do so if national law so allows. 
The territorialist response to this argument can be anticipated. The municipal law in 
France allows the parties to provide for freedom from that law. Other municipal laws 
will subject the parties to set-aside jurisdiction and other provisions of that law even if 
the parties expressly attempt to exclude the application of the law.630 Ultimately, the 
parties’ ability to delocalise arbitration in the fashion they have in the Götaverken case 
depends on the permission of the municipal law at the seat of the arbitration. For 
example, an arbitration taking place in England will fall under the Arbitration Act 1996 
and the set-aside jurisdiction of the English courts. It is assumed that an arbitration 
taking place in England is juridically seated in England, unless England is expressly 
                                                 




designated as the venue and another legal system as the juridical seat.631 Even then, it 
is assumed that the arbitration must have a juridical seat in some country:632 the 
concept is fundamental to the English understanding of arbitration. So Götaverken 
could not have been decided the same way had the arbitration taken place in England 
rather than Paris, and Mann’s territorialist theory would hold. 
The delocalised municipal approach of one country is however capable of international 
effect in a fashion best demonstrated by the Putrabali cases. This case was discussed 
in chapter 3, and the relevant facts can be found in full there.633 In short, the case 
concerns the effect of foreign set-aside proceedings on enforcement of an award in 
France. In Putrabali, the French courts recognised an award of non-liability in favour 
of a French party, notwithstanding that it had been set-aside under the Arbitration Act 
1996. The possibility of set-aside had been expressly provided for in the arbitral rules 
agreed upon by the parties. The French courts then refused to enforce a subsequent 
award rendered in favour of the English party. 
The Putrabali decision extends France’s delocalised conception of arbitral awards to 
awards rendered overseas. It does so in a fashion utterly irreconcilable with pure 
territorialist theory. It is worth noting that the delocalisation, which in Götaverken had 
its roots in the parties’ autonomy over the arbitral process, is now stated to be rooted 
in the nature of arbitration itself. International arbitration is viewed in Putrabali as an 
international legal order, distinct from municipal laws.634 In fact, properly understood, 
this is closer to pluralist theory: the award was enforced because French municipal law 
said it could be, not because the arbitral award was inherently detached from any 
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national legal order.635 Indeed, the Putrabali reasoning exactly contradicts the 
autonomy-based reasoning underlying the Götaverken decision. As has been pointed 
out in scholarship, the parties in Putrabali chose IGPA arbitration, the rules of which 
in turn expressly subject the arbitration to appeal under the 1996 Act.636 Yet the 
parties’ clear intent does not tally with the new French conception of arbitration, and 
therefore could not be given effect. 
The Putrabali decision can be and has been criticised on a wide range of grounds, 
which will be considered further below. Before doing so, it is worth considering an 
interesting proposal for reform, under which arbitration would be entirely 
denationalised. The proposal is to create a replacement for the New York Convention 
that mirrors the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
Convention.637 
The ICSID Convention sets up a self-contained, denationalised process for the 
settlement of investment disputes.638 The role of national courts is limited to the 
enforcement of the award, without the possibility for any review.639 In this way, the 
arbitral process in investment arbitration is truly delocalised and exists beyond the 
control of the courts of any one state.640 
It has been suggested that a similar new treaty and institutional system in international 
commercial arbitration as the only viable route to progress.641 The lack of consistent 
application of the New York Convention – see Putrabali – between states can be seen 
as a deficiency in the current system, undermining the predictability of the 
enforcement of awards.642 Specific proposals draw heavily on the ICSID example, for 
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example in how the appellate body might work in practice.643 This concept is in its 
infancy and subject to many potential criticisms, but is nonetheless a potential means 
to achieve consistency in international commercial arbitration.644 Such a proposal may 
indeed be the only way to achieve delocalised international commercial arbitration 
without falling afoul of the many criticisms considered below, but remains at present 
a mere suggestion, without realistic prospects of being put into practice any time soon. 
(2) Criticism 
Strong delocalisation has been the subject of much criticism. The force of this criticism 
points to the conclusion that strong delocalisation remains a highly controversial 
approach to international arbitration. Criticism applies both to the delocalisation of 
proceedings seated in a country from the municipal law of that country, as in the 
Götaverken case, and to the refusal to recognise the potential for foreign arbitral 
awards to be set aside where rendered, as in the Putrabali cases. 
One of the main reasons that it is widely accepted that some control should be retained 
by the courts of the seat of the arbitration is that, absent set-aside proceedings, a losing 
party in an obviously procedurally-flawed arbitration will be compelled to challenge 
the award’s validity in every jurisdiction where the winning party sees fit to attempt 
enforcement; there will be no centralised method of resisting enforcement. Jan 
Paulsson first puts this argument as question, worded to leave no doubt as to where he 
personally stands: ‘…should one insist on the identification of one ‘natural’ judicial 
authority – the judge of the place of arbitration – rather than an unknown number of 
potential execution jurisdictions, to control the arbitral process?’645 He goes on to be 
rather more express in arguing that the courts of the seat should ensure that the 
arbitration adheres to basic standards of procedural fairness: “Unless national courts 
accept this role as ‘transnational’ controllers at the seat of arbitration, the detachment 
principle may be justly criticised on the grounds that it leaves no forum where a 
manifestly deficient award may be set aside.”646 
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Park promotes the same view, arguing: ‘Wisdom dictates that the State of arbitration 
exercise some control over the integrity of the proceedings[…] Fairness requires that 
a procedurally defective arbitration be susceptible to being annulled at the place where 
rendered. The loser should not be forced to litigate issues such as arbitrator corruption 
in all States where it has assets.’647  
This view has wide acceptance, even amongst proponents of weak delocalisation,648 
but such support is not universal. Brazil-David argues in her article that parties 
agreeing to arbitration have excluded court jurisdiction and must take the rough with 
the smooth. She places importance on the fact that the award is ultimately subject to 
judicial scrutiny at the place where recognition and enforcement is sought.649 No 
mention is made of the point that this could entail multiple lengthy, costly relitigations 
of the same basic issues with an award. It is submitted that this constitutes a 
fundamental flaw in the argument for judicial control only at the point of recognition 
and enforcement.  
Some practical examples bear out that this flaw is potentially fatal. One lies in the swift 
reversal by the French legislature of the rule in Götaverken.650 This strongly suggests 
that the legislature was very uncomfortable with the rule, though it is almost 
disappointing that the decision was not given time to develop so that its effects could 
be tested. 
A more complete and informative example can be found in the Belgian arbitration law 
of 1985. The law excluded the possibility of set-aside of an award rendered in Belgium 
where neither party was a Belgian national, resident, or legal person constituted in 
Belgium, and was designed to increase the popularity of Belgium as a venue for 
international arbitration.651 The initial response was mixed, with some commentators 
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arguing that certain parties may have been enticed to hold specific arbitrations in 
Belgium because of the change in the law,652 but ultimately wide agreement has been 
reached that on the whole parties were discouraged from seating arbitrations in 
Belgium.653 At any rate, the situation has since been reversed and under modern 
Belgian law the parties must specifically agree to exclude recourse to the courts for 
set-aside jurisdiction to be ousted.654  
It can be seen that both theory and empirical evidence speak against complete 
detachment of arbitration from the law of the seat. Parties generally appreciate the 
possibility of a court review capable of wider international effect than simply the 
refusal of recognition and enforcement within one jurisdiction. 
Other criticisms have been made of the detachment of arbitration from the municipal 
law of the seat. One such criticism is that it deprives parties of the beneficial effects of 
the arbitral law at the seat. Not every court intervention in arbitration is an invasive 
overstep; sometimes courts intervene to support the arbitral process by providing 
interim measures such as freezing injunctions, enforcing procedural orders of the 
tribunal, or by assisting in the taking of evidence.655 Furthermore, municipal arbitration 
laws can fill ‘gaps’ left in the parties’ procedural agreement or selected institutional 
rules: a role which takes on additional importance in the case of ad hoc arbitration.656 
The loss of such support is described by Brazil-David as the price the parties pay to 
avoid the peculiarities of local procedural rules,657 but many proponents of 
delocalisation still believe the court should remain willing to make such positive, 
supportive interventions in the arbitral process.658 Some suggest support should be 
available from any national court, whether or not it is the seat, which is the case in 
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some, but not all, countries.659 At any rate, the criticism that detachment from national 
law may entail detachment from its supportive provisions is valid. 
Delocalisation in the Putrabali style, where one country categorically refuses to give 
effect to the set-aside judgments of another, leads to all manner of confusion and has 
given rise to much justifiable criticism, some of which shall be considered here. 
It should be borne in mind that there were three arbitral awards issued in the Putrabali 
saga: Award 1 (made by the arbitral tribunal as originally constituted); Award 2 (made 
after institutional appeal in accordance with the IGPA rules); and Award 3 (made after 
partial set-aside of the award under the Arbitration Act 1996, also in accordance with 
the IGPA Rules). All three awards were different: Award 1 ordered that the seller 
should be paid for the goods that were lost at sea; Award 2 ordered that the buyer was 
not liable for the contract price; Award 3 ordered the payment of a different sum to the 
seller. The French court recognised Award 2 and thereafter refused to enforce Award 
3 on the basis that Award 2 had already been granted recognition in France. It did so 
even though the parties had agreed on the IGPA Rules, which subject the award to the 
scrutiny of the English courts. 
The Putrabali decision has been criticised as leading to ‘bizarre results’660 for a 
number of reasons. The first concerns the adequacy of the first-in-time rule, which in 
effect sets up a race to enforcement.661 Hulbert imagines jokingly a situation where: 
‘…after [Award 3] was issued, the parties settled amicably, so that there was nothing 
to enforce or resist, but counsel for the two parties, pranksters as well as interested 
observers of French arbitration law, decided to conduct an experiment. They boarded 
the same Eurostar in London, shared a cab from the Gare du Nord to the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance, and, arm in arm, presented to the clerk of the court at exactly the 
same moment duly authenticated and properly translated copies of the Second and 
Third Awards, requesting exequatur of each. What result? As a commercial matter, it 
is obvious that the final result of the arbitration, that is, the Third Award, should 
triumph. Would it, as a matter of French law?’662 
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The example is offered lightheartedly and involves a fairly extreme set of facts, but it 
does raise a reasonable question as to the good sense of a temporal rule. 
Second, the French court recognised Award 2 despite the fact that the parties had 
agreed to IGPA arbitration, which provided for the oversight of the English courts. 
The seller waited for the final result of the contractually agreed arbitration process, 
whilst the buyer attempted to obtain recognition of the first favourable award it 
received (Award 2). An interesting question arises: what if the seller had taken the first 
favourable award it received (Award 1) for enforcement in France. It may be that the 
French court would treat institutional review of an award differently from review by a 
foreign court, but remember that both review processes are products of the parties’ 
agreement in this case. The fact that an award has not become binding on the parties 
or has been set aside is not a basis for resisting enforcement of that award under the 
New York Convention in France. There is an argument that Award 1 has not been 
rendered in accordance with the parties’ agreement, which provided for institutional 
appeal in its choice of the IGPA rules. That argument, however, equally applies to 
Award 2, as the parties agreed upon court oversight according the 1996 Act, also by 
choosing the IGPA rules. It is therefore submitted that the seller may have had the 
possibility to enforce Award 1 before the French courts, in spite of the pending 
institutional appeal. If that is the case, the seller has effectively been punished for its 
good faith in adhering to the parties’ agreement: hardly an ideal state of affairs. 
The Putrabali decision provides an obvious example of what Paulsson anticipated as 
‘troubling questions of precedence and timing in multi-jurisdictional post-award 
litigation’.663 He also identifies conflicting decisions as a major potential problem with 
delocalisation at a national level.664 In Putrabali, the French court has recognised 
Award 2, absolving the buyer. The English courts would presumably recognise Award 
3, Award 2 having been deprived of legal effect by being set aside. Such situations, in 
which conflicting awards are enforced in different countries, create huge uncertainty 
and are obviously undesirable.665 What if Award 2 had upheld a counterclaim, and 
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Award 3 the original claim, when enforcement of each would cancel the other out? 
What, in that scenario, was the point of coming to arbitration? 
One of the main arguments advanced in favour of delocalisation is to point out that the 
‘seat’ of arbitration is often selected by the parties simply as a neutral, convenient 
venue, and has little or no real connection to the dispute.666 The issue then is what 
interest the courts of that venue have in supervising the conduct of the arbitration and 
scrutinising the award. Mann would point to the fact that every sovereign has an 
interest in regulating conduct that takes place within the borders of its territory. This 
argument, however, shows the basis on which the sovereign may take supervisory 
jurisdiction over arbitrations conducted within his borders, but does not really speak 
as to whether and on what basis he should exercise that jurisdiction. Where, critics 
might ask, is the interest in supervising the fairness of an arbitral proceeding involving 
parties with no connection to the venue, when the award will at any rate be subject to 
judicial scrutiny when it is taken for recognition and enforcement in a country with a 
presumably more significant nexus to the dispute, in that one of the parties will at least 
have assets there? Arguments can go back and forth about the desirability of one 
controlling judicial authority, as discussed above.  
This line of thinking, however, raises an equally valid question: what is the French 
interest in being able to enforce an arbitral award set aside where rendered? Is the fact 
that a party has assets in France a sufficient connection to the dispute to justify French 
law unilaterally enforcing an award viewed as flawed where rendered? Is the presence 
of assets a better connection than the agreement of the parties to resolve a dispute 
within a given jurisdiction? It is submitted that, in an increasingly globalised 
commercial world, many of the parties to international arbitration will at some point 
have some kind of assets against which an award may be enforced in any number of 
countries; this fact should not provide those countries with a better right to decide on 
the validity of an arbitral award than the country where that award was rendered. 
Indeed, parties drafting a contract in the modern world certainly should be aware that 
the choice of venue for their arbitration has a potential legal significance going far 
beyond simply designating a convenient place for hearings to take place. The exercise 
                                                 




of party autonomy – so important in so many contexts in international private law, as 
discussed in previous chapters – in choosing a seat for the arbitration creates a far 
better connecting factor for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction that the 
coincidental location of assets.667 
The French courts in Putrabali, in an attempt to promote pro-arbitration values, may 
in fact have done the opposite. As outlined above, the decision creates considerable 
uncertainty and confusion – anathema to parties to commercial dealings – and may 
hinder the progress of arbitration far more than it helps it. 
D. Preliminary conclusions 
When strong delocalisation is done by countries unilaterally, it gives rise to 
considerable scope for confusion and uncertainty; especially as regards the 
enforceability of awards. The movement clearly has at its heart an arbitration-friendly 
theory: that arbitration should not be subject to the parochial provisions of national 
law, especially because of the uncertainty of outcome this creates. It is ironic, then, 
that the inconsistent application of this theory creates another kind of uncertainty.  
If strong delocalisation could be universally agreed upon, for example by the creation 
of a new, ICSID-style commercial arbitration convention, this scope for confusion 
would be greatly reduced and the arbitration-friendly effects of delocalisation could 
be realised. It is, however, submitted that there is no real appetite for this kind of 
delocalisation on a wide scale; it is at present so far from being a realistic and realisable 
goal as to render it practically irrelevant to any contemporary discussion. 
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Weak delocalisation is the argument for a particular application of states’ territorially-
based control over arbitration, using internationalised rather than purely municipal 
standards of control. It is therefore a movement based on a territorial conception of 
arbitration. Parallels can perhaps be drawn with the favor arbitrandum and home-
country control principles, discussed in the previous chapter. In the hierarchy of norms 
in both cases, the liberal, supposedly pro-arbitration theories are constrained by state 
sovereignty.  
The relevance of the delocalisation debate to this thesis is very clear. The inclusion of 
arbitration in jurisdiction regimes like the Brussels I Regulation would clearly localise 
arbitral awards at the seat of the arbitration and potentially give effect throughout 
Europe to set-aside judgments of courts at that seat. If delocalisation theory, especially 
strong delocalisation theory, is correct, this approach would be undesirable and a 
backwards step in the delocalisation process. 
As shown above, however, weak delocalisation is not inconsistent with a broadly 
territorialist approach; it simply urges the use of territorially-based jurisdiction over 
arbitral proceedings in a particular fashion, consistent with international norms. The 
inclusion of arbitration in jurisdictional instruments therefore does not contradict weak 
delocalisation. It is important to note that nothing in the proposals advanced by this 
thesis would stop the EU member states from agreeing to restrict the bases on which 
set-aside could be granted, for example by way of a protocol to the New York 
Convention or a separate European Convention. This would allay the concerns of weak 
delocalisation proponents that it would be anti-arbitration to require reciprocal 
enforcement of set-aside on parochial bases by countries that are not arbitration 
friendly. 
Strong delocalisation has been shown to be undesirable on a piecemeal, inconsistent, 
or unilateral basis, and extremely unlikely in the near future on any broader basis. 
Furthermore, in the European example, the Brussels Regime has created a single 
enforcement area for commercial decisions within Europe. The Regime promotes a 
high degree of consistency and predictability of enforceability in the EU, founded on 
principles of mutual trust. Harmonising the process of enforcement of arbitral awards 




It may be useful in this context to consider how we think about enforcement of 
judgments within Europe and the wider world. Imagine an arbitral award rendered in 
Edinburgh and set aside by a court in Edinburgh, then taken for recognition and 
enforcement by a court in London. In this situation, it seems patently obvious that the 
court should refuse recognition and enforcement on the basis of the relationship 
between the constituent countries of the UK and their legal systems (leaving aside the 
technical law of enforcement of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982). No 
one could reasonably argue that the London court had made an arbitration-unfriendly 
decision by respecting a judgment made by another court within the same state. Then 
imagine an award rendered and set aside in Russia, taken for recognition and 
enforcement in Peru. It is far less obvious that the Peruvian court should defer to the 
Russian court’s decision on the validity of the award, given the lack of any special 
relationship between the two states. It is submitted that the situation where an arbitral 
award is rendered and set-aside in one EU member state and taken for recognition and 
enforcement in another EU member state intuitively has more in common with the 
former situation than the latter. The legal systems of the member states of the EU are 
increasingly closely interrelated, and in civil and commercial matters, there exists 
something approaching a single enforcement area. It seems strange that court decisions 
on arbitration matters should be excluded from this arrangement. 
In conclusion, nothing in weak delocalisation theory prevents the inclusion of 
arbitration in a jurisdictional regime like the Brussels I Regulation, though it may call 
for a separate rethinking of the bases on which set-aside would be granted. Strong 
delocalisation theory would stand opposed to such inclusion, but could not itself 
provide a fair, efficient, workable system of control of the arbitral process without the 
creation of a supranational supervisory authority. In the absence of such an authority, 
control at the national level by the seat of the arbitration seems the most efficient way 
of regulating the arbitral process. Within the EU, it seems right that member states 
respect one another’s ability to effectively supervise the arbitral process, under a trust-
based regime like the Brussels Regulation. If strong delocalisation were to take place 
with the formation of a supranational supervisory body, there would no longer be any 
pressing reason to have rules concerning arbitration contained in jurisdictional 




the distant – future, and so should not stand in the way of consideration of the best 
approach for jurisdictional instruments to take to arbitration in the short term. 
Furthermore, if such an approach were to be adopted, rules for national courts taking 
jurisdiction in proceedings relating to arbitration under the Brussels Regime would 
simply become irrelevant and would not interfere with the new system. It is submitted 
that there is therefore no reason for this potential approach to stand in the way of the 





8. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
This chapter will draw together the various strands of this thesis by presenting a 
proposal for the inclusion of arbitration within the Brussels I Regulation. It has been 
argued in previous chapters that the justification for the exclusion of arbitration was 
weak and that the exclusion has caused significant problems, which the Brussels I 
Recast has failed to address. The chapter will therefore begin by proposing a scheme 
for the partial inclusion of arbitration in the Brussels I Regulation that addresses 
existing problems to the greatest extent possible.  
A number of scenarios that may arise at the interface between the Brussels I Regulation 
and arbitration will then be considered, to see how this proposal contrasts with the 
status quo. The proposal will then be assessed for its compatibility with the principles 
outlined in previous chapters. Next, some potential objections will be considered. 
Finally, it will be asked whether this proposal could have any application in the world 
at large, coming to the conclusion that the proposal is better suited to Europe than to 
the international community as a whole. 
This chapter is intended to constitute the major part of this thesis’s contribution to 
knowledge, drawing together all the strands of the previous chapters in a concrete 
recommendation. The contribution principally lies in the holistic approach taken to the 
question of the appropriate relationship between jurisdiction conventions and 
arbitration. 
A. Proposal 
This section presents a short discussion on each component recommendation of the 
proposal for amendment of the Brussels I Regulation. Deeper consideration of the 
proposal as a whole will follow in sections B and C. 
(1) Amended scope 
It is recommended to retain the exclusion of arbitration at Art 1 (2) (d), but with the 
addition of the words ‘except insofar as provided for in the rest of this Regulation’ 




regulate matters relating to arbitration only in certain well-defined circumstances. The 
aim is to address the problems outlined throughout this thesis, but not to interfere with 
the status quo in other circumstances, where such interference would be unnecessary 
on inappropriate. This would include situations when there is already an adequate rule 
in the New York Convention, such as when a court is seised of a matter in respect of 
which the parties have made an arbitration agreement and one party challenges the 
jurisdiction of that court, in which case the New York Convention would apply as it 
does today. 
(2) Exclusive jurisdiction and lis pendens 
It is recommended to insert a five-part, bespoke jurisdictional rule into the Brussels I 
Regulation. The letters in square brackets refer to headings below, under which the 
reasons for the provisions will be explained. The new article would provide: 
Article X 
1. If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that an arbitral tribunal 
is to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may 
arise in connection with a particular legal relationship [a], and have taken steps 
to commence an arbitration with its seat in a Member State [b], the courts of 
that Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement [c]. ‘Enforcement of the arbitration agreement’ shall 
include assessing the validity of that agreement and whether the subject matter 
of the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration [c]. This rule in no way 
affects the competence of the court to defer these matters to the arbitral tribunal 
or an arbitral institution [d]. 
2. When steps have been taken to commence an arbitration with its seat in a 
Member State, the courts of any other Member State shall stay or dismiss 
proceedings on the substance of the dispute when one party claims the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, until such time as the courts of the seat 
of the arbitration or the arbitral tribunal have declared that the tribunal has no 




of any court to provide interim relief or evidential assistance with the 
arbitration, in accordance with its own rules [f]. 
3. The rules in the preceding paragraphs shall not apply if the said arbitration 
agreement is manifestly null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being 
performed [g]. These rules shall not apply in disputes concerning matters 
referred to in Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter II, except insofar as an insurance 
contract within the meaning of Section 3 falls within the categories of risk 
included in Article 16 [h]. 
4. The seat of the arbitration is the country in which or under the law of which 
the arbitration takes place or is to take place [i]. Steps to commence arbitration 
shall include the submission of a request for arbitration to an arbitral institution, 
or beginning the arbitrator appointment process, with or without the assistance 
of a court [j]. 
5. Nothing in this Article shall affect the application of the New York Convention 
to questions concerning the jurisdiction of courts where no action has been 
taken to commence arbitration. The effects of a valid arbitration clause on 
jurisdiction over the substantive dispute remain governed by the New York 
Convention [j]. 
It is recommended that the request for a stay would be made by a simple standard form, 
to which would be attached the arbitration agreement and the evidence that arbitral 
proceedings had been commenced. 
Each of the constituent parts of this proposal shall now be introduced in more detail. 
(a) If the parties, regardless of their domicile, have agreed that an arbitral 
tribunal is to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen 
or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship 
This is based on the language used in Art 25 (1) Brussels I Recast on choice of court 
agreements, slightly modified to refer to arbitration agreements. If the wording ‘an 
arbitral tribunal is to have jurisdiction’ seems awkward, it is because it is included for 




agreed that any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship are to be decided by arbitration’. 
(b) and have taken steps to commence an arbitration with its seat in a 
Member State 
As will become evident below, it is important to limit the application of these rules to 
situations where arbitration and court proceedings are pending at the same time in 
different member states. The New York Convention already provides a rule of negative 
court jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement exists between the parties,668 which 
does not need to be complicated in situations where there are not parallel proceedings. 
Furthermore, requiring that arbitration with its seat in a member state has been 
commenced means that there should be less controversy over where the seat of an 
arbitration is. Either the seat of arbitration will be obvious, whether from the parties’ 
agreement or the fact of where proceedings have been commenced, or it will not be 
possible to say that the arbitration has its seat in a member state, in which case the 
Brussels Regulation will not apply, and the New York Convention will be applicable 
by default. This is important because the definition of the seat was a contentious point 
of the Commission’s proposal for reform, where it was pointed out that an inconsistent 
approach to the definition of the ‘seat’ could lead to conflicts of jurisdiction.669 This 
proposal as a whole is designed to ease that concern, by providing a definition of the 
seat, below, and by limiting the application of the rules to situations where there are 
parallel proceedings. Even if the definition cannot be standardised and some cases slip 
through the cracks, leading to conflicts of jurisdiction, the situation is no worse than 
that which already exists, outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
(c) the courts of that Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
the enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
When parallel proceedings are pending, exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement will be given to the courts at the seat of the arbitration. This 
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will mean the conclusion of that court on the validity of the arbitration agreement will 
have to be recognised across Europe, reducing the uncertainty created by parallel 
proceedings. The choice to give that authority to the court at the seat of the arbitration 
is in line with the broadly territorialist perspective outlined in the previous chapter. 
(d) This rule in no way affects the competence of the court to defer these 
matters to the arbitral tribunal or an arbitral institution 
This enshrines the arbitral competence-competence principle, which the 
Commission’s original proposal was criticised for failing to do.670 This is because the 
original Commission suggestions concerned only court proceedings relating to 
arbitration and not proceedings before the tribunal itself.671 This criticism was reflected 
in the scaled-back proposal eventually made, which was structured in a similar, but 
not identical, fashion to the rule proposed here.672 The party seeking to establish the 
validity of the arbitration agreement will not be forced to go to court to enforce the 
agreement because this sentence makes clear that the court of the seat is not required 
to take jurisdiction over the enforcement of the agreement; it is simply permitted to if 
its national law so allows. The rule will still serve its main purpose by excluding the 
parallel jurisdiction of other member state national courts provided proceedings have 
been commenced before the arbitral tribunal. 
(e) When steps have been taken to commence an arbitration with its seat 
in a Member State, the courts of any other Member State shall stay or 
dismiss proceedings on the substance of the dispute when one party 
claims the existence of an arbitration agreement, until such time as the 
courts of the seat of the arbitration or the arbitral tribunal have declared 
that the tribunal has no jurisdiction under the agreement 
This is a mandatory stay rule, similar to that included in the Commission Proposal,673 
and structured to align with the exclusive jurisdiction rule introduced above. The 
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requirement that arbitration proceedings have been started is intended to discourage 
tactical litigation or the use of the lis pendens rules to torpedo legitimate court actions. 
(f) This rule does not affect the jurisdiction of any court to provide interim 
relief or evidential assistance with the arbitration, in accordance with its 
own rules 
This is intended to make clear that the mandatory stay provision only applies to actions 
on the merits, even though this is mentioned in the preceding line. It should be clear 
beyond doubt that the courts of member states other than the seat of the arbitration 
should be free to provide support and interim relief in the arbitration. 
(g) These rules shall not apply if the said arbitration agreement is 
manifestly null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed 
This standard is borrowed from French rules on the ‘negative effect’ of the 
competence-competence principle. Competence-competence is the principle that an 
arbitral tribunal is able to rule on its own jurisdiction. The ‘negative effect’ of that rule 
is the extent to which competence-competence excludes the ability of the relevant 
national court to rule on the same question.674 The doctrine of competence-competence 
has negative effect in French law unless the arbitral tribunal has not been seised and 
the arbitration agreement is manifestly null or clearly inapplicable.675  
Having a similar rule in this proposal, combined with the requirement that steps have 
been taken to commence arbitration, is intended to ensure that an unwilling litigant 
cannot ‘torpedo’ legitimate court actions simply by alleging the existence of an 
arbitration clause.  
The language ‘null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed’ is taken 
directly from Art II (3) New York Convention. The word ‘manifest’ limits the 
discretion of the court addressed to assess the existence, validity, and scope of the 
arbitration agreement. This rule, and particularly the discretion afforded to courts of 
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countries other than the seat of the arbitration, will be discussed in more detail 
below.676 
(h) These rules shall not apply in disputes concerning matters referred to 
in Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter II, except insofar as an insurance 
contract within the meaning of Section 3 falls within the categories of 
risk included in Article 16 
This prevents these rules interfering with protective jurisdiction under the Regulation, 
or with national rules to deal with the arbitration of these issues, which will continue 
to operate as they do under the current regime. The same basic scheme was proposed 
in the Commission Proposal,677 and is in line with this thesis’s aim to address only true 
international commercial arbitration. The exception making reference to Art 16 is an 
addition to the Commission Proposal. It refers to certain types of insurance contract, 
which are not subject to the rules of protective jurisdiction and in respect of which the 
parties are entitled to make a pre-dispute agreement conferring jurisdiction on any 
given court. These include contracts such as those for marine insurance and goods in 
transit, which, it is submitted, are true commercial contracts. If these matters can be 
subject to a pre-dispute prorogation agreement, they should surely also qualify for the 
protection of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. 
(i) The seat of the arbitration is the country in which or under the law of 
which the arbitration takes place or is to take place 
This definition is included to reduce the scope for confusion and debate about the 
meaning of the term ‘seat’. The language is taken from the New York Convention, 
although the Convention does not actually refer to an arbitration’s ‘seat’.678  
This contrasts with the proposal by the Commission, which listed the seat as the place 
designated by the parties or the tribunal as the seat.679 The Commission’s rule does not 
make it clear whether the choice of the parties to hold an arbitration in a country 
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constitutes the designation of a seat, or whether this is merely a designation of venue. 
Parties do not always agree on a seat, or even a venue, for their arbitration.680 If the 
parties do not agree in advance to a seat, it is unlikely they will agree after a dispute 
emerges, especially if it is to one party’s strategic disadvantage to do so. The parties 
will then rely on the arbitral tribunal to fix a seat, which it may not do, or may not do 
publicly, given arbitration is often confidential. It is therefore submitted that the 
Commission’s Proposal could have left a large number of arbitrations in which the 
modified lis pendens rule did not apply. 
This proposal makes clear that the place of the arbitration can be considered the seat, 
but that the parties may instead designate the law of another place to govern. It could 
even be clarified in a recital that the venue of an arbitration will also be considered to 
be the seat in the absence of party agreement to the contrary. This may, however, 
provoke criticism that the Regulation infringes too much on the domestic arbitration 
law of member states by seeking to define the New York Convention’s provisions,681 
which simply adopting the New York Convention’s language should not do. It has 
therefore not been formally advanced as a recommendation in this proposal. 
Nonetheless, this slight difference should increase the effectiveness of the rule by 
ensuring it applies more widely. 
(j) Steps to commence arbitration shall include the submission of a request 
for arbitration to an arbitral institution, or beginning the arbitrator 
appointment process, with or without the assistance of a court 
This definition is included in order to clarify what will constitute commencement of 
arbitration for the purposes of the Regulation. The first step in an institutional 
arbitration tends to be the submission of a request for arbitration, whilst the first step 
in ad hoc arbitration is usually the appointment of arbitrators, either under the parties’ 
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agreement or the law of the seat of the ad hoc arbitration, which sometimes requires 
the support of a court. This definition therefore should encompass the appropriate first 
step in the arbitral process, and reduce the potential that the meaning of the phrase 
‘steps to commence arbitration’ becomes controversial. 
(3) Set-aside and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards 
It is proposed to add two new rules to the existing provisions on exclusive jurisdiction, 
as follows. 
‘Article 24 
The following courts of a Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless 
of the domicile of the parties: 
… 
(6) In proceedings to set aside arbitral awards, the courts of the Member State of the 
seat of the arbitration. 
(7) In proceedings concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, the 
courts of the Member State in which the award has been or is to be enforced.’ 
As will be discussed in more detail below, the rationale for the former rule is to 
promote legal certainty, within a scheme based on mutual trust, by requiring member 
states to recognise the set-aside judgments of other member states, thereby reducing 
the chance for Putrabali-style scenarios to arise. The rationale for the latter rule is to 
make clear that the decision to recognise and enforce an arbitral award is a matter 
exclusively for the court requested to enforce the award; the result of other recognition 
and enforcement proceedings in one member state do not affect the result in another. 
The language is similar to that used for exclusive jurisdiction over the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.682 
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(4) Conflict between arbitral awards and judgments 
It is recommended to add to Art 45 (1) (d) Brussels I Recast the following (insertion 
in italics): 
‘(1) On the application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be 
refused… 
(d) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment or arbitral award given 
or made in another Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action 
and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment/award fulfils the 
conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed. The existence 
of an earlier arbitral award shall not prevent recognition of a judgment setting aside 
that award’. 
This allows a party that has obtained an arbitral award to resist enforcement of a 
subsequent Regulation judgment on the same issue. This addresses the potential 
conflict between an arbitral award and judgment in favour of the arbitral award, 
provided that the arbitral award meets the conditions for enforcement in the member 
state addressed. It would also extend this rule to awards in arbitrations not seated in 
the EU, in the same way it does judgments. On the other hand, the new second sentence 
will prevent this exception being used to circumvent a set-aside judgment by the 
member-state court of the seat of arbitration. 
This cannot be seen as a radical extension of the scope of the Brussels I Regulation to 
cover arbitral awards; the rule simply provides for the effect of a pre-existing arbitral 
award on the recognition of a Regulation judgment. Similarly, the Regulation could 
not and does not purport to regulate jurisdiction or recognition and enforcement of 
judgments given in third states; it simply provides for the effect of such judgments on 
enforcement of a Regulation judgment. 
This rule addresses the scenario where a member state court disregards the 
recommended lis pendens rule and continues to render a judgment, by making 




provided the arbitral award itself fulfils the conditions for recognition and enforcement 
under the New York Convention. 
B.  Scenarios and analysis 
This proposal shall now be assessed by analysing its effects in some simple and 
foreseeable scenarios concerning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement or 
award. 
The scenarios use parties P1 and P2, where P1 is in favour of arbitration and P2 is 
against. The examples will also use two forums, F1 and F2, which are both European 
Union member states. F1 will be the proposed seat of arbitration, whilst F2 will be the 
forum in which P2 would prefer to have the dispute resolved by the national court. The 
scenarios will cover instances of both good and bad faith disagreement by each party. 
The jurisdiction scenarios that will be discussed are: when a party resisting arbitration 
brings a court action in violation of an arbitration agreement (the Marc Rich scenario); 
when a party resisting court proceedings alleges the existence of an arbitration 
agreement in the hope of ‘torpedoing’ the court proceedings; when there is genuine 
doubt as to the validity of an arbitration agreement; and when a party brings court 
proceedings in violation of an arbitration agreement that does not specify a seat. 
Finally, the scenario where an award set aside in one member state is taken for 
recognition and enforcement in another will be considered (the Putrabali scenario). 
(1) The Marc Rich scenario 
The first scenario is one in which two parties, P1 and P2, have made an arbitration 
agreement which is clearly valid and concerns a subject matter clearly capable of 
settlement by arbitration. The arbitration agreement provides for institutional 
arbitration in F1. Anticipating that P1 intends to take a claim to arbitration, P2 brings 
an action before the courts of F2, which are notoriously slow moving and untrusting 
of arbitration. The F2 courts tend to require a full argument on the validity of an 
arbitration agreement before declining jurisdiction, if indeed they do so. P2 hopes that 




cause P1 to settle for far less than he intends to claim.683 P1 commences institutional 
arbitration in F1, as per the arbitration agreement. This is essentially the Marc Rich 
scenario, with the addition of bad faith on the part of P2. 
Under the above recommended special lis pendens rule, the court in F2 will be required 
to stay proceedings without hearing arguments on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement as soon as P1 alleges the existence of the arbitration agreement and provides 
evidence that it has submitted a request for arbitration to the designated arbitral 
institution. If the court does otherwise, it will be in breach of European Union law. P2 
may still challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement before the courts of F1 
and/or the arbitral tribunal, but this is unlikely if its original recourse to the F2 court 
was purely tactical. The arbitration can proceed and result in an award, which can be 
taken for recognition and enforcement under the New York Convention, free of the 
potential for any conflicting judgment. 
Under the Brussels Regulation and the Recast, the court in F2 would be entitled to 
assess its own jurisdiction, which would include making a full review of the existence, 
validity, and scope of the arbitration agreement.684 Proceedings in the F2 court could 
therefore be protracted and expensive. Furthermore, there will be a looming 
uncertainty over the outcome of the F2 court’s assessment of its jurisdiction. These 
factors will make P1 more likely to settle without its claim being fully heard. Even 
after arbitration has run its course, assuming P1 wins, it may still face an ongoing battle 
to satisfy the F2 court that it lacks jurisdiction. If the F2 court ultimately assumes 
jurisdiction, holding the arbitration agreement invalid, it may go on to render a 
judgment which could conflict with the original award. The new Recital 12 in the 
Brussels I Recast provides that the F2 court’s judgment on the merits would be 
enforceable under the Regulation, but ‘without prejudice to the competence of the 
courts… to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in accordance 
with the [New York Convention], which takes precedence over this Regulation.’ As 
argued above, this seems to provide that both the award and judgment would be 
                                                 
683 See Force, above, for the likelihood that P2 can successfully frustrate P1 by doing so, which is 
potentially quite high. 




considered enforceable, which goes no way to alleviate the confusion or potential 
worry to P1 in this scenario. 
In this scenario, the advantages of the new approach are obvious. Tactical litigation is 
made much more difficult, which in turn should serve to discourage its use. The 
process of defending a claim on the basis that there is an arbitration agreement is 
streamlined, and the possibility for parallel proceedings and conflicting judgments 
eliminated, increasing legal certainty and predictability. Finally, it should reduce the 
amount of time and money spent arguing the same matters in different forums, which 
increases the efficiency of the administration of justice. All of these are clear 
advantages of this thesis’s proposal over the existing provisions of the Brussels I 
Regulation and Recast. 
(2) Torpedoing court proceedings by alleging the existence of an 
arbitration agreement 
The second scenario is where there is blatantly no arbitration agreement between P1 
and P2. P2 sues P1 in the courts of F2, which he believes to have jurisdiction over the 
substantive dispute under the Brussels I Regulation. P1 nonetheless alleges the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate disputes in F1, in the hope of obstructing P2’s 
court action. It is important that this situation is addressed because, just as it was feared 
in the Marc Rich case that a lis pendens rule with an imbalance towards court 
proceedings could lead to the use of court actions to ‘torpedo’ arbitration, so a lis 
pendens rule overly focussed on enforcing arbitration agreements could lead to 
arbitration being used to ‘torpedo’ court proceedings. 
Under the proposed approach, this scenario plays out as follows. If P1 has not taken 
action to commence his vexatious arbitration in F1, he will be unable to meet the 
standard required to request a stay: alleging the existence of an arbitration agreement 
and demonstrating that action has been taken to commence arbitration. The F2 court 
will be able to continue to hear the action, decide on any objection to its jurisdiction 
based solely on the New York Convention, and, if appropriate, render judgment. If, on 
the other hand, P1 has attempted to begin arbitration in F1 under the non-existent 




whether the arbitration agreement provided was ‘manifestly null and void, inoperative, 
or incapable of being performed’. Presuming this indeed is a case in which there is 
obviously no agreement to arbitrate, and P1 has not extended himself to perjury or 
fraud to try to obstruct the F2 proceedings, the F2 court should be able to arrive at the 
conclusion that the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and a stay is unnecessary. 
The proceedings in which P1 has commenced the vexatious arbitration would 
presumably fairly quickly come to the same conclusion. The proceedings in the F2 
court would continue and, if appropriate, a judgment could be rendered.  
Under the Brussels I Regulation and Recast, the situation would be roughly the same. 
It is true that P1 would have less incentive to begin a vexatious arbitration because, 
under the combined effect of Marc Rich and West Tankers, there would be no 
possibility that such an action could ‘torpedo’ the F2 court proceedings. That aside, 
the only other significantly different detail is the scope of review of the arbitration 
agreement by the F2 court. Under the Brussels I Regulation, the court would be entitled 
to make a full review of the validity of the agreement; under the proposal, it would 
only assess whether the requirements for stay were met and, if they were, whether the 
agreement was manifestly null. This means that only in obvious cases will the F2 court 
be able to proceed, and not in borderline cases, as discussed below. The minor changes 
in the Brussels I Recast do not alter the existing approach to this scenario, unless 
Advocate General Wathelet’s interpretation is adopted, in which case the allegation of 
the existence of an arbitration agreement would immediately remove the proceedings 
from the scope of the Regulation, allowing torpedoing parallel proceedings to be 
commenced.685 This recommendation is, however, unlikely to be adopted, as argued 
above. 
It is true that there is some leeway in the word ‘manifestly’, which could mean that 
different courts in different contracting states could adopt different standards of 
review. Too wide an interpretation of ‘manifestly’ could undermine the effectiveness 
of the lis pendens rule, allowing too invasive a review of the validity of the agreement 
by courts other than those at the seat of the arbitration. A narrower meaning of 
‘manifestly’ may be clarified in a recital, explaining that it means ‘on its face’ or 
                                                 




‘immediately obviously’, and that it does not permit a lengthy hearing into the validity 
or applicability of the arbitration agreement. At any rate, the Court of Justice will be 
on hand to ensure consistent interpretation. 
It is submitted that, in this scenario, the proposal provides the same result as would the 
Brussels I Regulation or Recast. There is very little difference, save that it might be 
slightly more tempting for a party resisting a court action to begin a vexatious 
arbitration because of the chance that this could torpedo the court action. This would, 
however, seem to be an expensive tactic which is unlikely to succeed given the 
structure of the rule. It is therefore submitted that the new rule provides no significant 
downside as compared to the existing system in this scenario, whilst making 
significant improvements in other scenarios. 
(3) In cases of doubt as to the validity of the arbitration agreement 
The third scenario is where P1 and P2 have arguably entered into an arbitration 
agreement, which clearly identifies F1 as the seat. P2, genuinely not believing himself 
to be bound by the arbitration agreement, begins an action in the courts of F2. P1 
believes the dispute should properly be resolved by arbitration in F1, so objects to the 
jurisdiction of the court and begins arbitration proceedings in F1. The courts of F2 
would have jurisdiction over the substance of the dispute under the Brussels I 
Regulation but for the arbitration agreement. A real-world example of this situation 
can be seen in the West Tankers case.686 
Under the proposal in this chapter, the scenario would develop as follows. P1 would 
initiate arbitration proceedings in F1 and allege the existence of the arbitration 
agreement before the courts of F2. The F2 court would then stay proceedings, as there 
is an arbitration agreement which is not obviously void or inapplicable. If P2 believes 
the dispute should properly be resolved before the F2 courts, he will be free to 
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challenge the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, whether before the courts of F1 or 
the arbitral tribunal itself. If the arbitration agreement is held to be valid, the arbitration 
will proceed and an award will be rendered. If, on the other hand, the agreement is 
held not to be valid, the arbitral process will cease, and the courts of F2 will be free to 
resume proceedings, taking jurisdiction and rendering a judgment if appropriate. 
This approach has obvious advantages compared to the situation currently prevailing 
under the Brussels I Regulation after West Tankers or the Brussels Recast. There is no 
possible reason to invoke the protection of an anti-suit injunction, whose use has been 
effectively outlawed in Europe by the Court of Justice in Turner and West Tankers. 
This approach however addresses the reason that parties might choose to seek an anti-
suit injunction – parallel proceedings – but does not simply remove access to the 
remedy without providing a suitable alternative solution.687 Indeed, parallel 
proceedings are virtually eliminated as a possibility. The law as it currently stands 
allows the possibility of parallel proceedings in these cases, at least on the validity of 
the arbitration agreement, as in West Tankers, and potentially also on the merits, as 
pointed out in the Heidelberg Report and the Commission Proposal.688 
It is true that this proposal, in addressing the borderline cases such as this, supports 
arbitration more strongly than court proceedings, insofar as correctly pursued court 
proceedings may be delayed by the allegation of the existence of a not obviously 
invalid or inapplicable arbitration agreement. It is submitted that this is an acceptable 
outcome. Given the commitment to eliminating parallel proceedings in European 
international private law, it is surely better that the possibility of parallel proceedings 
is removed than allowed to continue. This being true, it is inevitable that a rule to 
eliminate parallel proceedings will have to favour one type of proceedings over the 
other – arbitration or court. It is submitted that the decision to favour arbitration in the 
borderline cases is justifiable, especially because it supports the parties’ exercise of 
autonomy. Indeed, this mirrors the new provisions on choice of court agreements in 
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the Brussels I Recast.689 It is therefore submitted that this approach is appropriate in 
the circumstances. 
(4) Court proceedings brought in violation of an arbitration agreement that 
does not specify a seat 
This scenario is where there is a clear agreement to arbitrate disputes which fails to 
identify a seat, whether expressly or by reference to institutional rules designating a 
default seat. An example would be a clause saying simply: ‘All disputes to be settled 
by arbitration’. P2 begins court proceedings in F2. P1 believes the claim belongs in 
arbitration. 
This scenario is important, because a significant element of the criticisms aimed at the 
Commission Proposal focussed on the fact that proposed Art 29 (4) refers to the seat 
of the arbitration, but the seat will not necessarily be known in advance, nor necessarily 
when a court is seised.690 Lazić’s criticism centres on the fact that the proposal is 
unclear what would happen where a court is seised and the respondent in that action 
has no counterclaim, so arbitration is never actually commenced.691 Harris’s criticism 
reflects the fact that this may encourage the unnecessary commencement of 
arbitrations.692 This section shall seek to address both these criticisms, and shall 
address in turn what will happen in this scenario when P1 does have a claim to be 
resolved in arbitration, and when P1 does not. 
(a) Where P1 has already commenced arbitration 
If P1 has commenced arbitration before P2 commences court proceedings in F2, the 
situation is simple. P1 has commenced arbitration by beginning the arbitrator 
appointment process by applying to a court to appoint arbitrators, which would be the 
only option open to it under the clause described above. P1 can point to the arbitration 
agreement before the F2 court, which will have to stay proceedings, either under the 
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rules proposed in this chapter in accordance with the analysis above under B (1), or, if 
the seat of the arbitration is not yet clear, under the New York Convention. The seat 
of the arbitration could be determined by the court to which the application for 
assistance was made. 
(b) Where P1 has not commenced arbitration and has a counterclaim 
Where P1 has not yet commenced arbitration, but wishes to assert a counterclaim, P1 
can simply take action to commence arbitration, and the outcome will be the same as 
described above. 
(c) Where P1 has not commenced arbitration and has no counterclaim 
Where P1 has not commenced arbitration and does not wish to raise a counterclaim, 
the scenario becomes more difficult. This is the scenario described by Lazić as 
problematic. This problem is perhaps overstated, given parties are often willing to 
begin arbitration to obtain a declaration of non-liability.693 It is therefore submitted 
that this is a minor problem. 
This proposal is nonetheless capable of coping with the situation where the defendant 
in the court proceedings is absolutely unwilling to commence arbitration. This is 
because the proposal provides for the application of the New York Convention where 
the proposal’s rules have not been engaged, for example because no action has been 
taken to commence arbitration. This means that the P1 is free to assert the existence of 
the arbitration agreement before the F2 court, and require referral to arbitration under 
Art II New York Convention or F2 national law. The F2 court may simply decline 
jurisdiction, or may indeed take a more active role in the commencement of arbitral 
proceedings, for example by determining a seat694 and/or assisting with the 
appointment of arbitrators. In the latter case, it could be said that action has at that 
point been taken to commence arbitration. Either way, P2 is left with no option but to 
go to arbitration should he wish to pursue his claim.  
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It may fairly be pointed out that this leaves P1 reliant on the F2 court’s conception of 
an arbitration agreement. Whilst this is true, this is the same situation that faces any 
party looking to resist court jurisdiction on the basis of an arbitration agreement 
without raising a counterclaim, and Art II New York Convention is addressed to the 
courts of every signatory state. Furthermore, it remains open to the parties to specify a 
seat or venue for their arbitration at the time of making the agreement. Although, in 
the scenario where they fail to do so, the exact outcome on the question of validity of 
the arbitration agreement depends to some degree on the court in which the original 
action is raised, the system still operates effectively to prevent parallel court and 
arbitral proceedings, which must be viewed as a positive development. It will also 
mean that member state courts have the potential to fail to find a harmonious approach 
to the validity of an arbitration agreement only in this specific scenario, which is 
currently the case every time an arbitration agreement is in question. Furthermore, 
under this proposal, the defendant always retains the possibility to begin an arbitration 
for a declaration of non-liability if he does not like its chances of contesting jurisdiction 
before the F2 courts. 
Harris argued that the system proposed by the Commission might encourage the 
commencement of unnecessary arbitrations. It is submitted that this should not be seen 
as a major concern. If P1 feels moved to commence arbitration proceedings for a 
declaration of non-liability in order to ensure that the case is heard in arbitration – as 
was the case in West Tankers and in The Prestige under the current regime – this will 
simply expedite the process by which the parties arrive in the correct forum. This 
cannot truly be called ‘unnecessary’; rather it is necessary for the defendant to ensure 
that he can resist the claim in the correct forum. 
It is therefore submitted that the proposed system gives significant advantages over the 
status quo, without any significant down side. 
(5) The Putrabali scenario 
Turning from the enforcement of the arbitration agreement to the recognition and 




the courts at the seat of the arbitration, then taken for recognition and enforcement in 
another member state. This was the situation in the infamous Putrabali saga. 
Under this proposal, because the court at the seat of the arbitration has exclusive 
jurisdiction over set-aside actions, the court asked to recognise and enforce the arbitral 
award will also be bound to recognise the set-aside judgment. This means that, in the 
absence of exceptional grounds for refusal of recognition of the set-aside judgment 
under the Brussels I Regulation (such as violation of European public policy) the 
second court will not be able to recognise and enforce the arbitral award. The arbitral 
tribunal can be reconvened to issue a further award, if appropriate, which can then be 
taken for recognition and enforcement. 
By contrast, under the current law, the Putrabali approach prevails. The effect is that 
the court asked to recognise and enforce the arbitral award may do so, notwithstanding 
that the award has been set aside in another member state, and that the arbitral tribunal 
may have been reconvened and issued a contradictory award (as was the case in 
Putrabali). This situation presents all the potential problems discussed in chapters 3 
and 7 of this thesis. 
This new rule on set aside may be the most controversial aspect of the proposal in this 
thesis. It will be assessed for its compatibility with relevant principles below. It is, 
however, submitted, that the two possible approaches rely on different fundamental 
conceptions of the relationship between the courts and arbitration. The approach of 
this thesis puts emphasis on the responsibility of the courts at the seat to oversee and, 
where necessary, control arbitration. The previous approach relies on the control of all 
the various possible enforcement jurisdictions at the recognition and enforcement 
stage. Furthermore, if one of those potential enforcement jurisdictions takes the French 
approach of simply enforcing awards set aside where rendered, the whole system boils 
down to a race to court, as has been pointed out in literature and discussed previously 
in this thesis. It is not necessarily true that one of these approaches is inherently 
‘better’, but the values implicit in these approaches should be borne in mind when 
considering the context and relevant principles against which the approach is taken. It 
is submitted that the latter approach is inappropriate within the EU, for reasons that 




C. Problems identified in Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 of this thesis identified a number of problems at the interface between the 
Brussels Regulation and arbitration. These were: the scope of the exclusion; the 
potential for parallel proceedings; the ineffectiveness of declaratory judgments; the 
treatment of judgments rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement; the treatment of 
judgments setting aside arbitral awards; and award and judgment conflict problems. 
This section shall briefly address each of these in turn, although the solution to most 
of these problems has already been made clear above. 
(1) The scope of the exclusion 
The persistent confusion about the scope of the arbitration exclusion is to an extent 
clarified by the inclusion of certain court proceedings related to arbitration in the scope 
of the Regulation. At any rate, in addressing the most controversial issue – parallel 
proceedings, which were the centre of the disputes in Marc Rich and West Tankers – 
the likelihood that court intervention will be required to determine the scope of the 
exclusion has been reduced. 
(2) Parallel proceedings 
One of the central aims of this proposal is to eliminate parallel proceedings, as has 
been demonstrated above. 
(3) Declaratory judgments 
Declaratory judgments on the validity of an arbitration agreement are now included in 
the Brussels I Regulation, as long as they are delivered by the court at the seat of the 
arbitration in an arbitration that has already been commenced. This is an improvement 
on the previous situation, in which declaratory judgments never had meaningful effect. 
(4) Treatment of judgments rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement 
Regulation judgments rendered in spite of arbitration agreements are enforceable 
under the Regulation. This is not expressly stated, but is implied by the decision to 




Regulation judgment, whilst making no mention of judgments rendered in spite of an 
arbitration agreement. It is hoped that the inconsistent approaches of member state 
courts to this question will not continue after the relationship between the Brussels 
Regulation and arbitration has been clarified under the proposal advanced here. This 
should especially be the case because the defendant in court proceedings has 
opportunities that did not previously exist to resist those proceedings on the basis of 
an arbitration agreement, especially under the lis pendens rule proposed here. Failure 
to use these may to an extent justify the enforceability of a judgment ultimately 
rendered in the dispute. 
(5) Treatment of set-aside judgments 
The proposal in this chapter makes clear how set-aside judgments should be treated 
under the Regulation, resolving this problem. 
(6) Award and judgment conflict problems 
This problem is an extension of the parallel proceedings problem, which is now 
effectively dealt with by the proposed lis pendens rule. Furthermore, the existence of 
a contradictory arbitral award would justify non-recognition and enforcement of a 
Regulation judgment in the event one was rendered. 
(7) Conclusion on identified problems 
The proposal in this thesis either solves or significantly ameliorates every one of the 
problems identified in Chapter 3. 
D. Relevant principles 
Chapters 5-7 of this thesis considered relevant principles in both the European law of 
jurisdiction and international commercial arbitration that should be borne in mind 
when considering the relationship between the Brussels Regime and arbitration. This 
section shall consider this proposal for its compatibility with each of these principles. 
Each of the two main recommendations of this proposal shall be considered in turn: 
first, the recommendation concerning jurisdiction and lis pendens, and secondly, the 




(1) Mutual trust 
Mutual trust was identified as a fundamental principle of the European law of 
jurisdiction, and indeed of the European Union more generally. In the European law 
of jurisdiction, it means that the courts of member states must respect one another’s 
ability to reach decisions as to their own jurisdiction and the result they ultimately 
reach.695 
The recommendation of this thesis concerning the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements is a lis pendens rule in favour of the courts of the seat of the arbitration or 
of the arbitral tribunal. It may be suggested that this is not the operation of mutual trust 
in its purest form, which is exhibited by the strict first-in-time lis pendens rule that is 
generally applied under the Brussels Regulation.696 Under that approach, every court 
blindly trusts every other court to reach an appropriate conclusion, to the extent that 
the rule may be criticised as a blunt instrument, albeit one that is probably necessary 
in the circumstances to ensure a reliable and predictable system, which will not be 
undermined by constant second-guessing. Nevertheless, this pure trust-based approach 
is not appropriate in all circumstances. Sometimes the operation of the general lis 
pendens rule is altered, for example where the parties have concluded a choice of court 
agreement or where a court’s exclusive jurisdiction is violated.697 Lis pendens in cases 
concerning an arbitration agreement is just such a case, in which the general trust-
based rule should be modified to take account of the circumstances. These altered lis 
pendens rules still promote a trust-based approach; simply one where trust must be 
placed in a specific court rather than any court. This is a more trust-based approach 
than the status quo, under which each country simply does as it pleases with respect to 
arbitration agreements, without any trust in one another’s approaches whatsoever. It is 
therefore submitted that the recommendation of this thesis concerning the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements respects and promotes mutual trust. 
As regards set aside and the enforcement of arbitral awards, the approach taken by the 
French courts in Putrabali self-evidently runs contrary to mutual trust. Indeed, the 
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French court refused to place any trust in the abilities of the English court to supervise 
arbitrations carried out within its jurisdiction. Leaving aside for the time being any 
discussion of the appropriate degree of judicial control of arbitration, it is clear that the 
recommendation in this thesis that set-aside decisions in one member state be 
recognised in every other member state promotes a far more trust-centric approach. It 
is therefore submitted that this proposal aligns far better with the fundamentally 
important principle of mutual trust than does the status quo. 
(2) Legal certainty and predictability 
It has been established that the promotion of legal certainty and predictability for 
litigants is a vitally important principle underlying the European law of jurisdiction. 
This is demonstrated especially by the Brussels Regulation’s strict approach to lis 
pendens and the emphasis it places on the elimination of parallel proceedings.698 
The recommendations of this thesis concerning the enforcement of arbitral agreements 
promote legal certainty and predictability by substantially reducing the possibility for 
parallel proceedings. The lis pendens rule proposed by this thesis has the express 
purpose of eliminating parallel proceedings so far as possible, minimising the attendant 
uncertainty for litigants. 
In turn, the proposal concerning set-aside is intended to promote legal certainty and 
predictability. It does so by reducing the possibility of multiple awards becoming 
enforceable in the same dispute, as in Putrabali. One of the main reasons for parallel 
proceedings’ being viewed as anathema within the Brussels Regime is the possibility 
of irreconcilable judgments being rendered in the same case, which in turn undermines 
legal certainty and predictability for litigants.699 It is submitted that the possibility of 
irreconcilable awards being rendered in the same dispute is equally offensive to legal 
certainty and predictability. To the extent that this proposal would eliminate this 
possibility, it must be said to promote legal certainty and predictability. Equally, by 
providing for the strengthened judicial control of the award by one forum, this proposal 
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promotes predictability as compared to the status quo, where a litigant may face 
repeated protracted battles against enforcement proceedings concerning an annulled 
award.  
It is therefore submitted that the adoption of this proposal would aid legal certainty 
and predictability. 
(3) Party autonomy 
Party autonomy is a fundamental principle upheld by both the Brussels Regulation and 
the New York Convention.700 It is therefore crucial that the proposal advanced in this 
thesis sufficiently respects party autonomy.  
It is submitted that the recommendation concerning jurisdiction supports party 
autonomy because it ensures effective enforcement of agreements, or, in other words, 
the parties’ exercise of their autonomy. This can be analogised with the effective 
protection for choice of court agreements that has been introduced in the Brussels I 
Recast by the reversal of Gasser, which, as argued above, can only be seen as a move 
designed to protect and support party autonomy.  
The provisions reversing the Court of Justice decision in Gasser create a new lis 
pendens rule that gives priority to the court designated in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement over the courts of any other member state court, in order to protect the 
parties’ exercise of autonomy in concluding a choice of court agreement from abusive 
tactical litigation.701 It is unclear why arbitration should warrant different treatment or 
any less protection.  
It is true that the reversal of Gasser was more urgent, the court having ruled in that 
case that the general lis pendens rule applied even where the parties had entered an 
exclusive choice of court agreement, meaning proceedings before the designated court 
could not continue when the courts of another member state were earlier seised. The 
effect was to give the tactical litigant a much-criticised ‘torpedo’ power in respect of 
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choice of court agreements;702 one which has definitely not existed in respect of 
arbitration since the Marc Rich decision. Nonetheless, as argued above, the decision 
to reverse Gasser and protect choice of court agreements reflects values that would 
urge equal protection of arbitration agreements, including most notably the promotion 
of party autonomy. Both choice of court agreements and arbitration agreements are 
exercises of parties’ well-established autonomy over their contractual relations and 
disputes. Therefore, the effective protection of arbitration agreements in this proposal 
is in itself a promotion of party autonomy. 
Regarding the recommendations for set aside, this proposal promotes party autonomy 
by vesting the strongest judicial control in the only forum that may be chosen by the 
parties: the seat of the arbitration. As argued above, the eventual enforcement forum 
does not necessarily have any greater connection to the dispute than the fact that a 
party has – perhaps coincidentally – assets located there.703 The exercise of party 
autonomy in choosing a seat for the arbitration creates a far stronger connecting factor 
for the exercise of judicial control. Indeed, by placing this power in the hands of the 
courts at the seat of the arbitration, these rules would encourage parties to exercise 
their autonomy to find an agreeable, supportive seat. 
It is therefore submitted that the proposal of this thesis supports party autonomy far 
better than the current Brussels Regulation. 
(4) Home-country control 
Home-country control – the idea that each member state retains broad discretion to 
enforce or refuse to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards – has been 
identified as a centrally-important principle of the New York Convention.704 It is 
therefore necessary to assess to what extent this principle would be affected by the 
proposal in this thesis. 
The recommendations in this thesis concerning jurisdiction over the enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement localise a significant part of that discretion at the seat of the 
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arbitration, limiting the extent to which any other EU member state retains any control 
over the arbitration agreement. This proposal therefore limits the absolute home-
country control allowed by the New York Convention, realigning the balance of power 
in favour of one particular country. It is submitted that this realignment is appropriate 
within the EU and does not overly undermine the principle of home-country control 
for the following reasons. 
Under the New York Convention regime, each country has broad discretion to enforce 
or to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement. Each of these possibilities shall be 
considered in turn. The possibility to enforce an arbitration agreement irrespective of 
the approach that will be taken at the seat may be appropriate outside an economic and 
political union such as the EU, but is manifestly inappropriate within its bounds. In the 
world at large, it may be argued that there is a compelling public policy in holding 
parties to their agreements; in saying that, for better or worse, the parties have excluded 
the jurisdiction of the courts and therefore one party will be unable to obtain relief 
from a court that would be contrary to its agreement.705 The same cannot be said within 
Europe. This is because, if one member state enforces an arbitration agreement and so 
declines jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation, when the courts at the seat of the 
arbitration will be unlikely to enforce that agreement, this could ultimately lead to a 
denial of access to justice. If the first member state is the only state with good 
jurisdiction under the Regulation, and the second member state refuses to allow the 
parties to arbitrate within its territory, the claimant could be left with no forum in which 
to pursue his claim. This is undesirable in the world at large, but especially so within 
a political union such as the EU, where access to effective justice underpins the 
common market and which has the possibility to rectify the situation. The court of the 
first member state has no real incentive to pursue this course of action other than to 
stand by a point of principle, while the EU, on the other hand, has a clear interest in 
ensuring access to justice for its litigants.  
It is manifestly more appropriate, therefore, that a consistent approach be reached to 
arbitration agreements within the EU. It is submitted that the approach should be that 
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of the seat of the arbitration. As stated above, the justification for a country other than 
the seat to enforce an arbitration agreement not viewed as valid at the seat is essentially 
a point of principle. The seat, on the other hand, is the more appropriate forum to make 
the determination. First, it is determined by the agreement of the parties, which is a 
very strong connecting factor to the dispute. Second, if territorialist theory is broadly 
correct, and this thesis maintains that it is, the seat has a direct interest and 
responsibility to regulate arbitration conducted within its boundaries. These factors 
render the seat of the arbitration the more appropriate forum to determine the validity 
of the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, this approach avoids the possibility of a 
stalemate developing. It is therefore submitted that, although this proposal reduces the 
level of discretion of countries to enforce arbitration agreements, it does so in a way 
that is wholly appropriate, especially because it promotes access to justice and aligns 
with other relevant principles such as legal certainty and party autonomy. 
On the other hand, this proposal also reduces the discretion of member states other 
than the seat to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement. This was an important 
element of the New York Convention’s commitment to respecting state sovereignty. 
It is submitted that the arguments above relating to the appropriate forum for deciding 
on the validity of the arbitration agreement apply equally to this question. Furthermore, 
the very state sovereignty that is being protected has, in international private law 
matters, been conferred on the EU, which may impose new policies in its 
implementation, such as the promotion of arbitration. Finally, the discretion of the anti-
arbitration state to refuse enforcement will be retained to a large extent at the award 
enforcement stage, discussed below. For all these reasons, it is submitted that the 
restriction of home-country control in respect of the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements is appropriate. 
With regard to the enforcement of awards, this proposal limits discretion to enforce 
annulled awards by requiring set-aside judgments of other member states to be 
recognised across the EU. Discretion to refuse to enforce an award remains unaffected. 
As argued above, the seat of the arbitration is the best venue for effective judicial 
control of arbitration proceedings and arbitral awards. Furthermore, the requirement 




grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of a judgment under the Brussels 
Regime is met, such as public policy, the set-aside judgment may be refused 
recognition. 
At any rate, leaving aside the French approach, discussed in detail above, the broad 
international practice seems to be to give deference to foreign set-aside decisions. This 
is true especially when that set-aside is based on New York Convention Art V (1) (a)-
(d) grounds, unless there is some obvious flaw in the set-aside judgment, such as 
corruption.706 The New York Convention does not specify on what grounds an award 
may be set aside, and mutual trust between EU member states precludes the 
examination by one member state court of the substance of judgments rendered by 
another.707 Indeed, with many courts only ignoring set-aside judgments where that 
judgment is flawed due to corruption or fraud, and given EU member states implicitly 
trust one another’s judgments to be free from such contamination, one might 
reasonably ask on what basis the set-aside judgment of another member state court 
should ever be ignored. Indeed, it has even been suggested in scholarship that the 
recognition of set-aside judgments is effectively a matter of comity,708 which should 
automatically be accorded by member states to judgments rendered in other member 
states as a matter of mutual trust.709 It is therefore submitted that it is quite in line with 
international practice relating to set-aside to require the set-aside judgment to be 
recognised within the EU, where mutual trust eliminates the possibility that the 
judgment could be considered tainted. As argued above, nothing prevents the member 
states from making further agreements amongst themselves as to appropriate grounds 
for set aside.710  
In conclusion, although the proposal in this thesis undermines home-country control, 
it does so in a fashion that promotes other key principles, is manifestly appropriate 
within a supranational political union such as the EU, and aligns with prevailing 
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international practice. The proposal should therefore not be considered to be an 
unreasonable encroachment on the principle of home-country control. 
(5) Maximising enforceability 
The principle known as favor arbitrandum – that arbitral awards and agreements 
should be enforced to the extent possible – has been identified as an important tenet of 
the New York Convention.711 This proposal does not promote enforcement of 
agreements and awards in all situations, and the reasons for this shall now be 
examined. 
As regards the enforcement of arbitration agreements, the recommendations in this 
proposal may at times reduce enforceability in a theoretical sense, because arbitration 
agreements viewed as unenforceable at the seat of the arbitration will not be capable 
of being enforced elsewhere. On the other hand, a second member state court will be 
incapable of taking jurisdiction in spite of an arbitration agreement considered valid at 
the seat of the arbitration. To this extent, the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
is improved by this proposal. Furthermore, it is submitted that the increase in 
enforceability is of far greater practical significance than the corresponding decrease 
in enforceability. This is because, when the seat views the agreement as enforceable, 
parallel proceedings will be eliminated as a possibility, which reduces delay and 
expense, in turn decreasing the likelihood that the parties will settle, and thus ensuring 
the arbitration agreement is effectively enforced.712 In contrast, when the arbitration 
agreement is viewed as unenforceable at the seat, the enforcement of that agreement 
by another member state court – i.e. declining jurisdiction – is of relatively little 
practical benefit. An arbitration is extremely unlikely to proceed in spite of the 
objection of the courts of the seat. It is submitted that the latter form of enforceability 
is no great loss, while the former form of enforceability is a significant gain for the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in practical terms. This proposal therefore, on 
the whole, improves the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 
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The enforcement of arbitral awards will be reduced to the extent that an award that has 
been set aside in one member state will not be enforceable in any other member state 
under normal circumstances. Again, the impact of this change is blunted by the fact 
that it is only France that routinely enforces awards that have been set-aside in 
circumstances other than those such as corruption, which should not arise within the 
EU. It is submitted that this minor change is justifiable, even if it runs against the pure, 
theoretical favor arbitrandum principle, because on a holistic view, these 
recommendations should help arbitration be a more efficient, effective, attractive 
process.  
Furthermore, in commercial matters, the Brussels Regime has moved Europe steadily 
closer to becoming a judicial common market, especially in enforcement terms. Under 
such circumstances there is a very valid argument not to re-litigate set-aside orders 
based on flaws in the arbitral procedure (i.e. based on the grounds listed in New York 
Convention Art V (1) (a)-(d)).713 The question is: why not all bases of set-aside? The 
New York Convention does not specify on what grounds an award may be set aside, 
and mutual trust between EU member states tends to preclude the examination by one 
member state court of the motivation or substance of judgments rendered by another. 
As argued above, there is also no room for member state courts to second guess one 
another’s judgments on the basis that the judgment may in some way be tainted, which 
is a common ground for courts to ignore other courts’ set-aside judgments. 
Furthermore, the New York Convention clearly allocates a special supervisory 
jurisdiction to the courts at the seat of the arbitration,714 which are the only courts 
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competent to set aside an award.715 What should give any EU member state the right 
to second-guess any other’s decision under that jurisdiction? 
Finally, the New York Convention sanctions non-recognition of an arbitral award 
which has been set aside where rendered. Art V (1) (e) provides that, in such 
circumstances, ‘enforcement of the award may be refused’.716 Indeed, as discussed 
above, such eminent scholars in the field as Sanders and van den Berg would argue 
that Art V (1) (e) requires non-recognition and enforcement.717 In any event, in 
undertaking to recognise unconditionally one another’s set-aside judgments, the EU 
member states would simply be agreeing to exercise their discretion to refuse 
enforcement of awards in a particular manner. This approach is therefore manifestly 
consistent with the language of the New York Convention, notwithstanding the latter’s 
promotion of the enforceability of awards. 
It is therefore submitted that this scheme of inclusion of arbitration in the Brussels I 
Regulation does not run contrary to the principle of maximising the enforceability of 
arbitral awards under the New York Convention. Rather, it merely rearranges the 
system of enforcement within Europe, making that system more appropriate to its 
context. 
(6) The role of the seat 
The seat of the arbitration was identified as playing a crucial role in arbitration 
proceedings under the New York Convention.718 This has been a major contributing 
factor in the decision to increase the importance of the role of the seat in this proposals. 
The importance of the role of the seat of the arbitration in this proposal is obvious and 
does not require detailed discussion. It is, however, submitted that the fact that the seat 
plays an important role in the New York Convention regime helps justify the decision 
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to enhance the importance of the seat of the arbitration within the Brussels Regulation, 
keeping it broadly in-line with New York Convention principles. 
(7) Harmonisation and autonomous interpretation 
An important goal of the New York Convention was to bring a degree of harmonisation 
to the approach to arbitration amongst the contracting states.719 Of perhaps more 
significance, however, is the extent to which the New York Convention has 
encouraged harmonisation on a far wider scale, by serving as the basis for further bi- 
and multi-lateral treaties, national arbitration statutes, and court decisions.720 The 
positive effects of a harmonious, consistent approach to arbitration agreements and 
awards also underlie van den Berg’s seminal commentary calling for an autonomous 
interpretation of the New York Convention.721 
Overlapping bilateral and regional agreements are obviously contemplated as an 
expected and welcome development by the New York Convention, as evinced by Art 
VII (1). This provides that the New York Convention shall not deprive parties of their 
rights under such instruments to avail themselves of arbitral awards and by extension, 
as discussed above, arbitration agreements. This highlights an important weakness in 
the arguments that incorporation of arbitration in the Brussels I Regulation would 
encroach on the territory of the New York Convention: that the New York Convention 
itself encourages such encroachment, to the extent that it improves enforceability. The 
notion of improving enforceability has already been considered above, but, its having 
been established that regional agreements are not contrary to the New York 
Convention, let it next be considered what benefits these agreements can offer. 
Common jurisdictional rules concerning the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
and the recognition of set-aside judgments within Europe would provide far greater 
harmony on a European level. They provide a clearer and more stable system for 
enforcement of arbitral awards within the world’s largest single market. A well thought 
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out scheme of inclusion therefore serves the New York Convention’s principle of 
harmonisation well, by bringing harmony where once discord reigned. 
It is further submitted that inclusion of arbitration in the Brussels I Regulation would 
neither harm nor hinder the quest for an autonomous approach to the New York 
Convention. The approach would simply see the interpretation reached by national 
courts in one member state given broader recognition in others; it would not 
recommend a particular interpretative approach. It is therefore submitted that inclusion 
of arbitration in the Brussels I Regulation would harmonise on a regional level, whilst 
not affecting the quest for an autonomous interpretation. 
E. Addressing possible objections 
Some potential objections to this proposal may be anticipated, including that it is 
incompatible with strong delocalisation theory, that the EU may lack legislative 
competence for the reforms, and that the proposal may stifle arbitral competition. Each 
of these potential criticisms shall be addressed in turn.  
(1) Delocalisation 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this proposal may be criticised for not 
conforming with strong delocalisation theory: in other words, the concept that 
arbitration agreements and awards exist in a transnational legal order, independent of 
the municipal law of any one state.722 It does so because it clearly localises the 
arbitration at the seat, if a seat can be identified. This in turn has the effect that set-
aside judgments rendered by one member state must be recognised in all others, vastly 
reducing the possibility that an annulled award might be enforced. 
It has been argued at length above that this is an appropriate approach within Europe, 
with only the current French approach really standing to be changed. But there is a 
broader theoretical question that should be addressed: is this departure from 
delocalisation justifiable, or should the principles mentioned above yield to 
                                                 





delocalisation? Is delocalisation the way of the future, and any rules that stand in its 
way a bar to progress? 
The last chapter offered a critique of ‘strong delocalisation’ theory, arguing that, 
disparately applied, it leads to undesirable consequences and is not, contrary to what 
its proponents would suggest, arbitration friendly at all. If, one day, delocalisation can 
be achieved by agreement on a truly global scale, it may prove to be a positive 
development for international arbitration. But, as has been argued above, that day 
remains far away. 
But if this thesis concedes that strong delocalisation has the potential to be a force for 
positive change, surely this proposal to localise arbitral awards is regressive and a 
backward step? It is submitted that it is not so for two main reasons. First, as has been 
argued above, we live in a world where the broadly territorialist conception of 
arbitration dominates. Weak delocalisation is prevalent, but is a theory conceptually 
rooted in territoriality. It is therefore manifestly appropriate to propose a system of 
regulation for the world we live in, not the world we wish we lived in. Second, and 
crucially, nothing in this proposal stands in the way of progress for strong 
delocalisation. It has already been argued that nothing prevents agreement being 
reached between member states to limit the substantive grounds for set aside of an 
arbitral award. And if wider delocalisation is agreed on a global scale, with the creation 
of an ICSID-style supranational body to regulate international arbitration, this proposal 
would not obstruct that process either; set-aside court actions would simply become 
irrelevant because of other, external treaty obligations. This proposal would thus 
become irrelevant, but would not and could not stand in the way of progress. 
It is therefore submitted that this proposal cannot face major objection on the basis that 
they do not conform with delocalisation theory, because territorialist theory remains 
predominantly applicable, and because the proposal presented here does not stand in 




(2) Legislative competence 
Questions may be raised as to the internal and external competence of the EU in 
matters relating to arbitration.723 Specifically, it has been suggested that the Brussels I 
Regulation may be used to bring arbitration into the EU’s sphere of competence by the 
back door.724 This concern was more relevant to the Commission’s original sweeping 
proposal for reform, which went beyond the simple regulation of jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, with wider implications for substantive 
rules such as, inter alia, competence-competence.725 This concern is of less relevance 
for the proposal in this thesis, which confines itself to jurisdiction in court proceedings 
relating to arbitration, for which competence can clearly be found in Art 81 TEU.726 
In other areas where this proposal must use definitions, such as of the seat of 
arbitration, every effort has been made to keep to general, uncontroversial rules based 
in the New York Convention, to which all EU member states are party.  
Any residual legislative competence arguments can be analogised with, for example, 
contract law. The Brussels I Regulation provides jurisdictional rules for contracts, and, 
in so doing, has to provide for some definitions, such as the principal obligations in 
certain types of contracts.727 No one could seriously argue that this could be used to 
bring contract law within the competence of the EU; likewise, similar rules would not 
do so for arbitration. It is therefore submitted that this proposal raises no concerns 
about legislative competence.  
(3) Arbitral competition 
It has been suggested that some proposals for reform of the Brussels I Regulation could 
stifle the ‘healthy competition’ between member states for arbitration business.728 This 
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is a fair criticism of proposals that would, for example, harmonise the definition of an 
arbitration agreement across the member states.729  
This proposal does not raise such concerns because, by placing importance on the role 
of the seat of the arbitration, competition between possible arbitral seats is encouraged. 
The parties’ incentive to choose a seat with a pro-arbitration law and court system is 
increased, because the seat’s rules will have broader effect. This proposal therefore 
cannot be criticised for stifling arbitral competition.  
F. Appropriateness in a non-European context 
In the early days of this project, it was intended that the recommendations here could 
be relatively easily transported in substantially similar form to a convention similar to 
the Brussels Regulation on a global scale. As research for the project progressed, it 
became clear that such a recommendation could not be supported. 
This is clearly reflected in the Europe-centric nature of the thesis, which has barely 
mentioned the world beyond the European example since the second chapter. The 
reason for this should be clear to any reader: the recommendations of this thesis find 
their strongest support in the principles that underpin the European law of jurisdiction 
and the ongoing project of European unification more generally. Mutual trust, the 
promotion of legal certainty for businesspeople and other litigants in the EU, and 
support for party autonomy all speak strongly for the proposal in this thesis. And whilst 
it is uncontroversial to say that in the world at large legal certainty and support for 
party autonomy are desirable, it is also absolutely clear that mutual trust simply does 
not exist, and is not likely to materialise any time soon. 
That said, the recommendation for a lis pendens rule in favour of arbitration is 
perfectly capable of being transposed to a global instrument without causing too much 
controversy. That rule has a pro-arbitration bias that could perhaps be replicated in the 
world at large, albeit lack of mutual trust may undermine its operation. On the other 
hand, the rules of this proposal on set aside could not possibly work in a world in which 
some courts believe the judgments of the courts of other countries can be obtained 
                                                 




through corruption or with procedural deficiencies. Mutual trust is an absolutely 
fundamental prerequisite of this rule. 
For these reasons, this thesis does not propose this scheme of inclusion of arbitration 
in jurisdiction conventions in the world beyond Europe. 
G. Summary of proposal 
It is therefore concluded that the proposal in this chapter can solve or ameliorate the 
majority of the problems outlined in Chapter 3 of this thesis, whilst broadly aligning 
with the key principles of the European law of jurisdiction and international 
commercial arbitration more generally, as outlined in Chapters 5 to 7. The proposal 
cannot be extended beyond Europe in their current form because it is underpinned by 






This central conclusion of this thesis is that arbitration could and should be included 
in the Brussels Regime. This argument has been laid out as follows. 
Chapter 2 examined the reasons for the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Convention, which has served as a model for the later Brussels Regulations, and the 
Draft Hague Convention 2000. It concluded that the reason for the exclusion was the 
number of other conventions that dealt with arbitration, and specifically the New York 
Convention and, in the case of the Brussels Convention, the European Uniform Law 
Convention. In the modern world, only the New York Convention remains directly 
relevant. It was then argued that the New York Convention could not justify the 
exclusion of arbitration from jurisdictional instruments because there is at most a tiny 
area of substantive overlap between an international arbitration convention on the one 
hand and an instrument dealing with court jurisdiction on the other. It then examined 
the other exclusions from the Brussels Convention, discovering that each of these had 
been subject to separate, bespoke regulation at a European level. A separate 
instrument, however, is not required for the creation of bespoke jurisdictional rules. It 
was therefore concluded that the justification for exclusion of arbitration from 
jurisdiction instruments in the first place is weak. 
Chapter 3 then investigated whether the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels 
Regime has caused, exacerbated, or simply left unaddressed any problems, there being 
no pressing reason to correct an unjustified exclusion that does not give rise to any 
problems in practice. The chapter first set out the scope that has been given to the 
exclusion through the case law of the Court of Justice. It then went on to consider, in 
light of this scope, what issues arise at the interface between the Brussels Regime and 
arbitration. It identified the uncertainty as to the scope of the exclusion, the availability 
of parallel proceedings, the ineffectiveness of declaratory judgments, the treatment of 
judgments rendered in spite of an arbitration agreement, the treatment of set-aside 
judgments, and the potential for an award-judgment conflict as the main problems. 
These problems may mostly exist in the world at large, but are exacerbated within 




York Convention for arbitral tribunals and awards and the Brussels Regime for court 
proceedings and judgments. 
Chapter 4 addressed the process of recasting the Brussels I Regulation. It first 
introduced the procedure for the recasting, followed by the various ideas that had been 
proposed to address (or not) some of the problems identified in the previous chapter 
and in wider scholarship. This chapter then analysed the changes made by the Brussels 
I Recast itself, concluding that they are minor and are likely to be inconsequential. 
This chapter specifically rejected the notion that the Recast has reinstated the anti-suit 
injunction. It concluded that the Recast approach can be criticised for failing to solve 
or significantly improve any of the problems identified in the previous chapter, likely 
because of time pressure, different priorities, and the difficulty in reaching a proposal 
for reform acceptable to the various member states. 
It having been established that reform of the Brussels Regime’s relationship with 
arbitration is justified and necessary, this thesis then turned to address the legal context 
in which that reform would be proposed. This is seen as necessary to ensure the 
proposed system of rules broadly accords with theory and practice in both the 
European law of jurisdiction and the world of international commercial arbitration. 
Chapter 5 introduced the principles that have taken on significant importance in the 
European law of jurisdiction. These include, mutual trust, the promotion of legal 
certainty and predictability, and upholding party autonomy. Mutual trust in particular 
can be seen as a fundamentally important principle of the European law of jurisdiction 
and the law of the European Union more generally; it is what makes Europe different, 
and without it, the common market would grind to a halt. It is therefore given special 
emphasis in this thesis. 
Chapter 6 identified the crucial principles underlying the quasi-constitutional New 
York Convention. This chapter drew on a sizeable literature to identify home-country 
control, maximising the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards, party 
autonomy, the special role of the seat of the arbitration, harmonisation of arbitration 
law internationally, and maintaining fairness and due process as key principles. These 




of the principle of maintaining due process, which has been left out as irrelevant to the 
scope of enquiry of this thesis.  
Finally in terms of principles, Chapter 7 considered the ongoing delocalisation debate. 
This is because delocalisation theory, in its challenge to the traditional territorialist 
narrative, would stand opposed to some of the proposals advanced in this thesis. By 
contrast, territorialist theory would support them, and pluralist theory, which is in no 
way normative, would neither support nor challenge these proposals. This chapter 
concludes that delocalisation theory does not apply in the world beyond France, and 
even there could be considered just a particular application of territorial authority. 
Delocalisation achieved internationally through an ICSID-style commercial arbitration 
convention could potentially work, but is not a realistic likelihood in the near future, 
and at any rate would not face any obstacle in the form of the propositions in this thesis 
if it were to develop. 
Chapter 8 tied together the various strands of this thesis into a proposal for reform. 
This proposal included recommendations for the partial inclusion of arbitration in the 
Brussels Regulation. It recommended giving exclusive jurisdiction over the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement in an arbitration that has already been 
commenced to the courts at the seat of that arbitration. It further recommended to give 
exclusive jurisdiction over set-aside actions to the courts at the seat of an arbitration. 
Finally, it recommended the inclusion of the existence of any arbitral award between 
the same parties in the same dispute as a ground for non-recognition and enforcement 
of a Regulation judgment. It was argued that adoption of these recommendations 
would significantly improve upon the problems identified at the interface between the 
Regulation and arbitration. This argument was supported with reference to certain 
foreseeable scenarios, as well as with reference to the problems identified in Chapter 
3 of this thesis, each of which the proposal would solve or at least ameliorate. 
Furthermore, the proposal broadly accords with the guiding principles identified in 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis. It is therefore submitted that this proposal would make 
a significant improvement on the status quo. 
This thesis as a whole is intended to provide a contribution to knowledge, thereby 




the holistic approach to the question of the appropriate relationship between 
jurisdiction conventions and arbitration, bringing together the strands of modern 
thought in European international private law, international commercial arbitration, 
and the practical experience of the European Union with the arbitration exclusion.  
Original insights are also contained in various chapters of this thesis. These include 
Chapter 2’s detailed analysis of the history of the arbitration exclusion from the 
Brussels Regime and Hague instruments; the identification of mutual trust as a 
fundamentally important tenet of European international private law and European 
Union law more generally in Chapter 5; Chapter 7’s engagement with the ongoing 
delocalisation debate in the context of this topic; Chapter 8’s proposal and justification 
of a novel scheme of inclusion of court proceedings related to arbitration in jurisdiction 
conventions; and the thesis’s outward-looking approach to lessons for global 
jurisdiction conventions arising from the European example. 
